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THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS IN THE FORMATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF HABITAT CONSERVATION POLICY:
THE WILDLIFE AND COUNTRYSIDE ACT 1981 - SUMMARY
KATHRYN VICTORIA LAST
The aim of the thesis is to ascertain the determinants involved in the introduction
of the 'voluntary system' for the protection of habitats in the Wildlife &
Countryside Act 1981 in order to explain its existence and form and also its
effectiveness.
The identification of the determinants involves consideration of a number of
hypotheses. A positive proof shows why the voluntary approach was chosen. A
negative proof shows why the alternatives of using criminal sanctions or planning
control were not chosen. Hypothesis 1 is that the system adopted for species
protection had proved inefficacious and thus criminal sanctions were regarded as
inappropriate for protecting habitats. This hypothesis is disproved. Hypothesis 2 is
that the purpose of the legislation was a determinant. The thesis will show that
there is no positive proof of this hypothesis although there is the possibility of a
negative proof. Hypothesis 3 is that pressure group activity in the pre-
parliamentary stages of its enactment was a determinant. This shows a possible
positive proof. Hypothesis 4 is that the influence of pressure groups and
Parliament was a determinant during the parliamentary stages of its enactment.
xvi
This hypothesis is disproved. Hypothesis 5 is that Thatcherite policy was a
determinant. This shows a negative proof. Hypothesis 6 is that trends in
governmental implementation mechanisms were a determinant in the adoption of
the voluntary approach. This shows both positive and negative proofs.
The determinants in the formation of the system are then reconsidered in the
context of the impact of the system The purpose of the system is then reconsidered
to evaluate the efficacy of the system. This evaluation indicates the predicted
defects of the system that have materialised. The results are then considered in
relation to the implementation of the Habitats Directive. Criteria for reform of the
system are then proposed.
xvii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1) RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The thesis will provide an explanation for why the so-called 'voluntary system'
was introduced for the protection of habitats and how it is working. This
voluntary system has been the subject of much criticism, both during and since its
enactment in the Wildlife And Countryside Act 1981 (WACA). The research
question is why, in the face of heavy opposition and obvious deficiencies, the
government introduced this system. The answer to this is not purely of academic
interest, although the WACA is 15 years old, because the government has
continued to utilise the voluntary approach in the implementation of the EC
Directive on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora
92/43/EEC, hereafter referred to as the Habitats Directive.
The aim of the thesis is to ascertain the determinants involved in the introduction
of the voluntary system in order to explain its existence, form and effectiveness.
It might seem that an appreciation of the effectiveness of the system should be the
most important element of such a study; indeed the majority of writing on the
subject has concentrated on this aspect. However, such an assessment is
methodologically flawed without an understanding of the origin of that system.
As McManus (1978:185) points out, "To take legislation as a starting point, as the
object of our research, and to remove it from the context within which it was the
1
chosen vehicle for the implementation of policy, may ignore factors crucial to the
assessment of its impact". This has also been recognised by Renner (1949:54),
who commented that "we can only develop a complete theory of the law if we
supplement positive legal analysis by an investigation of the two adjoining
provinces, the origin and the social functions of the law". An understanding of the
origin of the legislation and its intended purpose provide a benchmark by which to
evaluate the system and formulate criteria for its reform. The thesis will therefore
propose reforms that take account of the determinants in the operation of the
system and the purpose of the protection.
A number of writers (Adams,1984, Lowe et a1,1986, Rowel1,1992) have
conducted evaluations of the voluntary system and proposed reforms. These are
the source of much of the criticism discussed in chapters 2 and 9. However, these
evaluations have been carried out without reference to the purpose of the
legislation or the determinants of its introduction and operation. This thesis will
show that an understanding of this purpose and these determinants is fundamental
to an understanding of the operation of the system. Possible determinants in the
introduction of the system have been discussed in the literature. The predominant
proposals have been that it is a product of Thatcherite policy or of the corporatist
relationship between the National Farmers Union (NFU) and the state. However,
this thesis will show that there is no theoretical justification for the argument that
Thatcherism is a determinant. It will also show that concentration on the NFU's
corporate status is too simplistic an approach. According to Allen (1964:433),
"the elements which contribute to the framing of much modern legislation are
numerous and diverse". It will be argued that a number of determinants have
2
interacted to bring about the adoption of the voluntary system. There are also a
number of proposals for reform of the system, but as these are often based on
methodologically unsound evaluations, they have proved unrealistic when
considered in the light of a comprehensive evaluation of the system
2) TERMINOLOGY
Until 1991 responsibility for nature conservation in Great Britain rested with the
Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) 1 . This was established under the Nature
Conservancy Council Act 1973. The NCC advised the Government on all aspects
of nature conservation. They promoted conservation directly and through the
provision of advice and information on nature conservation.
The Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990, section 128, established three
separate national bodies to take over the responsibilities of the NCC. These were
the Nature Conservancy Council for England known as English Nature (EN), the
Nature Conservancy Council for Scotland and the Countryside Council for Wales
(CCW). In Wales the functions of the Countryside Commission (CC) have been
combined with the NCC. In Scotland the Natural Heritage (Scotland) Act 1991
merged the Nature Conservancy Council for Scotland with the Countryside
Commission for Scotland to form Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH). A Joint
Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) was established under section 128(4),
1 For a discussion of the history of the NCC see Blackmore (1974).
3
EPA 1990. It is funded by the three country agencies and is responsible for
undertaking special functions on behalf of the three Councils2.
Because of the nature of the study, it concerns events both before and after the
changes to the NCC. To avoid having to use all of these names and to provide
consistency, throughout the thesis reference will be made to the Nature
Conservancy (NC) rather than NCC, EN, SNH or CCW except where they are
specifically referred to in quotation.
3) RESEARCH AREA
The voluntary system for the protection of habitats3 is based on the designation of
areas as a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). There are many other types of
designation aimed at nature conservation which are discussed in chapter 2.
However, as they are all based on the SSSI designation this thesis will concentrate
on this particular area as it is the foundation for protection.
Designation as an SSSI of itself provides little protection. It is merely a procedure
for initiating negotiations with the landowner so that a management agreement can
be concluded. Brotherton (1989) refers to this as a system of enforced delay.
Management agreements provide for the payment of compensation to landowners
2 For a full description of their constitution and responsibilities see Ball (1991).
3 A detailed explanation of this system is given in chapter 2. The explanation is of the English
system of protection. The system is Scotland is essentially the same.
4
who abstain from damaging activities on a site. It is known as the voluntary
system because there is no compulsion upon landowners to enter into these
agreements and, if they decline to do so, after a short delay they are free to
damage the site, unless a Nature Conservation Order (NCO) is made. The NCO is
effectively just a SSSI with a longer negotiating period and is not available for all
sites. The protection of habitats is, therefore, purely dependent upon the voluntary
co-operation of landowners4. This voluntary system shows a different approach to
the system of protection for species, which involves the imposition of criminal
sanctions for actions such as injuring or killing certain species.
4) THEORETICAL CONTEXT
The thesis presupposes a conceptual framework based on the classification of
government policy implementation mechanisms as four generic types. This is
necessary because, when ascertaining the determinants in the introduction of the
provisions for the protection of habitats in the WACA, it is important to remember
that such legislation is the result of a process of which it is in no sense an
inevitable or the only potential result. The government has a wide range of tools
from which to choose. As Daintith (1989:193) points out, "the imposition of legal
controls is only one of several ways in which the government tries to secure
compliance with its policies".
4 Although Brotherton (1989) argues that it is not strictly a voluntary approach, the term is in
common usage and as will be seen in chapter 9 any controls that exist which may indicate a non-
voluntary system are rarely, if ever, used.
5
This wide range of tools makes the understanding of the determinants of the
adoption of a voluntary system fundamental to an evaluation of its efficacy and
thus its appropriateness. This is because, according to Hood (1983:132), "most of
the time, in seeing a choice of instruments by government as inept or inspired, we
judge case by case, ex post, on the basis of common sense ... but there is no
elaborate science in this ... context is everything".
Therefore, in evaluating the impact of the system it is first necessary to understand
the reasons for its implementation. To do this we must first understand what
alternatives were available to government to implement its policies. These policy
implementation mechanisms are what government can do about problems once it
knows about them. These can take a number of forms and there are four basic
resources available to government that can be used alone or in combination5.
AUTHORITY - This involves the possession of power (legal or official).
Government can demand, forbid, guarantee or adjudicate. It is the traditional
defining property of government and "gives the government the ability to
determine in a legal or official sense, using tokens of official authority as the coin,
and subject to a limit of legal standing" (Hood 1983:6). This strategy requires
people to adopt new behaviour under threat of penalties (Balch,1980).
5 These tools are not unique to government: "government's attempts to make an impact on the
world outside do not, much of the time, differ from those of other organisations in terms of basic
tools of the trade" (Hood 1983:121).
6
TREASURE - This involves the possession of money or goods with the capacity
for free exchange. It is sometimes referred to as cheque book government or
incentives (Balch, 1980).
NODALITY - This "denotes the property of being in the middle of an information
or social network" (Hood,1983:4) for example as a figurehead or, in an informal
sense, building up a store of information not available to others. The resultant
capability is the traffic in information founded on figureheadness or having the
whole picture. According to Balch (1980) this is a strategy used when people
wish to adopt the new behaviour.
ORGANISATION - This is based on the possession of a stock of people, land,
buildings, materials and equipment, somehow arranged. It provides the
government with the ability to act directly using its own forces and affect the
physical environment. This is sometimes referred to as facilitation (Balch,1980)
The habitat protection system in the WACA involves a mixture of these
approaches. The management agreement is an example of the use of treasure.
The reciprocal notification6 requirement is an example of authority. The code of
conduct in section 33 represents the use of nodality. Examples of the use of
organisation include the ability of the NC to conclude management agreements
and to undertake restoration of damaged sites7.
6 The requirement that an owner or occupier notifies the NC before carrying out a prescribed
operation. A failure to notify is an offence under Section 28(5).
7 This is only available for sites subject to a section 29 NCO.
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Such a mixture is not unusual. The tools are generic types, having a long ancestry
and innovation is through the use of different mixtures applied in different
situations and new contexts. "Government in practice always involves some
mixture of the whole gamut of tools.. .there may be single tool agencies, but there
is no such thing as single tool government" (Hood 1983:154). On the basis of this
classification of policy implementation mechanisms, a number of alternatives
were available to the government to protect habitats. An infinite number of
combinations is possible. However, the most important choice relates to the
dominant tool.
According to Ball (1990:74) "site protection may broadly be furthered by four
legal devices - legal restrictions, backed up by criminal sanctions; purchase and
management of the site; voluntary protection by the occupier, usually
compensated or encouraged by other incentives; and taking the interest of the site
into account in public decisions". These proposed methods relate respectively to
the use of authority, organisation and treasure. The final method is indirect and
the closest category is nodality. However, it doesn't strictly relate to one of these
tools as they do not focus solely on legal methods.
Of the four types of tool, nodality is generally the least often used in a formal
manner. Protection of habitats based on the use of nodality would involve
information and education on means of protection. This is available through the
Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG) and the code of conduct produced
under section 33 of the WACA. It has never been proposed as an exclusive
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measure for the protection of sites although the NCC has proposed its use for the
wider countryside (NCC,1989:8)8.
Control based primarily upon the use of organisation would involve something
like the purchase and management of all sites by the NC. This takes place to a
limited degree but it is currently restricted to National Nature Reserves. The
resource implications of such an approach are obvious9.
The system introduced in the WACA is based primarily on the use of treasure.
This involves positive grants for conservation work and compensation under
management agreements for not undertaking certain operations. This
encompasses the options available when using treasure.
The use of authority to protect habitats is the most often cited alternative to the
approach chosen. It represents the traditional approach of the legislature to policy
problems. This could take two possible forms. The first is an approach based on
the use of criminal sanctions such as that adopted for species protection and Tree
Preservation Orders. The second approach is the use of regulatory mechanisms
under the land use planning system such as those adopted for the protection of
listed buildings. Both possibilities were often cited in parliamentary debates on
the WACA.
8 It was also viewed by the Victorian preservationists as the only long term method of protection.
For more details see Chapter 4.
9 In fact the NC has been put under pressure "to sell off as many owned NNRs as possible, in
accordance with government dogma on privatisation" (Ratcliffe, 1989:15).
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5) METHODOLOGY
A consideration of why the voluntary system was introduced involves the
identification of the determinants of the decision to adopt the voluntary approach.
According to Rose (1982:22), "a law normally reflects specific circumstances of a
given time and place. The remedies it proposes will have some generality, but the
diagnosis of the problem, and the prescription for resolving it, are rooted in a
particular conjunction of political and social circumstances". The methodological
approach adopted to identify these circumstances, and thus the determinants, does
not involve the presumption of a 'correct' hypothesis of what these determinants
are. The study involves a systematic consideration of a number of hypotheses to
ascertain which of these are likely to have been of influence.
Each hypothesis will be tested to ascertain whether it was a determinant in the
introduction of the voluntary approach. This testing takes a number of forms.
Firstly it will be considered whether the hypothesis can be proved theoretically. If
so, it will be considered whether this is proved in practice. This is achieved by
considering the historical events, interviews with members of the conservation
bodies and pressure groups, and reading the archives of pressure groups and
Hansard reports.
There are both positive and negative proofs involved in this hypothesis testing.
The most important, the positive one, is why the voluntary approach was chosen.
The negative to this is why the often proposed alternative of using authority was
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not chosen. This might seem tautologous. However, as will be seen, some
hypotheses display only one proof and not both.
HYPOTHESIS I - Hypothesis 1 arises because of the disparity between the
approach adopted under the habitat protection system and that under the species
protection system. The hypothesis is that the system adopted for species
protection had proved inefficacious and was thus regarded as inappropriate for
protecting habitats. If this hypothesis is answered affirmatively, only a negative
proofio is made. If it is answered negatively, neither the positive nor the negative
proofs are made.
HYPOTHESIS 2 - This hypothesis is that the purpose of the legislation, the
function that it was intended to perform, determined the choice of approach. If
this is affirmed, the positive proof and negative proofs will be made. This may
seem to be an obvious determinant. However, this thesis will prove that this is
one of the least plausible hypotheses and thus there is no positive proof. A
comparison will be made with the purposes of the species protection system to
ascertain whether the hypothesis provides a negative proof.
HYPOTHESIS 3 - This hypothesis concerns the assertion made by writers such as
Cox & Lowe (1986a) and Grant (1983) that the corporate status" of the NFU was
a determinant in the choice of the voluntary approach. However, rather than
10 As it relates to criminal sanctions.
11 This term is explained in chapter 5.
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restricting the hypothesis purely to the influence of the NFU, hypothesis 3 is that
pressure groups were a determinant in the choice of the voluntary approach in the
pre-parliamentary stages of the enactment of the WACA. This hypothesis is
capable of both positive and negative proofs.
HYPOTHESIS 4 - This hypothesis is that the influence of pressure groups and
Parliament was a determinant during the parliamentary stages of the enactment of
the WACA. It is capable of both positive and negative proofs.
HYPOTHESIS 5 - This is a hypothesis put forward by writers such as Blowers
(1987) and Lowe & Flynn (1989), that Thatcherite policy was a determinant. It is
capable of both positive and negative proofs.
HYPOTHESIS 6- This hypothesis is that trends in governmental implementation
mechanisms that can be associated with constitutional change were a determinant
in the adoption of the voluntary approach. This is capable of both positive and
negative proofs.
The list is obviously not exhaustive. Some possible determinants will not be
considered, for example, cultural expectations, media coverage and the role of
property. These may have been influential, but this influence will have been far
too indistinct to attribute a specific role to it in the design of the system.
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Once the determinants of the legislation have been identified, it is then possible to
evaluate the efficacy of the system. Thus, the purpose of the system i2 will be
considered in order to evaluate the efficacy of the system. This evaluation will
indicate whether the defects predicted in the system have materialised. The
determinants in the formation of the system then have to be reconsidered to
ascertain how they may have influenced the efficacy of the system in fulfilling its
purpose. This will identify the source of any deficiencies in the system. Statistics
on loss and damage to sites provided by the conservation bodies have been used to
indicate impact and these have been supplemented by official reports and
interviews.
The importance of these results will then be considered in relation to the recent
implementation of the Habitats Directive. On the basis of this and a conception of
how the system is working and what has affected this, it is possible to propose
criteria for reform of the system so that the factors exerting a negative influence
on the efficacy of the system can be circumvented or their influence diminished.
6) STRUCTURE
Chapter 2 explains the system of habitat protection and describes the defects that
were predicted during the passage of the Act and immediately after, both in
parliamentary debates and by external commentators.
12 Which was identified earlier to assess whether it was a determinant of the voluntary approach.
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Chapter 3 tests hypothesis 1. It explains the species protection system and
examines the efficacy of the system to ascertain whether this was a determinant in
the choice of the voluntary system to protect habitats.
Chapter 4 tests hypothesis 2. It considers the purpose of the species protection
system and the purpose of the habitat protection system and compares them to see
if this is likely to have influenced the introduction of the voluntary system. The
identification of the purpose of the habitat protection system has a dual function.
As well as being a possible determinant in the choice of implementation
instrument, it provides criteria by which to evaluate the efficacy of the system as
considered in chapter 9.
Chapter 5 tests hypothesis 3. It considers the nature of pressure group influence
utilising theories of corporatist and pluralist styles of interest group
intermediation. It details the activities of the groups in the pre-parliamentary
stages of the enactment of the WACA and evaluates their influence.
Chapter 6 tests hypothesis 4. It considers the influence of Parliament and pressure
groups in the parliamentary stages of the enactment of the WACA. This considers
the proposed amendments to the Act that were successful and identifies who was
supporting or opposing them and thus who had influence.
Chapter 7 tests hypothesis 5. It considers the proposed influence of Thatcherite
ideology in the introduction of the voluntary system.
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Chapter 8 tests hypothesis 6. It considers the trends in governmental policy
implementation mechanisms and equates this to both the species protection and
habitat protection measures that have been enacted since the late nineteenth
century. It then considers why these trends have developed by reference to
constitutional changes during the same period. The chapter then offers some
conclusions as to the determinants of the introduction of the voluntary system.
Chapter 9 details the legislative changes to the voluntary system since its
introduction. It then evaluates the impact of the system The determinants in the
introduction of the system are then reconsidered in the context of their possible
influence on the operation of the system.
Chapter 10 evaluates the efficacy of the system with reference to the purposes for
which it was first introduced. It then reconsiders this question in the context of its
use in the implementation of the Habitats Directive and considers whether the
system is suitable for habitat protection.
Chapter 11 makes proposals for reform based on the determinants of the operation
of the system.
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CHAPTER 2
THE HABITAT PROTECTION SYSTEM: AN EXPLANATION
& THE PREDICTED DEFECTS IN ITS OPERATION
1) THE HABITAT PROTECTION SYSTEM
The statutory method of protecting habitats relies on the designation of areas.
There are a number of different types of designation but the one that has assumed
central importance is the Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) 1 . This provides
the foundation of legal protection. This is because "the 1981 Act is based on a
philosophy of voluntariness, with consultation, negotiation and the management
agreement, rather than compulsory powers, being the favoured mechanisms for
dealing with disputes. The SSSIs are the crucial test of that philosophy"
(Ba11,1985:767).
The SSSI designation was introduced in section 23 of the National Parks and
Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (NPACA). Under the NPACA, designation
as an SSSI only afforded protection to a site through the land use planning system.
If the NC considered an area to be "of special interest by reason of its flora, fauna,
or geological or physiographical features" the NC was under a duty to notify that
fact to the local planning authority (LPA) in whose area the land was situated.
The purpose of this notification was to enable the LPA to take account of the
1 As of April 1994 there were 6057 SSSIs in Great Britain.
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special interest of the site when deciding planning applications regarding that
site2 . Additional protection was provided in section 15 of the Countryside Act
1968. This gave the NC the power to enter management agreements with owners
or occupiers of such land. These were to enable the management of the land in the
interests of nature conservation. However, before 1981, the only real protection
for SSSIs was through planning control.
Section 15 NPACA provided for the establishment of nature reserves. These are
defined as areas managed "for the study of, and research into, matters relating to
the fauna and flora of Great Britain and the physical conditions in which they live,
and for the study of geological and physiographical features of special interest in
the area" or for "preserving flora, fauna or geological or physiographical features
of special interest in the area". The protection of these areas can be achieved in a
number of ways. The most certain method of protection is for the NC either to
buy3 or lease the land. They will then have control over the area and can manage
it accordingly. The other mode of control is through a nature reserve agreement
between the NC and the owners and occupiers of the land under section 16 of the
NPACA.
Section 20 of the NPACA empowers the NC to make bylaws for the protection of
nature reserves. These may include restrictions on: entry into or movement within
the reserve of persons, vehicles, boats and animals; taking, killing or interfering
2 Under Town & Country Planning Act 1947 at the time of the enactment of the WACA.
3 This can be through an agreement with the landowner or the compulsory purchase of the area.
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with animals, plants or the soil; the shooting of birds in areas surrounding the
reserve; dropping litter and lighting fires. These bylaws may not restrict public
rights of way, and if the site is subject to a nature reserve agreement, the land will
remain in its original ownership and the owners' rights will not be affected by
these bylaws. Protection as a nature reserve was limited to a small number of
sites4 so SSSI designation provided the protection for the majority of sites.
In the WACA, a remodelled form of the SSSI was introduced. This SSSI system
is based on the premise that the use of authority should be a last resort. The
philosophy of voluntariness, using the tool of treasure, is thus the predominant
characteristic of the controls. This is indicated by the use of management
agreements as the basis of protection for sites s . Management agreements provide
for the payment of compensation to a landowner who abstains from damaging
activities on the site.
There are supplemental provisions of a mandatory nature. These provide for
enforced delay in the performance of an operation that may damage the site. This
allows for the NC to negotiate a management agreement with the owner or
occupier. Consequently, the legal requirements of the provisions focus on the
duty to notify the NC of proposals to carry out activities on the site. The NC can
then identify threats to sites and initiate the process of negotiation of a
4 In 1981 171 nature reserves existed in Great Britain.
5 The same protection that was provided by agreements under Section 15 of the Countryside Act
1968.
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management agreement. The use of authority, in the form of criminal sanctions,
plays a very minor role in the scheme. It is used to ensure notification to the NC
of the landowner's intention to carry out a prescribed activity on the site.
The following description is of the SSSI system as enacted in the WACA 1981.
Amendments have been made since its enactment and are discussed later in the
thesis6 . However, it is the format of the enactment in 1981 that we are concerned
with because the aim of the thesis is to discover why the system was introduced in
that particular form. Therefore, judicial decisions on the Act and amendments will
not be discussed here. Once the system has been described, the criticisms made at
the time of the enactment will be discussed. This discussion will indicate why the
choice of this particular approach to habitat protection was so controversial.
1)a) Sites Of Special Scientific Interest
SSSIs were intended to comprise a representative sample of British habitats to
make up a national network of sites 7. This was regarded in the report of the Wild
Life Conservation Special Committee (1947:48), hereafter referred to as the
Huxley Report, as the minimum necessary to maintain biodiversity. The basis for
designation is scientific 8. Most sites are selected for their biological interest but
there are also geological sites. The selection of sites is performed by the NC. The
6 See chapter 9.
7 See NCC (1984b) Nature Conservation In Great Britain.
8 Although the Huxley Report also considered amenity interests to be of great importance when
such sites were first proposed.
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only criterion given by the Act, in section 28(1), is that the area is "of special
interest by reason of any of its flora, fauna, or geological or physiographical
features". It has remained for the NC to decide the conceptual framework and
criteria for the determination of special interest. According to the guidelines on
selection of biological SSSIs, "in deciding what is special, we [the NCC] seek to
identify the most important areas for the range of habitats and diversity of wildlife
occurring naturally in Britain" (NCC,1989).
If a site fulfils the criterion of special interest, the NC are under a duty to
designate that site9. The effect of this is to make any challenge against the
designation of a site extremely difficult. The NC sets the criteria and then applies
them. The application of principles of judicial review is therefore limited by the
subjective nature of the designation.
When the criterion of special interest is satisfied, section 28(1) requires the NC to
notify that fact to the Secretary of State, the local planning authority and every
owner or occupier of the land'''. Under the code of guidance", paragraph 6, the
NC will also notify public utilities, statutory undertakers, the Forestry
Commission, MAFF and other relevant bodies. All sites notified to the LPA
under the NPACA 1949 have to be renotified in this manner. Section 28(2)
9 The effect of this duty has been considered recently inR v Nature Conservancy Council, ex parte
London Brick Property Limited [1995] ELM 95, although this concerned Section 28 as amended by
the Wildlife and Countryside (Amendment) Act (WACAA) 1985.
10 Hereafter referred to as the landowner.
11 Established under section 33, WACA 1981.
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requiredu the NC to give three months' notice to a landowner before this
notification. This period is for the resolution of objections to the proposed
designation. The notification to landowners will specify the reasons for the
special interest of the area and any operations that appear to the NC to be likely to
damage that interest. These are commonly known as potentially damaging
operations (PD0s), although this phrase has no statutory basis.
Section 28(5) provides that these PDOs cannot be undertaken unless certain
conditions are met. Written notice of the landowner's intention to carry out a PDO
must be given to the NC. This is often referred to as reciprocal notification. The
operation can then be performed if one of three conditions is satisfied: if a threel3
month period has elapsed; if the NC has consented to the performance of the
operation; if it is carried out in accordance with a management agreement. The
three month moratorium is designed to allow time for the negotiation of a
management agreement.
The NC has the power to enter management agreements with landowners under
section 15 of the Countryside Act 1968. A management agreement is a contract
between the NC and the landowner to manage that land in the interests of nature
conservation. Management agreements are generally restrictive in nature,
providing for the landowner not to do certain things. However, they can be used
12 This is one of the provisions which has been subsequently amended. The three month period of
notice has now been removed because it provided an opportunity for landowners to destroy the
special interest of the site before any restrictions on activities were imposed.
13 This was raised to four months in the WACAA 1985.
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to provide for positive actions to manage for the purposes of nature conservation.
The landowner receives compensation from the NC for the loss of profits arising
as a result of the abstention from carrying out the PDO. The amounts of
compensation payable are laid down in the fmancial guidelines produced by the
Ministers 14 under section 50 WACA. These guidelines were published on
2/2/1983 in the Department of the Environment (DOE) Circular 4/83 15. They are
based on the principle of compensation for profits forgone which includes such
things as loss of agricultural grants or lost revenues had the land been converted to
more profitable use16.
If a management agreement is not entered, at the end of the three month
moratorium the landowner is free to go ahead with the operation without
penalty 17. However, if the operation is carried out before the end of the
moratorium period or if no notice of the proposal to carry out the PDO has been
given to the NC, an offence is committed. Section 28(7) provides for a maximum
fule of £500 18 for such an offence. An exception to the offence is provided in
14 The Secretary of State and Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food. Although the Bill was
promoted by the Department of Environment (DOE) it is interesting to note that the Ministry of
Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) is solely responsible for setting the guidelines for
compensation payments by virtue of Section 52(1). However, they are actually published by the
DOE.
15 The guidelines are discussed in detail in section le of this chapter.
16 As such they are generous to landowners; a grant for the work may not have been made in
reality but this is of no relevance in determining the amount of compensation.
17 However, if it is an operation requiring planning permission this must also be obtained.
18 This was converted to the standard scale level 4 by Section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982.
Level 4 was increased to £1000 by the Criminal Penalties (Increase) Order 1984 SI 1984/447 art
2(4) Sch 4, and then to £2,500 by the Criminal Justice Act 1991.
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section 28(7) when there is 'reasonable excuse'. This is defined in section 28(8).
No offence is committed if it was an emergency operation or if the operation was
authorised by planning permission. The offences under section 28 can only be
committed by a landowner, as defined above.
Section 33 provides for the Minister to prepare a code of guidance in respect of
S SSIs 19 . This was published in 1982, explaining how the SSSI system was to
work but added little of legal substance.
1)b) Nature Conservation Orders
Under section 29, if the Secretary of State for the Environment, in consultation
with the NC, considers it expedient, he may make a Nature Conservation Order
(NCO). This Order may be applied to a SSSI in two circumstances. The first is
for the purpose of securing the survival of any kind of plant or animal, or for
compliance with an international obligation". Secondly, for the purpose of
conserving flora, fauna, or geological or physiographical features. The sites must
be of special interest and, for those falling under the second category, must be of
national importance.
19 At one stage during the enactment of the WACA this was intended as the only protection for
SSSIs. See Chapter 6 for details.
20 For example, the Directive on the Conservation of Wild Birds 79/409/EEC (known as the Birds
Directive), the Convention on the conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 1979
(known as the Bern Convention), the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of
Wild Animals 1979 (known as the Bonn Convention), The Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat 1971 (known as the Ramsar
Convention).
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Schedule 11 lays down the procedure for the application of NCOs. A NCO comes
into effect immediately it is made 21 . Under Schedule 11 paragraph 1(2) the order
ceases to have effect nine months after it is made unless the Secretary of State has
given notice under paragraph 6 that he does not propose to amend or revoke it or
he has amended or revoked it. When the order is made it must be notified to every
owner or occupier and the LPA, and it must be publicised generally in a local
paper. Paragraph 2(1)(c) gives a period of 28 days for objections or
representations to be made. Paragraph 4 provides that if any objection to the order
is not withdrawn, the Secretary of State shall hold a local inquiry or appoint an
inspector. The Secretary of State may then confirm, amend or revoke the order.
The controls on activities provided in section 29 are essentially the same as those
in section 28. The restrictions on carrying out PDOs are extended in section 29(3)
to cover all persons and not just landowners. In addition, the three month
negotiation period can be extended to twelve months. This can be done if the NC
offer a management agreement or offer to purchase the interest of the person who
notified them of their intent to carry out a PDO. If a management agreement is
rejected by the landowner before the expiration of twelve months, the period is
three months from the rejection22. At the end of the twelve month period, the
operation can go ahead without penalty. As with SSSIs, the purpose of the
21 Unlike the three month interim period originally enacted for SSSIs.
22 The same period applies if the NC withdraw their offer to enter a management agreement.
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moratorium is to facilitate the formation of a management agreement or the
conclusion of terms for purchase of the site.
Compensation is payable under section 30(2) for any reduction in the value of an
agricultural holding due to the imposition of a NCO. In addition, where the
extended negotiation period has come into operation, section 30(3) provides for
compensation for expenditure incurred which has been rendered abortive by
reason of the extension or any loss directly attributable to the extension23 . This is
purely compensation for losses during the twelve month moratorium, and is
separate from compensation payable under a management agreement.
As with SSSIs, if the PDO is carried out before the end of the period or if no
notice was given to the NC of the landowner's intention to perform it, an offence
is committed. Under section 51 the NC is authorised to enter land to see if an
offence has been committed. These powers are not available for SSSIs, although
the power in section 51 extends to where it is necessary to ascertain whether a
section 29 Order should be made. For committing an offence under section 29(8),
the offender is liable to a fine not exceeding the statutory
conviction and to an unlimited fine for conviction on indictment. Because
protection has been extended to cover such actions by all persons, the offence is
not limited merely to landowners.
23 This does not include any reduction in the value of the interest in land.
24 This was £1000 and since the Criminal Justice Act 1991 is £5,000.
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maximum24 on summary
If an offence has been committed, the court has the power under section 31 to
make an order for restoration of the site. This requires the offender to carry out
specified works within a specified period to restore the land to its former
condition. If they fail to do so, section 31(5) provides for a fine of £1000 25 and
£100 a day for a continuing offence. There is also provision in section 31(6) for
the NC to perform the restoration. Any expenses involved in this can then be
recovered from the landowner.
NCOs therefore rely on the SSSI system as a first defence. For sites that fulfil the
criteria in section 29(1) & (2) NCOs provide extra controls when SSSI designation
has been unsuccessful in securing the protection of the site 26. If the NCO also
fails, the only recourse is compulsory purchase of the site under section 17 of the
NPACA 1949. Once this has been achieved, the site can be managed by the NC
as a National Nature Reserve (NNR).
1)e) National Nature Reserves
Nature reserves were first provided for in the NPACA 1949. The substantive
legislation has largely remained in place since then, but section 35 of the WACA
1981 has provided for the designation of National Nature Reserves (NNRs).
Designation of an area as an NNR is performed by the NC declaring it as one.
25 This was converted to the standard scale level 5 by Section 46 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982.
Level 4 was increased to £2000 by the Criminal Penalties (Increase) Order 1984 SI 1984/447 art
2(4) Sch 4, and then to £5000 by the Criminal Justice Act 1991.
26 in the year 1993-1994 there were 23 such sites in Great Britain. A total of 41 Orders have been
made since 1981 (Withrington & Jones,1992).
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NNRs are nature reserves that are of national importance and are either held by the
NC, being managed as a nature reserve under an agreement 27, or are held by an
approved body and being managed as a nature reserve. This third category allows
for sites owned by bodies such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
(RSPB) to be declared NNRs 28 . This also allows the NC to save its money for the
purchase of sites at risk.
Ownership by the NC of a NNR represents the highest level of protection
available to a site (Adams,1984a). Although NNRs are arguably simply a
different method of protection, rather then a higher one, the power of land
ownership29 in practice gives much stronger protection". The NC will manage
the site for the purposes of nature conservation and they can impose bylaws to
limit damage by third parties. NNRs are also designated as SSSIs. NNRs do not
necessarily represent the top of a hierarchy of sites. Declaration as a NNR tends
to be opportunistic in nature. It depends mainly on the resources of the NC and
occurs when sites happen to become available or are under threatm.
27 If the NC are unable to come to an agreement with the owner, or if an unremedied breach of
agreement occurs, then the NC have powers to seek a compulsory purchase order under Section 18
of the NPACA 1949. Such an order will require the approval of the Secretary of State.
28 This category accounts for 10 out of 150 NNRs in England.
29 If the NC own or lease the site.
30 Although the majority of NNRs are held under Nature Reserve Agreements (Adams,1984a) so
the protection afforded is diminished.
31 Although the NC does have a list of proposed nature reserves: Ratcliffe (1977).
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1)(1) Duties Of Agriculture Ministers & Water Authorities
Section 32 of the WACA delineates the duties of agriculture Ministers regarding
SSSIs. When considering applications for farm capital grants 32
 in areas
designated as SSSIs or where a NCO has been imposed, the Minister must have
regard to furthering the conservation of the special interest of the site. However,
this only applies so far as it is consistent with the purposes of the farm capital
grants scheme. If the NC object to the making of the grant on conservation
grounds and the grant is refused for that reason, section 32(2) provides that the NC
must offer a management agreement to the landowner within three months.
Section 48 provides a similar duty with respect to water authorities 33. They must
exercise their functions so as to further conservation generally. With respect to
SSSIs, section 48(3) provides that before carrying out any operations appearing to
them to be likely to damage the site, the water authorities must consult with the
NC34. However, this excludes emergency operations.
32 Under Section 29 of the Agriculture Act 1970.
33 This was superseded by the Water Act 1989, Water Resources Act 1991 and the Environment
Act 1995. Details of these changes are given in Chapter 9.
34 It was just such a consultation that was absent in Southern Water Authority v NCC [1992] 3 All
ER 481 which is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
28
1)e) The Financial Guidelines
The financial guidelines were published in DOE circular 4/83 on 2 February
1983.5
 The guidelines only concerned themselves with compensation for
restrictions. Payment for positive actions was to be left to the individual parties to
negotiate. The guidelines provide for a choice of either a lump sum payment or
annual payments that are index linked36. The lump sum payment should be equal
to the difference between the restricted and unrestricted value of the landowner's
interest37. Annual payments should reflect net profits forgone because of the
agreement. This calculation assumes that farm capital grant would have been
payable. In addition, the guidelines provide for the NC to pay the costs of
professional advisors used by the landowner in connection with the agreement. In
addition to the statutory compensation under section 30(3) for areas subject to a
NCO, the guidelines provide for the NC to pay for any expenditure reasonably
incurred in the twelve months prior to the date of the notification that was
rendered abortive by the agreement, or any loss or damage directly attributable to
the agreement.
The landowner has the right to dispute the offer within one month and
determination of the payment offered is then referred to arbitration. If the making
35 As they are not in the form of a statutory instrument they are not subject to any direct
parliamentary control.
36 Special indices are provided for this purpose which reflect annual changes in farm productivity
and profitability.
3 7 This is calculated having regard to the rules for assessment in respect of the compulsory
acquisition of an interest in land as set out in Section 5 of the Land Compensation Act 1961.
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of the offer was mandatory38, and the amounts payable determined by the
arbitrator exceed those determined by the NC, the NC must amend its offer
accordingly. However, if the offer was non-mandatory, the NC may choose either
to amend the offer or to withdraw that offer39.
Under section 32 of the WACA, the obligation on the NC to provide a
management agreement in respect of a refusal of farm capital grant consequential
upon their objectionso was limited in its application. It did not extend to a
number of grant schemes such as those for forestry operations and those under the
Agriculture and Horticulture Development Scheme. However, in the guidelines,
the NC agreed to treat forestry applications in SSSIs the same as agricultural ones
and voluntarily apply the obligation under section 32, even though they were
under no statutory duty to do so.
To cope with the problems where land is let41 , the guidelines proposed a
complementary agreement with the landlord in which the landlord undertook not
to serve a notice to remedy contrary to the intentions of the management
agreement. In addition, where the landlord intends to take the land in hand at the
termination of the tenancy he should give the NC six months' notice of his wish to
38 Because the NC were obliged to offer a management agreement due to a successful objection to
a farm capital grant application.
39 No mention is made in the guidelines of what should happen if the arbitrator determines
amounts lower than those already being offered by the NC.
40 Discussed in previous section.
41 Where there is a possibility of a tenant being in breach of his tenancy agreement by entering a
management agreement. For a detailed discussion of the problems involved see Cardwell (1996).
30
terminate the agreement. Then a management agreement would be offered on
similar terms to those enjoyed by the previous occupier.
1)1) The Land Use Planning System
The provisions in the WACA overlap with those of the land use planning system.
Most important is the exception to offences under Sections 28 and 29 where the
activity has been granted planning permission. A planning permission can,
therefore, represent a threat to the protection that might otherwise be available for
a site under the WACA 1981. Planning permission is required for operations and
material changes of use that fall within the definition of developmentu.
Where planning permission has been applied for on a site designated as an SSSL
the LPA is required to consult with the NC before making a decision 43. The NC
are then allowed 14 days to make their reply. This was supplemented by the
Department of the Environment (DOE) circular 108/77 on Nature Conservation
and Planning, which urged the LPA to allow more than the minimum of 14 days
and encouraged consultation to facilitate the framing of suitable conditions to the
planning permission". It also encouraged consultation over developments in the
vicinity of an SS SI.
42 Currently in the Town and Country Planning Act (TCPA) 1990 Section 55.
43 This requirement is currently contained in the Town and Country Planning (General
Development Procedure) Order 1995, article 10(u).
44 This is now contained in DoE Planning Policy Guidance Nature Conservation (PPG 9).
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1)g) Capital Taxation
Conditional exemption from Inheritance Tax is available on land of outstanding
scientific interest under sections 30 - 35, Inheritance Tax Act 1984. Land within a
NNR or SSSI can be expected to qualify for this. To obtain the exemption, the
landowner is required to undertake to maintain the scientific interest of the land, to
preserve its character and to provide reasonable public access to it (where
appropriate). Where a management agreement is already in existence and
conditional exemption is granted from Inheritance Tax, any compensatory
payments due to the landowner under the management agreement cease and any
part of a lump sum previously made would be reclaimed. If land is of outstanding
scientific interest, relief from Capital Gains Tax is available under section 258,
Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, if the land is sold to certain bodies listed
in Schedule 3 to the Inheritance Tax Act 1984. The NC is one such body. The
effect is that 10% of the notional tax is given back to the vendor as an inducement
to sell to one of the named bodies.
2) CRITICISMS OF THE HABITAT PROVISIONS IN THE WACA
The system of habitat protection described above has been heavily criticised. The
WACA was extremely controversial both during its passage s and after its
enactment. It involved 2,300 tabled amendments and eleven months of debates
before its final enactment on 30th October 1981. The choice of the voluntary
45 The passage of the bill through Parliament is detailed in Chapter 6.
32
principle was attacked by the conservation lobby throughout the Parliamentary
stages of the enactment of the WACA. The provisions of the Bill were also
attacked by members of the farming community, but this was more on the detail of
drafting than the use of a voluntary system.
Before considering the criticisms two points must be made. Firstly, the provisions
have been amended since their initial enactment so that a number of the defects
have now been remedied". Secondly, the provisions changed dramatically
throughout the Parliamentary stages of the enactment". The original intention of
the government was to protect only a limited number of sites through what
became NCOs under section 29. The SSSI provisions in section 28, the
restoration of sites under section 31, the duties of agriculture Ministers and the
duties of water authorities were all introduced during the Parliamentary stages".
Those introduced at later stages of the Parliamentary process were obviously
subject to less criticism in debates. Also, much of the criticism directed at the
voluntary approach was linked to the various proposals to protect SSSIs at the
particular stage that had been reached. The progression was from no additional
protection" for most SSSIs, to protection through a voluntary code, to protection
through notification. Most of these were referred to under the heading of the
46 See Section 1 of Chapter 9.
47 For a detailed discussion see Chapter 6. Also see Appendix 1 Table 1 for an overview of the
changes made.
48 See Appendix 1 Table 1 for details of when each was introduced.
49 Other then that already existing under the NPACA 1949 which was protection through town
planning only.
33
voluntary approach. However, in the following discussion, the criticisms cited are
related to the final versions of the provisions when possible".
Another point to note is the types of defect that were identified at the time of the
enactment. These tended to be the political/policy defects 51 . Because there was
little legal debate on the Act, the defects identified were not the lawyers defects52
that have subsequently been identified. One possible reason for this is that the
voluntary conservation groups involved in lobbying on the Bill did not have
lawyers working for them then and so these issues were not raised.
Many of the criticisms correlate with different perceptions of the purpose of the
controls53 . For example the criticism that the voluntary system is in conflict with
the land use planning system is based on the view that the system should seek to
control all activities on a site. Many of the 'conservationist lobby' thought that the
legislation should aim to do more than the government intended it to do. This is
clearly represented in the comment of Lord Chelwood: "It does not really seem to
measure up fully to the clear needs of the moment or to all of our hopes"
(Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1028). These differing perceptions of what the Act
SO Some criticisms, although made of earlier versions of the provisions, were not specific to those
versions. This is particularly true of the structural defects.
51 Classified below as structural or design defects.
52 Classified below as drafting defects.
53 The purpose of the controls is identified in chapter 4. This different perception of the purpose
of the controls is also reflected in subsequent evaluations of the system. If an evaluation is
undertaken with the premise that the provisions do not fit the purpose then they will necessarily be
judged inefficacious. Although a different purpose might be desirable, an evaluation must be on
the basis of the actual purpose of the controls.
34
should do for habitat protection are evident throughout the debates on the Act.
According to Mr Hastings MP, "The Bill's whole approach to the countryside is
misconceived" (Hansard:HC3,27-4-1981,547). Mr Bennet MP considered it to be
"a sad and anaemic Bill, and a tragic missed opportunity ... yet another example
of the Government's ability to compromise all virtue away. It is about as useful in
dealing with the problems of the countryside and of wildlife as sitting in an oak
wood on a stormy autumn day and trying to catch all the falling leaves"
(Hansard:HC3,27-4-1981,591). According to Lord Melchett, "The Bill simply
does not begin to meet the needs which it should be meeting"
(Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,994). As these quotations indicate, the Act was
considered to be lacking in several respects; it was referred to by Viscount Ridley
as "a toothless bulldog" 54 (Hansard:HL417,13-2-1981,446). Baroness David
believed that "the provisions in this Bill for the preservation of conditions
essential to even a modicum of wildlife are inadequate ... the Bill is no more than
window dressing" (Hansard HL 415,16-12-1980,1081). However, underlying all
the criticisms are a number of recurring themes, resource problems, the 'maverick'
landowner and the conflict with agricultural policy.
The criticisms made of the system have been divided into structural, design and
drafting criticisms. Structural criticisms relate to the framework within which the
system operates and tend to be rather general in nature. Many of these problems
would be present when using any of the possible implementation mechanisms and
54 A sentiment echoed in the decision in Southern Water Authority v NCC [1992] 3 All ER 481
where Lord Mustill referred to the provisions as "toothless".
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are not necessarily specific to the voluntary approach. They often represent the
fundamental problems that face conservation. Drafting and design criticisms tend
to be more specific. Design criticisms are those that relate to the type of
implementation mechanism and the approach adopted. Drafting criticisms, the
lawyers defects, concern the wording of provisions and do not relate to the type of
implementation mechanism. They are things not really thought about at the time
and are easily solved without changing the nature of the system. However, the
distinction between the three is blurred and there is obviously some overlap. The
drafting and design criticisms are relatively easy to solve, requiring the
introduction of amendments to the legislation 55 or new legislation. However,
structural problems are much more difficult to solve56.
At this point the thesis will not consider all the criticisms that have been made of
the system. In addition to the distinction between structural, design and drafting
criticisms, a distinction can also be drawn between those problems seen at the
time of the enactment of the WACA, those spotted soon after and those realised in
the application of the law. The focus in this chapter will be on those criticisms
made when the provisions were enacted in 1981 and before its amendment in
1985. This will indicate the problems and disadvantages of the system that arise
due to the choice of instrument and its enactment in that particular form. This
shows why the choice of the voluntary system was so controversial at the time of
55 In fact a number of them have been subsequently solved in the WACAA 1985.
56 These tend to be the defects that are most often cited and were the most contentious in the
Parliamentary debates.
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its enactment. This relates to the research question posed in Chapter 1: why in the
face of heavy opposition and obvious deficiencies did the Government introduce
this system? The determinants of the choice of approach therefore become highly
relevant when attempting to justify its adoption. This discussion of the criticisms
will also provide the basis for an evaluation of the Act later in the thesis 57. It will
enable an assessment of whether the Act is more or less efficacious than was
expected and whether perceived problems have come to fruition.
2)a) Structural Criticisms
2)a)i) Insufficient Resources
Resources are of fundamental importance for habitat protection because finances
form the backbone to the voluntary approach. Without money to pay
compensation for management agreements there is no protection. As Rose and
Secret (1982:preamble) point out, "the letter of the Act depends not on the spirit of
goodwill but on hard cash". Lack of resources was therefore one of the most often
cited criticisms of the system. According to Lord Gibson "cash is at the bottom of
our problems" (Hansard HL 415,16-12-1980,1009).
This is one of the structural defects that is of greater importance with the adoption
of the voluntary approach. The reliance on management agreements has a high
visible cost, that of compensation payments. Other mechanisms such as using
57 In Chapter 10.
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criminal sanctions, have high non-visible costs such as administrative costs, for
example enforcement costs. However, in addition to the cost of compensation
under management agreements administrative costs are also high for the voluntary
system. The system is therefore expensive.
There are three elements to this criticism of insufficient resources: (1) lack of
money to enter management agreements, (2) lack of money to use stronger powers
such as NCOs and compulsory purchase and (3) lack of administrative resources.
2)a)i)1) Lack of Money to Enter Management Agreements
For any SSSI that the NC wishes to save from damaging agricultural or forestry
operations it is obliged to come up with money for compensation to conclude a
management agreement. If this money is not available then the site may be lost.
Commentators were concerned that compensation payments would be so high that
the NC would be able to afford to pay compensation on only a limited number of
sites58. This is compounded by the additional cost of negotiating these
agreements. According to Lord Gibson 59, "in our experience, management
schemes take a great deal of time and trouble to draw up and management time to
monitor" (Hansard:IFL415,16-12-1980,1010).
58 In addition, according to Ball (1985:775), the cost of the system is higher then expected by the
government because "occupiers have been encouraged to seek compensation for what may
previously have happened voluntarily". Adams (1984a:276) also notes that "farmers previously
happy to conclude agreements at a nominal figure are now unwilling to do so".
59 Chairman of the National Trust.
38
The generous nature of compensation paymentso was seen as an incentive to the
uncooperative landowner to enter an agreement and protect that site. However,
they were also seen as a risk to other vulnerable sites because the limited finances
of the NC would mean that only a few sites could benefit from the agreements and
thus be protected. According to Viscount Thurso, "the money will not be there,
either with management agreements or with compulsory purchase, to meet all of
these obligations" (Hansard:HL418,12-3-1981,413). The financial guidelines
were also criticised by the RSPB for prolonging discussion needlessly
(RSPB, 1984:13).
2)a)i)2) Lack of Money to use Powers
The lack of resources could also influence the NC's ability to impose NCOs or
compulsorily acquire sites. NC0s, like SSSIs, are only a delaying tactic, merely
allowing a longer negotiation period than with SSSIs. The requirement in section
30 to pay compensationo may inhibit the imposition of a section 29 Order. The
imposition of a NCO also shows a willingness to act to save the site and, failing a
management agreement, the NC will have to purchase the site to protect it. Thus
the expense involved in compulsory purchase may also inhibit the imposition of
an NCO.
60 This is because of the principle enshrined in the fmancial guidelines that landowners should be
compensated for any net loss of income, including potential use. The guidelines are not legally
binding on the NC in all circumstances (only where a PDO is notified to them or a farm capital
grant has been refused as a result of their objection) but in practice the guidelines are applied in all
circumstances.
61 This does not protect the site; a management agreement or compulsory purchase, both involving
more expenditure, are necessary for this.
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This influence has become apparent with the announcement during the debates on
the Bill that only some 40 sites should be subject to the section 29 protection
(Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1092, Earl of Avon) 62. This limitation on the role of
NCOs was criticised by Lord Buxton of Alsa as "a crude attempt, albeit well-
meaning, to solve financial stringency, the knock-on effect of which may be
catastrophic in the long run" (Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1059).
2)a)i)3) Lack of Administrative Resources
The lack of financial and administrative resources on the part of the NC was one
of the most damning criticisms of the Act. Lord Gibson noted that "management
of the countryside, where we need to achieve the required balance of interests,
cannot be achieved without whatever agencies are set up being properly funded"
(Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1010). As Lord Chelwood 63
 pointed out, however,
such funding had not been adequately provided for the NC: "we suffer in that
council from a very serious lack of resources which greatly inhibits our carrying
out our statutory duties" (Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1028). Such a lack of
resources obviously limits the activities of the NC and their ability to protect sites
within the framework of the voluntary system. Lord Chelwood's prophecy of "a
continued erosion of critically important habitats for wildlife" was based on his
1......•••
62 By 1994 there were only 25 sites subject to a NCO.
63 A member of the NC and an ex-president of the RSPB.
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observation that "the government's excellent intentions have not been matched
with the minimum necessary resources" (Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1032).
These much needed resources were not perceived as being adequately dealt with,
although they were recognised as being very necessary. According to Lord
Gibson "policies of balanced management are expensive and the Bill does not
provide greater resources to back ••• management agreements"
(Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1009). This point was also stressed by Lord
Winstanley who noted that, "we shall not achieve everything that is necessary
unless we are prepared to pay the price. I believe that there is a price, and I am
not entirely sure that it is adequately provided for in the Bill" (Hansard:HL415,16-
12-1980,1052). The scale of the problem was great because of the requirement of
renotification of sites notified under the NPACA 1949".
2)a)ii) Conflict With Other Systems
A particular problem is the conflict with the land use planning system. If planning
permission has been granted for an activity the landowner is exempted from
offences under section 28(8). The landowner can therefore apply for planning
permission to carry out an operation without notifying the NC of their intention.
The NC will only be informed of the threat by the LPA and will have only 14 days
to take action. The moratorium period is bypassed and the lack of notification by
the landowner will not constitute an offence. Thus the additional protection
64 See Adams (1986) for a discussion of this problem.
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afforded to SSSIs under the WACA is effectively removed, putting them in an
equivalent position to S SSIs under the NPACA 1949.
This exception also results in the avoidance of the controls under the WACA for
existing permissions for mineral and peat extraction within SSSIs. These are in
sites which tend not to have been identified as of importance when the permission
was originally granted. Revocation of the planning permission would entail a
liability to pay compensation, any management agreement would mean having to
pay compensation for lost profits, and any attempt to purchase the site would
generally involve payment of the market price.
In addition to planning permission trumping SSSI designation, there is also the
problem of private Acts65 taking priority.
2)a)iii) Conflict With Agricultural Policy
Agriculture and conservation were seen as conflicting land uses in the debates on
the Act. According to Ball (1985:767), "there is a conflict between modern
agriculture and conservation with SSSIs on the battleground". The conflict has
been attributed to the failure to integrate agricultural policies and conservation
objectives. It was recognised that an integration of rural policy was necessary.
According to Lord Sandford there was a "need to take a more integrated approach
to rural matters" (Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1039). This was also recognised by
65 Such as the Cardiff Bay Barrage Act 1993.
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Lord Beaumont of Whitley: "We do need to reconcile the interests of agriculture
and the environment. It is a very great shame when dealing with this Bill that we
cannot at the same time cope with the revision of our agricultural policy in order
to reassure and reward the farmers. It is an even greater shame that countryside
matters are split between MAFF and the Department of the Environment. It is a
great pity that we do not have, as so many European countries have, a department
of rural affairs" (Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1008). This division between
departments is of great importance; as Mr Thomas MP pointed out, "there is a lack
of co-ordination between the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the
Scottish Office agricultural division and the Welsh Office agricultural division,
and the environmental policies of those Departments and the Department of the
Environment. There is no coherent countryside policy" (Hansard:HC3, 27-4-
1981,576).
The result of such separation is an inevitable conflict of policy. According to Tam
Dalyell MP, "The left hand of the Government, in the shape of the narrow
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food's responsibility, does not co-ordinate
with what the right hand of the Government, in the shape of environmental
responsibility, is doing or would like to do" (Hansard:HC3,27-4-1981,596). The
result of this non-integration of policy is the imposition of economic pressures on
farmers which conflict with conservation (Harvey,1982). Stephen Hastings MP
noted that "economic pressures - not least the CAP and the demands of European
agriculture - often force a farmer to plough and drain where many of us would
wish him to leave the land alone" (Hansard:HC3,27-4-1981,546). This was also
recognised by Mr Bennett MP who commented that "One of the major problems ..
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is that we still have vast amounts of money available to the farming community
that can be used to destroy the countryside rather than conserve it. It is sad that
from the Common Market and its agricultural fund there are large amounts of
money available to create butter mountains and wine lakes but very little money to
conserve our own mountains, lakes and countryside generally" (Hansard:HC9,30-
7-1981,1318).
These economic pressures are best illustrated by the farm capital grants scheme
under the Agriculture Act 1970. The policy of this scheme66 is to raise the
productivity of middle range farms. Grants were available for a number of
activities including drainage, land clearance, reclamation, lying of permanent
pasture and the filling of ditches and ponds. If any of these activities were to be
carried out on an SSSI they would represent a threat to the scientific interest of
that site. "The grants of more than £500m given to farmers each year actually
promote the destruction of wildlife" (The Times,6-1-81). Without the provision of
these grants the project may not be an economically viable proposition. In the
assessment of grants it is merely technical viability that is relevant, no assessment
is made of the value of the projecto.
This is a prime example of the conflict between agricultural and conservation
policies. This leads to the anomalous situation described by Earl Peel: "How can
66 This was in the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Scheme between 1980 and 1985, the
Agriculture Improvement Scheme between 1985 and 1988, and is now more conservation oriented
in the Farm and Conservation Grant Scheme running since 1989. Details of these schemes are
given in Chapter 9.
67 They are also awarded irrespective of the wealth of the farmer who is applying for them.
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it be right for one department of state - to wit, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food - to encourage farmers by means of powerful incentives,
capital grants, to reclaim and develop for minor agricultural gains vital areas of
moorland within a national park whose principal feature is moorland, while in
contrast and, indeed, in contradiction by compensatory grants another department
of state - to wit, the Department of the Environment - is trying to dissuade farmers
from proceeding to reclaim, to plough or otherwise to develop, but with no power
to prevent them" (Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1025). According to Lord Buxton
of Alsa, the influence of this grant aid was pervasive. "Nobody except a lunatic
would derive satisfaction from destroying a man-made treasure, say, a Rembrandt;
but, either because of the indifference to the interest of future generations or
because of the lure of grant aid, agricultural human beings, I am sorry to say, are
wiping natural Rembrandts from the face of the earth ... The Government remain,
through grant aid, the chief instigators and supporters of habitat destruction"
(Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1058). The essential problem was that farmers are
as bound by economic reality as anybody else. In economic terms, conservation
was not viable in the face of capital grants. Farmers seldom act independently of
governmental agricultural policy because of economic conditions. Therefore a
voluntary system is unlikely to be effective when a farmer is not really free to co-
operate because of economic considerations.
If the farmer starts an operation that is a PDO before making a grant application
and fails to notify the NC he will commit an offence under section 28(8).
However, though it may jeopardise his chances of a grant, it will not ensure non-
approval. When one considers that in 1981 the maximum fine under section 28
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was £500 and the total spent on capital grants schemes was £100.4 million
(National Audit Office,1989:21), there seems to be no effective deterrent to
farmers for undertaking work on an SSSI for which a grant will be applied for.
Under section 32(1) of the WACA 1981 if the application for a grant concerns a
site designated as an SSSI, the appropriate agriculture minister is under a duty to
make his decision on a grant so as to further the conservation of the special
interest of the site. However, this is subject to the important qualification of "so
far as may be consistent with the purposes of the scheme". The scheme is
production oriented so conservation is unlikely to be consistent with its purposes..
The Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS) will consult with
the NC who will inform them if the proposal will affect the scientific interest of
the site. If so, ADAS will attempt to reconcile the two sides. There are two
possibilities, modification of the application or the offer of a management
agreement by the NC. If no arrangement can be reached the NC can formally
object to the award of a grant and the Minister will take this into account when
making his decision.
A refusal of grant by the Minister on conservation grounds results in a duty being
imposed on the NC to offer a management agreement compensating the farmer for
the loss of grant and lost profits 68. The imposition of this duty effectively
restrains the NC's power of objection to a grant since it will thereby be subjected
68 As long as the farmer used the reciprocal notification procedure.
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to an open-ended duty to pay compensation that it may not be able to afford69.
Even the refusal of a grant will not necessarily save a site. The farmer is not
obliged to accept an agreement or the compensation. He can go ahead with the
work without the grant if he so desires. The only recourse for the NC is to
compulsorily purchase the site.
Even if the farmer does not apply for a grant and merely notifies the NC of
intention to carry out a proscribed operation its availability is assumed under the
financial guidelines and any compensation under a management agreement would
include this amount. This has obvious implications for resources.
2)b) Design Criticisms
Design defects are those that relate to the choice of implementation mechanism,
the voluntary approach. The focus of these criticisms was therefore the fear of the
SSSI system being wilfully undermined by maverick farmers who would not co-
operate. These mavericks were seen as the primary threat to effective protection
for habitats. Management agreements, the foundation upon which the whole
voluntary system is based, have been heavily criticised. "Any voluntary
agreement has a crucial limitation - it is a technique for producing compromise
and can rarely succeed where there is a serious conflict of interest, since it does
69 This is particularly so since the levels of compensation payable have been inflated by
agricultural policy. According to Ball (1985:776), "agricultural support of all types inflates the
incomes of farmers and the value of agricultural land, and in paying compensation the NCC is
effectively paying sums for which the Ministry of Agriculture should be responsible".
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not tackle the underlying reasons for the conflict"(Ball,1985:775) 70. There were
two criticisms made of management agreements, (1) that they are voluntary and
landowners do not have to enter into them, and (2) that even if the landowner does
enter an agreement they are ultimately unenforceable.
2)b)i) Management Agreements Rely On Voluntary Co-operation
The use of the voluntary philosophy with the reliance on management agreements
does not provide for the maverick landowner. Management agreements can only
be entered into with co-operative landowners. No one can force a landowner to
enter into an agreement with the NC. As Lord Winstanley pointed out, "they
depend for their effectiveness entirely on the goodwill of individual farmers.
Those who are not sympathetic to conservation will not enter into an agreement"
(Hansard:HL417,13-2-1981,435). These mavericks were a real cause for concern:
"most people behave in a sensible and civilised way. The problem is persuading
the remainder to conform. That is the major weakness of the voluntary approach.
The good landowner would be perfectly happy to conform to the voluntary code,
but it would not catch the rogue or the agricultural vandal" (Hansard:HC8,13-7-
1981,911,Andrew Bennett MP). This becomes a particular problem with sites in
multiple occupation where all have to agree71.
717 The underlying reasons for the conflict can of course be seen in relation to the lack of cohesion
with policies on agriculture which is discussed above.
71 Problems may also arise with new owners when the agreements may have to be re-negotiated,
due to the difficulty of enforcing management agreements against successors in title. The problem
of enforcing management agreements against successors in title is discussed in chapter 10 rather
than here because it has not been identified before.
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The benefits of the system were recognised but so were its limitations. As Lord
Underhill commented, "of course compromise is desirable. Of course
management agreements are desirable. But ... will it be sufficient to leave this
matter entirely to a voluntary system? What will be the situation if agreement is
not reached?" (Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1046). The basis of these criticisms
was that a voluntary system72 had not worked so far. "This is the system that
operates at the moment. The Nature Conservancy Council and nobody else has
any legal powers to stop this rate of change. Compromise, agreement, getting on
with landowners and not upsetting anybody is the order of the day at the moment.
It is under that system that we have lost sites of special scientific interest, at the
rate last year of 10 per cent" 73 (Hansard:HL417,12-2-1981,291,Lord Melchett).
2)b)ii) Management Agreements Are Unenforceable
The second criticism of management agreements was their unenforceability. A
management agreement is a contract between the landowner and the NC. If the
landowner was to breach the agreement, damages are payable. However, it would
be almost impossible to quantify the loss as it would be to the national heritage.
The plaintiff claiming damages would be the NC, as they are the other party to the
72 That provided by the NPACA 1949. This was a different type of voluntary system but although
additional protection has been afforded to SSSIs by the WACA it too is voluntary and dependent
upon co-operation.
73 Reference here was to the system proposed before Section 28 was introduced. Although the
protection afforded to 'ordinary' SSSIs was changed, it is still ultimately voluntary and the only real
protection is through co-operation.
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contract, and it is doubtful if they would be able to claim for a loss that is not
personal.
Other possible remedies for breach would be specific performance and injunction.
Specific performance, however, would only be of use for sites that are not yet
damaged and the need for constant supervision by the courts could make it
unworkable. Injunction is a possibility but by the time the NC know of the breach
it may be too late to save the site. If the breach is serious the NC may treat the
contract as repudiated, however, this will not ensure the long term protection of
the site.
2)b)iii) Compensation Levels Under the Financial Guidelines
The amounts of compensation are provided for by the Financial Guidelines laid
down under section 50 of the WACA. 74. These provide the formulation for the
calculation of compensation and enshrine the principle that the landowner should
be fully compensated for any net loss of income, including the potential use
value75. Paragraph 23 requires the assumption that any available agricultural
grants would have been paid and thus such amounts are included in the calculation
of the compensation. As Adams points out, the Financial Guidelines "demand the
estimation of future agricultural yields, for which there is nationally no adequate
74 Discussed earlier at section le.
75 These principles are based on the sums paid for agreements on Exmoor in the 1970s which were
intended to be a special case: the Porchester Report (1977).
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source of data, they assume that farmers would receive a grant without demanding
an appraisal of whether in fact it would have been paid, and they make no
allowance for risk in land development" (Adams,1984a:276).
Compensation is paid in two situations, as part of a management agreement, and
under section 30, which allows for payment if an owner/occupier loses income as
a result of a section 29 order. In addition, under section 32(2)(b) owner/occupiers
are automatically entitled to a management agreement when an application for
MAFF grant aid is denied on conservation grounds and this will entail the
payment of compensation. This provision was highly controversial, since it
"establishes an extraordinary precedent; it enshrines in law the right of an owner
or occupier to receive tax-payer's funds, either in the form of MAFF grants or
compensation payments from the NCC, merely for threatening to harm a SSSI"
(Rose and Secret,1982:4). This payment for mere threat led in turn to the
recognition of the possibility of claims based on work that the landowner had no
intention of ever performing. As Viscount Ridley pointed out, "not all farmers are
angels. ..it will be tempting for some farmers to try to get paid for not ploughing
out heath and moorland, which they had no intention of ploughing out anyway"
(Hansard HL 415,16-12-1980,1036). This possibility was also recognised by
Lord Melchett; "what is to stop somebody coming along and saying, 'I intend to
convert this to arable and therefore you have to pay me for the loss of revenue
which would be involved', even if they had no intention of doing so?" (Hansard
HL 417,12-2-1981,370). The compensation payments were also criticised for
being too generous because landowners would be paid for doing nothing on the
site
51
2)b)iv) Inadequate Protection Through Land Use Planning Control
Reliance on the land use planning system in the protection of habitats dates back
to 1949 when SSSIs were first introduced in the NPACA. Section 23 provided for
the NC to notify LPAs of the existence of SSSIs so that account could be taken
when deciding planning applications. This was subject to criticism even then.
According to Mr W. S. Morrison MP, "Commissioners and Conservancies can
notify, inform and recommend, but if the notification, information or
recommendation is disregarded nothing happens....there is no surer way of asking
for trouble than providing for a conflict of opinion and failing to provide some
means for resolving that conflict" (Hansard:HC463,31-3-1949,1493). The effect
of the protection provided by development control is minimal. "At best the
development control system protects only some sites from some activities"
(Ba11,1985:770).
Many operations that might damage a SSSI are not regulated by the land use
planning system. Under the Town & Country Planning Act 1990, section
55(2)(e)76, planning permission is not necessary for agricultural or forestry
operations. The definition of agriculture is very extensive, the result being that
"the countryside can be converted to intensive agricultural systems, woods cut
down, moorlands ploughed, wetlands drained and coniferous plantations grown
without any control being exercisable by the local planning
76 Previously Town & Country Planning Act 1971 Section 22(e).
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authority"(Ba11,1985,769). Also under the Town and Country Planning (General
Permitted Development) Order 1995, Schedule 2, part 6 77 , automatic planning
permission is granted for any land over 1 acre for any building or engineering
operations likely to be carried out on an ordinary farm. It is possible to withdraw
this by serving an Article 4 direction but this requires confirmation by the
Secretary of State and the payment of compensation. It is a temporary measure.
Such problems were foreseen with the voluntary system by the Viscount of
Arbuthnott78. "At a time when the pressure is on all land users, and when the
cheapest way to make more land is to reclaim it or drain it or reseed it, or when
afforestation seems an attractive alternative, there will be a clash between the
accepted uses and conservation use" (Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1042).
Designation of a site as an SSSI is notified to the LPA but they are not obliged to
take any notice of this, except as a relevant consideration in deciding a planning
application. The Town & Country Planning (General Development Procedure)
Order 1995, Article 10(u)79, requires consultation with the NC over any proposal
requiring planning permission within an SSSI but the LPA is not bound by the
advice of the NC, it is merely a material consideration to be taken into account.
As Ball points out, "it is difficult to see how these limited requirements could be
enforced properly. The courts are unlikely to hold the consultation procedures
77 Previously Town and Country Planning General Development Order 1977 Schedule 1, Class
VI.
78 Deputy chairman of the NCC and president of the Wildfowlers' Association.
79 This requirement was previously contained in The Town & Country Planning General
Development Order 1977, article 15(1)(g).
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mandatory and quash a determination made in contravention of them"
(Ba11,1985:769). Other factors such as economic or social reasons may outweigh
the need for protection of a site 80 . Appeals to the LPA are only possible against a
refusal of planning permission. No appeal can be made against the granting of a
permission. In addition government departments are exempt from all
development control and statutory undertakers also have wide ranging
exemptions.
2)b)v) Level Of Fines
Failure to comply with the notification requirements in section 28 would
originally have resulted in a fine of up to £500. According to Rose and Secret
(1982:4) "These penalties are at best cosmetic protection". "The scale of fines
amounts to little more than a concessionary measure" and are "a small price to pay
for ploughing up 450 acres of unspoilt heathland, or felling a hundred acre
woodland, given the potential profits from a replacement cereal crop. Fines are
only effective if they act as a deterrent; to do so they must reflect the true costs of
the crime". The perceived inadequacy of fines was widely commented upon.
According to Lord Melchett, "the penalties will be nowhere near adequate to deter
people from destroying a site illegally" (Hansard HL 418,12-3-1981,431). Fines
are only effective if they act as a deterrent and to do so they must represent the
true value of the damage done. A fine is unlikely to provide a deterrent when the
80 Although economic factors are not relevant when deciding the area of a site to be designated
under the EC Birds Directive: R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte the RSPB
Times, 2nd August 1996.
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profit to be made from converting the use of the area may be many times the
amount of the fine, particularly if the operation is eligible for farm capital grant.
2)b)vi) Restoration Provision Of Limited Use
If an order has been made under section 29 and is disregarded with the result that
an SSSI is damaged or destroyed, the convicting court has the ability, under
section 31, to require the offender to perform specified works to restore the site to
its former condition. However, according to Ball (1985:774) this section is often
"inapplicable because the damage is irreversible". As Baroness White pointed
out, "if you destroy a raised bog, you destroy it; you cannot put it back. If you
plough up a chalk downland, you destroy the habitats of all the creatures great and
small" (Hansard:HL417,12-2-1981,300). However, it may provide a greater
deterrent than a fine particularly as, should the order be ignored, the NC has the
power to enter the land and perform the work itself and charge the landowner for
expenses incurred. However, this would be a pointless exercise unless the NC
intended to purchase the land. Once the restoration has been carried out, the
landowner could notify the NC of his intention to carry out the operation, wait
twelve months, and then go ahead with the operation legally and destroy the site.
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2)B)vii) 3 Month Pre-Notification Period
The three month period provided by section 28(2) 81 for objections to new SSSI
designations82 leaves sites open to destruction without penalty. As Adams
(1984b:45) comments, sites "are wholly unprotected in the 3 month period
required by the Act for informal consultation with owners and occupiers".
According to Ball (1985:771), "This was intended to provide an opportunity for
objections and for tackling management problems in advance, but a major effect
was to allow the maverick landowner to escape section 28 altogether by
destroying the SSSI prior to designation". The code of guidance on SSSIs states
that no PDO should be carried out during this period, but this is not what the Act
provides for83.
2)B)vii) Lack Of Back Up Powers
According to Lord Foot, "In deciding to rely upon voluntary agreements and to
abandon the last resort of compulsion, they are departing from the
recommendations made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, in his report; they are
departing from - indeed they are turning upside down - the recommendations
which were made by Lord Porchester in his report; and, of course, they are
reversing what was to have been the decision of the previous Administration"
81 This provision was removed in the WACAA 1985.
82 This does not apply to renotification of existing SSSIs under the NPACA 1949.
83 This can be circumvented by the imposition of a NCO which has immediate effect but most
sites will not satisfy the designation criteria of national importance, etc.
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(Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1078). This absence of compulsion was criticised
on two grounds. Some saw the existence of reserve powers as a way to facilitate
agreement84 . For others, a major concern was that in the event of a failure of the
voluntary system in the protection of a site, there were inadequate back up
powers85.
The absence of back up powers is illustrated by the fact that three 86 months after
notification to the NC of intention to carry out a prescribed operation the operation
can go ahead unimpeded, unless it requires and fails to get planning permission or
stronger protection is sought under section 29, if available. In the end the NC
must rely on the goodwill of landowners or they must resort to spending money to
save SSSIs. The maverick landowner is not legislated for.
According to Mr Chapman MP, "As damage is taking place on such an alarming
scale, it is not unreasonable to add a provision in the Bill which gives reserve
powers to supplement rather than replace, the system of voluntary notification and
management agreements.... It is essential to have effective long term safeguards
for our rapidly diminishing wildlife habitats" (Hansard:HC3,27-4-1981,563).
Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge called for "a mailed fist behind the glove"
(Hansard:HL416,27-1-1981,680). It was felt that the maverick landowner, "the
person who spoils the game" (Hansard:1TL417,12-2-1981,299, Baroness White)
84 For example see Viscount Ridley (Hansard:HL417,13-2-1981,446).
85 This is closely linked to the criticisms of the voluntary nature of management agreements
discussed above.
86 Since the WACAA 1985 four months.
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had not been legislated for. According to Baroness David, "the Bill must., make
some provision against the obstinacy of the purely selfish or bloody-minded
landowner. One hopes that these are rare but they certainly do exist, as in every
other section of the community, and they should not be allowed to obstruct
whatever may be clearly in the long term interest of the community as a whole"
(Hansard:HL415,16-12-1980,1087).
It was pointed out that such mavericks were not tolerated in other situations. "Is it
really tolerable that one individual for economic reasons should be entitled to defy
what is a very considerable national interest? In no other field of planning do we
allow such a thing to happen. We do not allow people to build up their back yards
just as they please" (Hansard:HL417,13-2-1981,460, Lord Foot). In this call for
reserve powers, Lord Craigton likened SSSIs to historic buildings. "I cannot for
the life of me see the difference in common sense between an SSSI, an historic
building, or an ancient monument. The owner of an SSSI has part of our heritage
which should be preserved, and he is as proud of, or as annoyed about, having
been asked to preserve it as he now is in regard to his historic building or ancient
monument. He can ask no more and no less restriction or compensation"
(Hansard:HL417,12-2-1981,336)87.
According to Lord Beaumont of Whitley, "from time to time for the good of the
community you must introduce compulsion, and this is one of those occasions"
87 For a description of the controls for listed buildings see Suddards & Hargreaves (1996) and
Ross (1991).
58
(Hansard:HL418,12-3-1981,416). This compulsion was necessary because
according to Rose and Secret (1982:1), "the Act merely relies for its effectiveness
on a refined and codified voluntary approach. Indeed the Act will depend on the
effectiveness of a formal voluntary code which will depend on voluntary restraint
by farmers and landowners. If this restraint is not forthcoming.. .then the code
must fail. If the code fails, the Act provides insufficient reserve powers to enable
NCC to protect wildlife sites". This was reiterated by Viscount Massereene and
Ferrard: "if we are to stop the destruction ... I cannot see how it can be done
unless we use the stick. One does not like using the stick, but I think it is
necessary" (Hansard:HL417,12-2-1981,302).
Section 29 will only provide protection if the NC can afford a management
agreement or purchase of the site. Given the issue of resources discussed earlier
this may be unlikely. The alternative is the NNR. However, this will only
provide protection if the NC purchase the site. This is because, unless the site is
owned by an approved body, protection is dependent on a nature reserve
agreement. This will not work if the SSSI and NCO failed because they are both
based on agreements. If the landowner will not enter a management agreement in
pursuance of Sections 28 or 29 of the WACA, he is unlikely to do so under section
16 of the NPACA 1949.
2)b)ix) Non-Use Of Back Up Powers That Exist
In relation to the powers that the NC have under section 29, concerns had been
expressed during the debates about the application of these restrictions. Lord
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Gibson pointed out that reserve powers were important for all sites. "The
Government say that they have no money and that they are setting up a framework
for the provision of money when it can be afforded. So in effect they are
providing the framework for the carrot, but hardly any stick. The stick is being
provided only in the case of a very small number of sites. I feel that that is not
really quite good enough" (Hansard:HL417,12-2-1981,320)
When the DoE indicated that this additional protection would only be applied to a
few SSSIs, because of the requirement of national interest, no more than 40 or 50
sites would become eligible, if threatened, because of their outstanding
characteristics, it was seen as clearly unsatisfactory. "The NCC are emphatic that
the NNR and SSSI series represent a minimum conservation requirement, and as
such every site is of equal importance as a critical habitat worthy of guaranteed
protection; the Orders last a comparatively brief time, after which the
owner/occupier can proceed as s/he originally intended: the creation of a few
'super' SSSIs implies a corresponding devaluation of the remainder" (Rose and
Secret,1982:4). This devaluation 88 was regarded by Lord Craigton as "one of the
most objectionable to all shades of conservation opinion and should be done away
with"89 (Hansard HL 417,12-2-1981,293,). The predicted effect was the
widespread destruction of the 'down-valued' sites. According to Lord Melchett,
88 This has become more likely with the introduction of even higher level designations under the
EC Habitats Directive.
89 Lord Craigton was in fact making this comment before the extension of protection through
notification had been included in the Bill However, even once this provision had been added there
were claims of creating a hierarchy of sites as can be seen by the previous quotation from Rose &
Secret (1982).
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"having created a top tier of 30 or 40 sites ...the rest of the sites of special
scientific interest would be seen as much less important than they are now and we
would simply have an open season on them and they would be destroyed not at the
rate of 10 per cent as they were last year but at a much higher rate in years to
come" (Hansard HL 417,17-2-1981,620). Such a devaluation may also occur
because of the hierarchical structure imposed by the necessity to choose between
sites for the conclusion of management agreements".
Another problem exists with section 29, which relates to the policy to designate
only those sites that are under an imminent threat. The effect of such a policy,
which has been attributed to lack of resources 91, is a possible delay in the
implementation of the designation procedure. The NC has first to hear of an
intended operation and then has to persuade the Secretary of State to issue an
Order, by which time it may be too late. This may result in the loss of some key
sites.
The final recourse is the NNR. However, they are intended as reserve powers
only to be very rarely used92. Their use is restricted to those situations where a
landowner refuses to enter into a management agreement on an SSSI or site
subject to an NCO and refuses to sell the property. The only remaining weapon in
90 Because EN may not be able to afford to make such agreements on all sites.
91 Designation under Section 29 not only costs money itself but also implies a willingness on the
part of the NCC to spend more money to protect the site. See earlier discussion at 2)A)i).
92 There are also positive reasons. The NC only wants certain sites as NNRs because not all
qualify for this accolade.
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such a situation is the compulsory purchase order. The designation of a site as an
NNR is a very costly procedure. Consequently the NC will only consider those
sites that are imminently threatened.
2)B)x) Only The Landowner Is Restricted In Carrying Out Activities On The Site
There is the problem that persons visiting the land cannot commit an offence and
many sites are subject to extensive public accesso. There is no way of excluding
or controlling the public apart from the landowners exclusive property rights.
Such a gap is important because, as Lord Inglewood pointed out, SSSIs "can very
easily be destroyed by access just as historic houses can easily be destroyed by the
feet of those thousands who come and visit them" (Hansard:HL418,12-3-
1981,442).
2)b)xi) Code Of Guidance
According to Ball (1985:773), this code "has become useless. Its purpose to
provide a non-statutory framework for protection of SSSIs was removed by the
strengthening of the original Bill. That left it with little to do except add a few
93 Unlike the TCPA 1971, Section 102, on tree protection which allows the prosecution of
contractors, Section 28 does not create any offence capable of being committed by anyone other
than owners or occupiers. This exact problem occurred inSouthern Water Authority v NCC [1992]
3 All ER 481, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
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comments on NCC practice and to explain the Act in a slightly more palatable
way"94.
2)b)xii) Delay In Implementation Of NCOs
Because of the fact that only those sites under imminent threat are designated as
NC0s, designation may often come too late. The NC has to discover the threat
and then persuade the Secretary of State to issue an order, all of which takes time.
As can be seen from the problems of the 3 month pre-notification period for
SSSIs, sites can be destroyed in a very short period of time.
2)b)xiii) Wording of emergency defence
Under section 28(8)(b) it is a defence to liability under section 28(5) that the
operation was an emergency one. This leaves it open for landowners to carry out
an operation and then claim that it was an emergency. The NC only have to be
notified after the fact and it is difficult to ascertain the nature of the operation after
it has already been performed.
94 See Appendix 1. The code of guidance was introduced for SSSIs in the Committee stage of the
Lords. It was replaced by the notification procedure for SSSIs at Report in the Commons when the
code of guidance was moved to a separate clause.
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2)b)xiv) AaNQI_App&4121.aths,_&11figgimar	 • •
Until a site has been notified under the provisions of section 28, the controls in the
WACA do not apply95 . Even sites that had previously been notified under the
NPACA 1949 would not benefit from this additional control until they had been
re-notified.
2)c) Drafting Criticisms
It was felt that there were major omissions from the remit of the Act and that there
were serious defects in the provisions enacted. According to Lord Burton, "it is
riddled with anomalies", "It is a mammoth compilation of restrictive legislation
couched in phraseology that is most difficult to understand. The result is, I fear,
that the law will be brought into disrepute" (Han.sard:HL415,16-12-1980,1062).
2)c)i) Occupier Not Fully Defined
An offence under section 28 can be committed only by an owner or an occupier of
that land. These owners or occupiers will be aware of the designation of the site
as an SSSI because either they will have been notified or when buying the land
they will have been informed of its existence because it is registrable as a local
land charge. This leaves a difficult situation regarding those with common rights
on land. If they are not considered to be either owners or occupiers of the land
95 Although the Code of Guidance urged such landowners to voluntarily comply.
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then they will commit no offences under section 28. However, if they are
construed as such, to bring them within the remit of the section, then the NC has
the almost impossible task of notifying all persons with common rights of the
designation of the site. Those sites already designated would also require
notification and this would represent an enormous workload for the NC and render
the controls invalid until the notification has been completed.
2)c)ii) Nature of PDOs
The major problem with PDOs is that neglect of a site is not covered and on many
sites this would be just as harmful as some of the listed operations. The reason
that neglect is not included is due to the nature of PD0s, they are positive actions
that are restricted, rather than inaction. In addition, only those operations
specifically listed by the NC are restricted. "Apart from being unduly uncertain
and productive of work, this invites landowners to commence an operation
claiming that it is not covered" (Ba11,1985:773).
2)c)iii) NC Has No Power Of Entry
The NC has no power of entry to a SSSI96. This means that many sites could be
lost through neglect and for those damaged by the carrying out of PDOs the NC
cannot go into a site to see if an offence has been committed97.
96 Although it does for NCOs.
97 Although a power to see if Section 29 order is justified is available under Section 51.
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3) CONCLUSION
As can be seen from part 1 of this chapter, the voluntary approach is central to the
protection of habitats. A large number of criticisms were made of the provisions
of the Act and with the use of a voluntary system in part 2 of this chapter. Not all
the defects in the provisions were seen at the time. Some only became obvious
when the system was operating. A number of the problems were addressed by
later action, for example in the Wildlife and Countryside (Amendment) Act 1985
(WACAA), and by the provision of greater resources for the NC.
Of these criticisms made of the system the structural ones must be the most
serious. However, the problem of conflict with agricultural policy would exist
regardless of the system introduced for habitat protection. It is not strictly a defect
of the SSSI system. A number of the drafting defects could be solved by the
enactment of amending legislation98 and many of them could have been avoided.
The reason for the existence of most of these is that protection for all sites 99 was
introduced rather late in the Parliamentary stages of the enactment of the
WACA100 . However, some of the design defects could have been easily avoided
such as the three month pre-notification loophole. Given that there was so much
98 And a number of them have in the WACAA 1985.
99 Rather then just those that satisfy the criterion of Section 29.
100 For details see Chapter 6.
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criticism of the Act, particularly of the design, it must be asked why such an
approach was adopted.
The defects discussed here will give a benchmark by which to measure whether
the operation of the WACA matches expectations of it, or whether the view of
Denyer-Green (1985:10) that "the continuance of this Act on the Statute Book is
in fact causing more damage than good" is more appropriate.
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CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESIS 1
1) HYPOTHESIS 1
Chapter 3 tests hypothesis 1, effectively why a compulsory system was not chosen
for the protection of habitats since there was a workable mechanism already being
used for species protection. Hypothesis 1 focuses upon the disparity between the
use of treasure in the habitat protection system and the use of authority in the
species protection system. The hypothesis is that the system adopted for species
protection was perceived' as inefficacious and was thus regarded as inappropriate
for protecting habitats. This hypothesis only considers the negative side of the
research question, why authority wasn't used to protect habitats. It does not
provide any explanation for the positive side of why treasure was chosen.
Part I of the WACA, which relates to species protection, took a very different
approach from Part II, which concerns habitat protection. The species protection
system is founded upon the use of authority and involves the establishment of
blanket criminal offences of interfering with specified wildlife The restrictions
relate to the killing or talcing of certain animals or birds or disturbing them during
the breeding season or when rearing young. This is accompanied by a list of
exceptions and defences for acceptable activities. Many of these will require
1 Whether it was in fact efficacious or not does not matter, it is how it was perceived that is
important in influencing the choice of implementation mechanism.
68
permission or a licence from an official body. In addition, there are prohibitions
against buying, selling, advertising or importing certain species. The taking or
destruction of wild plants is also an offence.
Some protection for species is also provided through the common law. Under the
common law wild creatures are afforded no rights of their own. Consequently any
protection must be provided through the rights of the 'owner'. However they are
not strictly the subject of ownership. They are subject merely to a qualified
ownership by the landowner. This qualified ownership consists of an exclusive
right for the landowner to catch, kill and appropriate the animals on his land.
According to Blade v Higgs (1865) 11 H.L.C. 621, as soon as the animals are
killed or taken they fall into the ownership of the landowner, even if killed by a
trespasser2. Plants are part of the land and are thus owned. Therefore, property
rights may be used to provide some form of protection from destruction and
appropriation for wild plants and animals against persons other than the
landowner.
Anyone who kills or injures a wild animal or picks a plant on someone else's land
commits the tort of trespass and interference with property3 . So, a landowner can
bring an action against an offender in the civil courts. The remedy for the
landowner would normally consist of damages for the value of the item taken or
2 Although in Scotland they belong to the taker. See Leith v Leith [1862] 24 D 1059.
3 Land includes for legal purposes all trees, shrubs, hedges, plants and flowers growing thereon,
whether cultivated or wild. They attach to the realty and are thus part of the estate owned by the
landowner.
69
destroyed. In the case of continued breaches it would be possible for the
landowner to seek an injunction from the court to restrain any further action4.
Some form of protection is also provided by the law relating to theft. However
this is only relevant to plants. A person who uproots plants may commit the
crimes of theft and criminal damage. Wild animals are not the subject of such
protection because only domestic animals can be stolen.
However, it is with the legislative provisions that we are concerned here, the
positive steps taken by Parliament to protect species, so that the choice of
authority can be compared with the choice of treasure to protect habitats.
The hypothesis considers whether the system for species protection was
inefficacious and thus a different approach was needed to ensure the protection of
habitats. To determine this question, the species protection system will be
explained and then its practical application will be evaluated5.
4 This approach was employed by Paul and Linda McCartney to prevent deer hunting on their
land.
5 It might seem that the system must have been successful in order to justify its continued use in
the WACA because, as with the habitat provisions, species were protected before the enactment of
the WACA and the controls used are based upon the same approach as that used in earlier Acts.
However, this cannot be assumed. As will be shown in Chapter 4, the voluntary system of habitat
protection was failing and yet was retained in principle in the enactment of the WACA. The
species system may also have been inefficacious thus rendering it unsuitable for habitat protection
but being retained for species protection for any number of reasons (such as Parliamentary time,
political consensus etc.).
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2) THE SPECIES PROTECTION SYSTEM
The primary protection for species is contained in Part I of the WACA 1981.
There are also Acts dealing with specific species such as seals 6, deer7, and
badgers8
 and there is a multitude of legislation providing incidental protection
relating to hunted species 9. In addition, the Conservation (Natural Habitats)
Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No 2716) create some further offences regarding
certain animals and plants. Because all the species protection Acts adopt the same
approach, using authority, the discussion below will concentrate on one example.
The chosen example is the protection provided by the WACA. This has been
selected because it encompasses the majority of protected birds, animals and
plants. In addition, for the purposes of a comparison with the habitat protection
provisions, comparing two approaches adopted in the same Act to some extent
eliminates possible variables that may have been influential on choice of
implementation mechanism.
6 The Conservation of Seals Act 1970.
7 The Deer Act 1991.
8 The Protection of Badgers Act 1992.
9 Such as deer, game birds, wildfowl, rabbits and fish. See for example the Salmon & Freshwater
Fisheries Act 1975 and the Salmon Act 1986. For more details see Reid (1994).
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2)a) Birds
Under section 1(1) it is an offence to intentionally m kill, injure or take any wild
bird l 1 or to take, damage or destroy a nest while it is in use or being built, or to
take or destroyu the eggs of any wild bird. It is also an offence under section 1(2)
to be in possession or control of a wild bird (alive or dead) or part thereof or an
egg of a wild bird. No offence will be committed under section 1(2) if the bird or
egg had not been killed or taken, or had been killed or taken without contravening
the provisions of the Act. In addition, no offence will be committed under section
1(2) if the bird or egg had been sold without contravening the provisions of the
Actu. Under the provisions of section 2, no offence is committed if the action
concerns a Part I Schedule 2 bird i4 and it is outside the close season for that
species defined in section 2(4). Also, under section 2(2), no offence is committed
10 It is no defence that the accused did not know that the bird was wild: Kirkland v Robinson
[1987] Crim LR 643.
11 Section 27(1) defines wild bird as "any bird of a kind which is ordinarily resident in or is a
visitor to Great Britain in a wild state but does not include poultry". Poultry means domestic fowls,
geese, ducks, guinea-fowls, pigeons, quails and turkeys. Also excluded from the definition of wild
bird (except for the purposes of sections 5 and 16) are game birds, which are defmed as pheasant,
partridge, grouse (or moor game), black (or heath) game or ptarmigan. In addition, under Section
1(6) any bird shown to have been bred in captivity is not a wild bird. A bird will only be treated as
bred in captivity if its parents were lawfully in captivity when the egg was laid.
12 Section 27(1) defmes destroy as doing anything to the egg which is calculated to prevent it from
hatching.
13 See later discussion of Section 6 regarding the sale of birds and eggs.
14 These are certain other game birds and wildfowl.
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in relation to Part II Schedule 2 birds 15 if the action is taken by an authorised
person16.
Under section 1(4), if any of the offences is committed in respect of a bird listed in
Schedule 1, then a special penalty is incurred. Section 21 provides that the
maximum penalty for committing one of the above offences is increased from
£1000 to £5000 17 when a Schedule 1 bird is involved. There is also an offence
under section 1(5) of intentionally disturbing a Schedule 1 bird on or near its nest,
or disturbing its dependent young. This also incurs the higher penalty. Schedule
I is divided into two parts; the birds in part I are protected by the special penalty
at all times, those in part II are only protected by the special penalty during the
close season that is defined in section 2(4) 18. Outside the close season, the
ordinary offences under section 1 apply but the special penalty will not arise.
Section 3 gives the Secretary of State the power to provide for "areas of special
protection" for wild birds (bird sanctuaries). All areas of special protection are
also designated as SSSIs, so they provide extra protection for birds in these areas.
They are designed to control the activities of parties entering the land. Under
15 This originally listed 13 common birds considered to be pests, all have now been removed by SI
No 3010 1992.
16 Section 27(1) defines authorised persons as the owner/occupier of the land on which the action
is taken or any person authorised by them; any person authorised by the Local authority; and with
regard to actions concerning birds, any person authorised in writing by such bodies as the NC and
water authorities.
17 Originally from £200 to £1000.
18 For capercaillie and woodcock 1st February to 30th September, for snipe 1st February to 11th
August, for wild duck and wild geese 21st February to 31st August and in any other case 1st
February to 31st August.
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section 3(1)(a), the order can extend the protection given to ali o wild birds in the
area so that the disturbance of such a bird while it is building a nest, or on or near
a nest containing eggs or young, or the disturbance of the young, is also an
offence. In addition, under section 3(1)(b), the order can make it an offence to
enter the area or any part of it at any time or at specified times. Under section
3(1)(c) the order can provide for offences under parts (a) and (b) to be subject to
the special penalty provided in section 21. An exemption is still provided for
authorised persons in respect of Schedule 2 Part II birds. The order can only be
made with the consent of the owners/occupiers and according to section 3(3)
"shall not affect the exercise by any person of any right vested in him, whether as
owner, lessee or occupier of any land in that area or by virtue of a licence or
agreement".
Under section 4 there are various defences to offences under sections 1 and 3.
Section 4(1) concerns actions in pursuance of a requirement by the Minister of
Agriculture Fisheries and Food or the Secretary of State under section 98 of the
Agriculture Act 1947 and sections 21 or 22 of the Animal Health Act 1981.
Section 4(2) provides defences for the taking of injured birds for the purpose of
tending it and later releasing it, or for the killing of an injured bird where there
was no reasonable chance of recovery, and where the action is "an incidental
result of a lawful operation and could not reasonably have been avoided". Section
4(3) provides a defence to the killing or injuring of a wild bird, except a Schedule
1 bird, when the action is necessary for livestock or crop protection, disease
19 Or specified wild birds.
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prevention or the protection of public health and safety. The burden of proving
these defences is on the defendant20.
Section 5 prohibits certain methods of killing or taking wild birds21 . It is an
offence under section 5(1)(a) to set in position articles of such nature and so
placed as to be calculated to cause bodily injury to any wild bird coming into
contact with them. This restriction applies to "any springe, trap, gin, snare, hook
and line, any electrical device for killing, stunning or frightening or any
poisonous, poisoned or stupefying substance". It is an offence under section
5(1)(b) to use for the purpose of killing or taking a wild bird any of the above
mentioned articles or any net, baited board, bird-lime or similar substance. It is an
offence under section 5(1)(c) to use for the purpose of killing or taking any wild
bird any bow or crossbow, any explosive other than ammunition for a firearm, any
automatic or semi-automatic weapon, any shot-gun having a muzzle more than
one and three quarter inches in diameter, any device for illuminating a target or
any sighting device for night shooting, any form of artificial lighting or any mirror
or other dazzling device, any gas or smoke or any chemical wetting agent. Under
section 5(1)(d) it is an offence to use as a decoy "any sound recording or any live
bird or other animal whatever which is tethered, or which is secured by means of
braces or other similar appliances or which is blind, maimed or injured" for the
purposes of killing or taking a wild bird. It is also an offence under section 5
20 The standard of proof is not beyond reasonable doubt but the less onerous balance of
probabilities: R v Hudson [1966] 1 QB 448.
21 This section has since been amended by the Wildlife & Countryside (Amendment) Act 1991.
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(1)(e) to use any mechanically propelled vehicle 22 in immediate pursuit of a wild
bird for the purpose of killing or taking that bird 23 . Offences under section 5(1)
carry the special penalty on conviction.
Defences to section 5(1)(a) are provided in section 5(4). The defendant must
show that the article was set in position "for the purpose of killing or taking, in the
interests of public health, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, or nature conservation,
any wild animals which could be lawfully killed or taken by those means and that
he took all reasonable precautions to prevent injury thereby to wild birds".
Section 5(5) permits the use of cage traps or nets by authorised persons for the
purpose of taking a bird in Part II of Schedule 2, the use of nets for the purpose of
taking wild duck in a duck decoy that is shown to have been in use immediately
before the passing of the Protection of Birds Act 1954 or the use of a cage-trap or
net for the purposes of taking any game bird if the taking of the bird is solely for
the purpose of breeding.
It is an offence under section 6(1)(a) if a person "sells, offers or exposes for sale,
or has in his possession or transports for the purpose of sale any live wild bird
other than a bird included in Part I of Schedule 3 24, or an egg of a wild bird or any
part of such egg". It is also an offence under section 6(1)(b) to advertise such
22 The defmition in Section 27(1) includes aircraft, hovercraft and boats.
23 Some of these restrictions are because of the cruelty of the methods, other because they are
considered unsporting.
24 These are birds bred in captivity which have been ringed or marked in accordance with the
Wildlife & Countryside (Registration & Ringing of Certain Captive Birds) Regulations 1982 SI No
1221 1982 (amended by SI No 478 1991).
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buying or selling. Section 6(2) provides similar limitations in respect of dead
birds or anything derived from them that are included in Part II or 111 25 of
Schedule 3 if the person is not registered in accordance with regulations made by
the Secretary of State. Contravention of section 6(2) is subject to the special
penalty. Section 6(9) provides for persons authorised by the Secretary of State to
enter and inspect premises where a registered person keeps wild birds for the
purpose of ascertaining whether an offence under section 6 is being or has been
commifted on the premises.
Section 16 provides exceptions from certain offences if a licence has been
obtained from the appropriate official authority. These licences can be granted
for: scientific or educational purposes; ringing or marking wild birds; conserving
wild birds; protecting any collection of wild birds; falconry or aviculture; public
exhibition or competition; taxidermy; photography; preserving public health or air
safety; preventing the spread of disease; preventing serious damage to livestock,
foodstuffs for livestock, crops, vegetables, fruit, growing timber or any other form
of property or to fisheries; protecting any zoological or botanical collection.
2)b) Animals
The offences are similar to those for wild birds. It is an offence under section 9(1)
for any person intentionally to kill, injure or take wild animals listed in Schedule
25 The birds in part III are protected only from 1st September to 28th February.
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526 . It is also an offence under section 9(2) to have in one's possession or control
any such animal alive or dead or any part thereof. An offence will not be
committed if the animal had not been killed or taken, or had been killed or taken
without contravening the relevant provisions27, or had been sold without
contravening the provisions of the Act. There are additional offences in section
9(4) that relate to the intentional damage or obstruction of places of shelter or
protection or the disturbance of an animal while occupying such a place. In
addition, under section 9(5), it is an offence to sell, offer or expose for sale, or
have possession of or transport for sale or advertise any live or dead wild animal
in Schedule 5. For these offences, the animal is presumed to be wild unless the
contrary is shown.
Section 10 provides exceptions to these offences 28 for anything done in pursuance
of a requirement by the Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food or the
Secretary of State under section 98 of the Agriculture Act 1947 or in pursuance of
an order under the Animal Health Act 1981. The offence in section 9(4) of
interference with structures does not apply to anything done within a dwelling
house. As respects anything done in relation to bats, section 10(5) restricts the
defence to the living area of a dwelling house unless the NC have been notified
26 This includes all bats, certain reptiles and amphibians, but only the rarest mammals, fish,
butterflies and other creatures. A number of species were added to the Schedule in SI 1992 No.
2350. In addition, further offences are provided in the Conservation (Natural Habitats etc.)
Regulations 1994 for those species listed in Schedule 2 to the Regulations. These are known as
European protected species.
27 This includes provisions of the superseded Conservation of Wild Creatures and Wild Plants Act
1975.
28 The same as those for birds under Section 4.
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and been allowed a reasonable time to advise on whether the operation should be
carried out and, if so, which method should be used.
Section 10(3) provides defences for taking of animals where the animal was
injured and the purpose was to tend and release it, the killing of animals where the
animal is so seriously injured that it would not recover or if the act was an
incidental result of a lawful operation and could not reasonably have been
avoided. In addition section 10(4) provides a defence if the action was "necessary
for the prevention of serious damage to livestock, feedstuffs for livestock, crops,
fruit, growing timber or any other form of property or fisheries". This defence
will not apply where it had become apparent before the action was undertaken that
it would be necessary and a licence under section 16 had not been applied for as
soon as reasonably practicable after that fact became apparent, or an application
for such a licence had been determined.
Section 11(1) covers illegal methods of killing or taking any wild animals29.
Section 11(2)(a) prohibits the setting in position of traps, snares, electrical devices
for killing or stunning or any poisonous, poisoned or stupefying substance
calculated to cause bodily injury to any wild animal included in Schedule 6.
Schedule 6 animals are also protected from the use of nets, automatic or semi-
automatic weapons, devices for illuminating a target or night sighting devices,
artificial light or mirrors or other dazzling devices, gas or smoke, sound
29 The use of self-locking snares, bows, crossbows, any explosive other than ammunition for a
firearm and any live mammal or bird used as a decoy are prohibited.
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recordings used as decoys and any mechanically propelled vehicle in immediate
pursuit of the animal for the purpose of driving, killing or taking that animal. A
defence is provided in section 11(6) where the article was set in position 'for the
purpose of killing or taking, in the interests of public health, agriculture, forestry,
fisheries or nature conservation, any wild animals which could be lawfully killed
or taken by those means' and that all reasonable steps to prevent injury to wild
animals included in Schedule 6 were taken.
For all offences the maximum penalty provided by section 21(2) is £500030. It is
also an offence under section 11(3) if snares that may be used to trap animals that
are not in Schedule 6 are not inspected at least once every day. The maximum
fine for this offence is provided by section 21(3) and is £250031.
2)c) Plants
Under section 13(1) it is an offence for anyone except an authorised person to
intentionally pick, uproot or destroy any wild plant included in Schedule 8 and to
intentionally uproot any wild plant32. An authorised person is the owner or
occupier, or any person authorised by the owner or occupier or any person
authorised by the local authority. It is also an offence under section 13(2) to sell,
30 Level 5 fme. It was originally £1000.
31 Level 4 fme. It was originally £500.
32 Wild plant is defined in Section 27(1) as any plant which is or (before it was picked, uprooted or
destroyed) was growing wild and is of a kind which ordinarily grows in Great Britain in a wild
state.
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offer or expose for sale, or have possession of or transport for sale any live or dead
wild plant included in schedule 8 or to advertise to this effect. A defence is
provided by section 13(3) where it is an incidental result of a lawful operation and
could not reasonably have been avoided33.
2)d) Enforcement
If a constable reasonably suspects that a person is committing or has committed an
offence under Part I of the WACA, section 19(1)(a) authorises him to stop and
search that person if he reasonably suspects that evidence of the commission of
the offence may be found. There is also a power under section 19(1)(d) to seize
and detain anything that may be evidence of the commission of an offence34.
Section 19(2) confers a power of entry to land other than a dwelling house if a
constable suspects that a person is committing an offence.
2)e) Penalties
Where an offence has been committed in respect of more than one bird, nest, egg,
other animal, plant or other thing, section 21(5) provides that the maximum fine
which may be imposed should be determined "as if the person convicted had been
convicted of a separate offence in respect of each bird, nest, egg, animal, plant or
33 Further offences are created by the Conservation (Natural Habitats etc.) Regulations 1994 for
European protected species listed in Schedule 4 of the Regulations.
34 According to Whitelaw v Haining [1992] SLT 956 this is not restricted to circumstances where
there has been a search under the previous provisions.
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thing". In addition, under section 21(6), the court shall order the forfeiture of any
bird, nest, egg, other animal, plant or other thing in respect of which the offence
was committed. The court may also order the forfeiture of "any vehicle, animal,
weapon or other thing which was used to commit the offence".
Under section 18(1) any person who attempts to commit one of the offences will
be guilty of an offence and "shall be punishable in like manner as for the said
offence". Under section 18(2) any person who has in their possession, for the
purposes of committing an offence, anything capable of being used for committing
an offence will be guilty of an offence and punishable on the same basis as if the
offence had been committed.
3) PROTECTION MECHANISMS COMPARED
The mechanisms used for the protection of species and habitats are very different.
The habitat protection system relies on voluntary codes of conduct and temporary
restrictions on harmful actions to reach a voluntary management agreement with
landowners. The species protection system relies on criminal offences to prevent
harmful actions with exceptions provided in licences, i.e. a regulatory style
system.
Although very different approaches have been adopted, the two systems are
linked. This is because of their subject matter. To protect species it is necessary
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to protect their habitats 35 . Because species protection legislation was well
established by 1981 and the habitat protection legislation was in its infancy36, it
must be questioned whether the reason why a similar approach was not adopted
was because the species system was regarded as inefficacious. If the system for
the protection of species did work there may be some other reason why it was not
used to protect habitats37.
4) EFFICACY OF THE SPECIES PROTECTION SYSTEM
To prove or disprove hypothesis 1, the protection for species that existed before
1981 must be comidered38. These controls were primarily contained in the
Protection of Birds Acts 1954, 1964 and 1967 and the Conservation of Wild
Creatures and Wild Plants Act 1975. The provisions regarding birds, animals and
plants were codified and extended in Part I of the WACA described above.
The RSPB have called the provisions of the Protection of Birds Acts "a major
success". They were "self explanatory, unambiguous, easily understood". The
1954 Act "formed a model much admired by conservationists in other countries"
(RSPB,1984:para63). The RSPB recognised that there were some weaknesses but
35 A factor that was not considered until relatively late in the development of legislation for nature
conservation. For more detail see Chapter 4.
36 See Chapter 4 for details.
37 Although many commentators have preferred the land use planning approach to the use of
criminal sanctions for habitat protection. As will be shown this is linked to the perceived purpose
of the habitat protection provisions when they were first introduced in 1949. This issue is
discussed in more detail in chapter 4.
38 Because a proof of hypothesis 1 would require this previous protection to be inefficacious.
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these were "mostly technical in nature" and "have been rectified by the Wildlife
and Countryside Act 1981" (RSPB,1984:para64).
Little else has been written as to the efficacy of these provisions. As will be seen
in Chapter 4, the provisions in the WACA were essentially a codification of the
existing protection with some strengthening of the provisions. Thus, comment on
Part I of the WACA is a useful indication of the perceived efficacy of the controls
in use before. However, a similar lack of comment is also present with the
provisions of the WACA. Even though section 24 of the WACA provides for the
NC to revise the schedules and provide advice, no mention of Part I of the Act is
made in the annual reports of the conservation agencies. The only source of data
available is that published by the RSPB on numbers of offences under Part I of the
WACA concerning birds39.
However, this absence of comment does not preclude a conclusion on this issue.
It may well indicate that the system was efficacious. If the working of the system
is not contentious it will not receive much attentiono. This is represented in the
debates on the WACA when most attention was focused upon Part II of the Act.
The majority of debate on Part I related to the inclusion or exclusion of species
from the Schedules rather than the approach used. It is also represented in the
House of Commons Environment Committee Report of 1985 on the operation of
39 See for example RSPB (1995) and earlier annual versions.
40 Unlike the voluntary system for habitat protection which has been highly controversial and
much has been written about it.
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the WACA which concentrated solely on Part II although their remit was the
whole Act. In their evidence to this committee, the RSPB also concentrated their
criticisms on Part II of the Act. The few criticisms that were made of Part I were
drafting rather than structural or design defects. Friends of the Earth (FOE) in
their proposed Wildlife Bill have also concentrated solely on Part II of the Act.
There are of course problems with the system. There is no such thing as a perfect
control, however, the problems are more limited in nature than those present in the
habitat protection system. They are general problems experienced with the use of
criminal sanctions in any area of law. Examples include the difficulty of
discovering that offences have occurred41 , and the drafting of offences and
defences42. The other main problem is that not all species are covered by the
protection, only those listed in the Schedules43 . As Reid points out, "by requiring
the express prohibition of the undesired conduct, there is a risk that some forms of
harm, or some species in need of protection, will be omitted, or will come to be
appreciated only after the law is in place" (Reid,1994:80). However, the use of
schedules listing protected species partly circumvents this problem as the
schedules can easily be amended.
41 This is of course also a problem with the habitat system. If no notification has been given to the
NC of an intention to carry out a PDO the only chance of discovery is if someone informs the NC
of the offence or one of the NC's officers visits the area.
42 See for example RSPB (1992) proposals 26, 28 and 32.
43 Except for birds.
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In addition there is the problem of identification. Can people identify these
particular species so as to avoid harmful actions? As de Klemm and Shine point
out, "long lists of species are of relatively little use if few people can recognise the
species concerned" (de Klemm & Shine,1993:121). There is also the problem
experienced generally with the use of criminal sanctions of enforcement. It is
often difficult to prove the intent necessary for some of the offences. However,
most of the criticisms are minor and there does seem to be a general satisfaction
with the system". The provisions may be ignored by hardened criminals, but
others are impressed by the symbolic threat of punishment, particularly with strict
liability offences.
The main problems that arise are with the practical enforcement processes. The
RSPB expressed concern that "the government have put time, effort and money
into the passing of legislation and its general administration yet has not seriously
tackled the problem of enforcement" (RSPB,1984:41). The RSPB also refer to
"the unsatisfactory way in which provisions for licensing various otherwise illegal
activities have been interpreted and put into effect by a variety of Government
departments and agencies" (RSPB,1984,29).
5) CONCLUSION
Although there are a number of criticisms that can be made of the system of
species protection, the apparent satisfaction with the mechanism adopted can be
44 See for example NCC (Annual Report,1984) praising the success of bird protection legislation.
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seen in its continued use in the Protection of Badgers Act 199245 and the Deer Act
1991. As mentioned previously, this is of course not conclusive of the system's
perceived efficacy. The voluntary approach has continued to be used 46 despite
being inefficacious47 . However, the continued use of the voluntary approach has
been highly contentious48
 unlike the continued use of criminal sanctions for the
protection of species. It therefore seems improbable that the efficacy of the
species protection system influenced the choice of approach for habitat protection
in the WACA. Thus hypothesis 1 is not proved.
'45 The controls have been extended in Section 3 to protection of badger setts and this too is in the
form of criminal sanctions. The very existence of this provision therefore negates the argument
that criminal sanctions are inappropriate for protecting areas.
46 In the implementation of the EC Directive on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild
Fauna & Flora 92/43/EEC which is discussed in Chapter 10.
47 As will be shown in Chapter 9.
48 See Chapter 10 for examples.
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CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESIS 2
Any policy implementation mechanism is likely to reflect the objectives of that
policy. Hypothesis 2 therefore considers whether the 'purpose' of habitat
protection policy was a determinant in the choice of mechanism. This chapter will
consider whether the objectives of the habitat protection system differ from those
of the species protection system. If there is a difference, this may indicate that the
objectives of protection were determinants in the choice of implementation
method. There are two elements that will be considered concerning the choice of
implementation method: the first is negative, why criminal sanctions were not
employed as they had been for species protection; and the second element is
positive, why the voluntary approach was chosen'.
The purpose of introducing the controls, as stated by the Goverment in the DoE
consultation paper, was the implementation of its international obligations2
 and
"to ensure that the most valuable wildlife resources can be conserved for the
nation". This rather opaque statement gives no real guidance for the purposes of
this chapter. Therefore, to ascertain what the objectives of the protection were, the
evolution of the policy to protect habitats and species must be considered. The
question that must be asked is why the protection was introduced and what it was
intended to do. Once the objectives have been identified they can be contrasted to
I Rather than, for example, extended planning control over agricultural operations.
2 For details of these see below at Section 2 part 2)d).
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determine whether any differences explain the decision not to use criminal
sanctions to protect habitats and the adoption of the voluntary approach.
SECTION 1- INITIAL OBJECTIVES OF SPECIES AND HABITAT
PROTECTION: A COMPARISON
The first part of hypothesis 2 involves a comparison of the objectives of the
species and habitat protection systems. The objectives of the policies to protect
species and habitats must be identified and once this has been done, these
objectives can be compared. If these are different, it can then be ascertained
whether the objectives of the habitat protection system were a determinant in the
decision not to use criminal sanctions as they had been for species protection.
This comparison with the objectives of the species protection has a dual function,
in addition to providing a context for the question of why criminal sanctions were
not used, it also performs a 'control' function. What is meant by this is that if the
objectives and implementation method of the species protection system were not
consistent, it would then be impossible to formulate a valid theory as to the
objectives of the habitat system being a determinant. Only if it can be shown that
the species protection objectives and methods are consistent can any explanation
be proposed as to the influence of the objectives of habitat protection. In addition,
it is instructive to consider the objectives of the species protection because they
have formed the foundation for the policy of habitat protection and many of the
values embodied in both systems are connected.
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The primary task is, then, the identification of the objectives of protection. These
are linked to the evolution of the policy to protect and what the species and
habitats were deemed to require protection against. The objectives cannot be
identified by looking solely at the 1981 Act. It is necessary to consider the
historical evolution of the policies of protection to identify the objectives. A
comparison will thus be made on the basis of the first protection introduced for
both species and habitats. It may appear that a comparison of the objectives in
1981 would be more instructive; however, the controls introduced in 1981 were
substantially founded upon the earlier protection and the values embodied in the
objectives of the legislation have evolved gradually. A comparison will therefore
be made of the initial objectives. Section 2 will then consider if these objectives
had changed by 1981 and if this was a determinant in the choice of
implementation method.
SECTION 1 PART A - SPECIES PROTECTION
1) RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR PROTECTION
1)a) Systems Already In Place - The Game Laws
The first form of protection for species arose after the Norman Invasion when the
Royal Forests and chases were established by William The Conqueror. Vast tracts
of land were set aside as sporting preserves and a code of laws was established to
protect the trees and wild animals within their boundaries. No person might hunt
within these preserves without the permission of the King. However, the purpose
of the protection thus afforded was merely to prevent those people without
permission from exploiting these resources as they were considered to be the sole
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property of the King. The purpose of controls was therefore the protection of
property rights. In 1389 an Act 3 was passed restricting those who did not have
sufficient income from hunting. The penalty was one years imprisonment4.
Under the Stuarts, unauthorised hunting of game anywhere in the kingdom was
viewed as an offence against the royal prerogative5. Those who did not posses
enough property to comply with the requirements of the game laws were
prohibited from hunting, even on their own land. So, on the coast sea-birds and
eggs were regularly taken and the poaching of game by the unqualified also
proliferated. Such exploitation of these natural resources was occasionally so
extensive that Parliament intervened to preserve individual species of wildlife6.
However, such protection was contingent on the creatures being of explicit benefit
to man. The protection afforded was purely for reasons of benefit for those with
hunting rights. The utility of the animals concerned was the paramount
consideration. The purpose of the legislation was the restriction of use of a
valuable resource.
Such laws did, however, have some positive influence. The influence of the game
laws and the cruelty legislation can be seen today. There are still restrictions on
3 See 13 RII Si XIII.
4 For other examples see also 1482 EN VI concerning swans, 1494 HVII XVII concerning
pheasants, partridges and the eggs of hawks and swans, 1503 HVH XI concerning deer, 1522-3
HVIII X concerning hares, 1533 HVIII XI concerning wildfowl and 1581 El X concerning
pheasant and partridge.
5 For a discussion of the monarchy's attitude to property rights in game see Munsche (1981).
6 For examples see 1604 JI XXVII, 1609 JI XI, 1670 CH XXV, 1706 A XIV.
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game and the restrictions in methods of killing and talcing 7 are often to prevent
cruelty. The laws that laid down the close seasons for game animals and game
birds were as much an important element in wildlife conservation as in the
maintenance of the sport of shooting, although only those various birds that came
under the denomination of 'game' were afforded protection by the law, and the
number of species so protected was sma118 . Commenting on the situation Russell
(1897:614) said "We have, no doubt, to thank the sporting spirit of our forefathers
for preserving (at the cost of many human lives and much human bloodshed and
suffering) several at least of these species from complete extermination"9.
1)b) Scientific And Philosophical Influences
After the Royal Society was founded in 1663, a new momentum was given to
scientific research. Experimentation on animals then became more prevalent.
Those conducting research discovered previously unknown physical resemblances
between animals and human beings. The comparative anatomists were also
conducting research into what was considered to be an exclusively human
attribute, the mind. This "neurological experimentation suggested that the senses
functioned in people exactly as they did in animals" (Turner,1980:4), but such
7 Which can be seen in section 5, WACA 1981.
8 According to Russell (1897), those birds protected included: pheasant, partridge, grouse, black-
game, ptarmigan, bustard, landrail, woodcock, snipe, quail, wild-duck, widgeon and teal.
9 However, these laws wrought alterations in the populations of predatory animals which were
extensive and frequently devastating. Foxes, polecats, hawks and owls were 'controlled' and
frequently killed off because they were considered to be detrimental to the interests of the game,
notwithstanding that both the predators and their prey had coexisted happily for thousands of years
before man thought of 'protecting' the game.
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scientific evidence of the similarity of men and animals did not necessarily
guarantee that animals would become the subject of compassion.
However, synchronous with the discoveries made by scientists about anatomy and
neurology were the works of moral and religious writers. These served to arouse
the moral sensibilities of the general public and an altruistic trend was inaugurated
in the 1700s. A great influence was exerted by the spiritual, moralistic movement
that is labelled Evangelicalism. The general complacency and the belief in an
assured place in Heaven that was characteristic of so much of the established
church's perception in the 1700s, was now disrupted by a novel desire for
salvation from original sin. Here in omnifarious forms was a religion that
necessitated acts of "profound submission and re-orientation in order to be saved:
the subject must undergo within himself conversion to the Lord and must
thereafter work constantly and unselfishly for the good of others rather than
himself' (Cornish & Clarlc,1989:68). Virtue was associated with omnipresent
benevolence.
Benevolence incorporated more than merely doing good; "its acolytes stressed the
tender passions - supposedly natural to human beings - that prompted and
accompanied acts of charity" (Turner,1980:5) m. By the end of the 1700s, other
ideologies had coalesced with the cult of benevolence. This signified an abrupt
alteration in the pattern of attitudes toward animals. One of these ideologies was
10 Although according to Turner (1964), the doctrine of benevolence accentuated sympathy with
the suffering of others, with the emphasis on the sympathy rather than the suffering.
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Utilitarian morality". Once morality had been reduced to a calculus of pleasure
and pain, it was difficult to exclude any sentient being from the doctrine of
benevolence. "The Rights of Man soon expanded, for some, to the Rights of
Animals" 12 (Turner,1980: 13).
1)c) The Voluntary Groups
Against this background, protectionist societies were founded. According to
Sheail (1976), they modelled themselves on existing pressure groups, such as the
Anti-Slavery Society. The first was the Royal Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) 13, founded largely by evangelical humanitarians,
which was primarily concerned with reducing cruelty to domesticated animals
(Harrison,1967). It became the largest and perhaps the most influential voluntary
organisation in Britain in the second half of the 18000 4. The important role the
Society played for the Victorian middle and upper classes was partially
consequential on the growing recognition of the affinity of man and beasts with
the erosion from the late 1700s of the concept of man as a supranatural being".
According to Harrison (1973:814), "The very emergence of the RSPCA was a
symptom as well as a cause of increased humanity to animals". Animals became
11 Usually linked with Bentham.
12 See for example Salt (1892) Animal Rights.
13 The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was founded in 1824, and obtained its
royal charter in 1840.
14 This society in turn became the model for latter ventures, including the Selbome Society and the
Society for the Protection of Birds, founded in the 1880s.
15 He was no longer considered different from and superior to other living beings.
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the beneficiaries of the effusive sentimentalism that was to become a fundamental
characteristic of the era.
The Victorians "became obsessed by the threat of human animality to the dignity
and uniqueness of man and to the maintenance of morality and civilisation.
Cruelty to animals was so disturbing, not only because of what it did to the
victims, but also because of what it implied about human nature"
(Lowe,1983b:330). According to Sheail (1976:9), "the protectionists believed that
in saving wildlife, they were also helping to preserve the very fabric of society" 16•
The enthusiasts frequently appeared perturbed by cruelty to animals more because
of what it implied about people than because of what it did to their victims".
Whilst the RSPCA's primary concern was with cruelty to domesticated animals, it
also played an important role in the promotion of the first legislation to protect
wild birds".
The Selborne Society for the Protection of Birds, Plants and Pleasant Places,
which was founded in 1885, was the first national organisation directly concerned
with the protection of wildlife. In 1889 the Society for the Protection of Birds was
founded specifically to stop the plumage trade. The first meetings were held in
the offices of the RSPCA. However, the Society expanded from an anti-plumage
16 The same attitude can be seen in the gentry's attitude to the game laws. For detail see Munsche
(1981).
17 In the 1800s legislation often had to be recommended on grounds other than humanitarianism;
'bull-baiting, for instance, was to be condemned less because it was cruel than because it
demoralised the people, or unfitted them for work' (Harrison,1973:786).
18 Discussed later in section 3.
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movement into an organisation concerned with the general protection of wild birds
and was granted a royal charter in 190419.
2) ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL CRUELTY
In 1822 Richard Martin obtained a measure to prevent cruelty to cattle and thus
established the principle of using legislation to protect animals from cruelty.
There were many opponents to legislation against cruelty and as the forerunner of
the legislation to protect wild birds it provides a useful illustration of the prevalent
attitudes of the time and the preferred approach to the prevention of cruelty.
Many of the arguments raised in the debates on proposed legislation against bull
baiting in 1800 were to reappear later when the issue of protecting birds was
raised.
2)a) Underlying Assumptions of The Provisions
Four main themes can be identified in Victorian thinking on the use of legislation
in preventing cruelty.
1) In the 19th century legislation was an integral part of social reform in all areas.
The advocates of legislation were intent on transforming the principles of the
general public. Cruelty was often viewed as a problem of the working classes and
legislation was generally seen as the best way to control these working classes.
19 See Sheail (1976) Chapter 1 for details of the activities of these groups.
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The advocates of legislation, primarily the RSPCA, were supported mainly from
the middle and upper classes and the government at the time was also fairly
unrepresentative of the working classes (Harding,1966). In the debate on the
Cruelty to Animals Bill in 1809, Windham argued that the proposed legislation
should be entitled "A Bill For Harassing and Oppressing Certain Classes Among
The Lower Orders of His Majesty's Subjects" (Amyot,1812,Vol.3:315).
2) The legislation proposed was for the prevention of cruelty and was therefore
required to preserve the fabric and morals of society". As Harrison (1973:815)
points out, "the RSPCA pioneers had very much more in mind than the mere
defence of animals: their movement aimed to civilise the lower orders, .... They
believed that the state must curb animal cruelty in the course of exercising its
general responsibility for promoting the citizen's moral growth" 21 . Cruelty to
animals implied a capacity to inflict harm on humans especially since the
recognition of animals as close 'relatives' of man. Referring to the slaughter of sea
birds at Flamborough Head, Mr Newton said: "Could men blaze away hour after
hour at those wretched birds without being morally the worse for it?"
(RSPCA,vol.10).
20 This attitude can also be seen nearly a century earlier in the debates over the Game Laws. The
advocates of preserving the Game Laws believed that they were also preserving the morals of
society. By preventing the lower classes from hunting or shooting game they were making sure
that they were not led astray and were fit and healthy for work. For more detail see Munsche
(1981).
21 The RSPCA based its attack on badger baiting, bull running and cock fighting on the premise
that they were exclusively patronised by the "lowest and most wretched description of people"
(Harrison, 1973:819). The RSPCA was slow to attack sports like steeple chasing and hunting
which were popular among its aristocratic supporters.
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3) The belief that animals were put upon the earth for the use of man. The utility
arguments that were so persuasive with regard to the game laws were also raised
for the protection of wild birds. Mr F Buckland expressly referred to the utility of
seabirds to justify their protection (RSPCA,Vol 10).
4) The importance of education, as an essential partner to legislation, both to
facilitate law enforcement and change public opinion22. During the nineteenth
century, "it was widely believed that legislation would be the most effective way
of controlling human behaviour, and consequently a great deal of attention was
given to securing wild bird protection acts and county by-laws for preserving wild
plants. It was hoped that lessons at school, posters, pamphlets and other forms of
propaganda would facilitate law enforcement and win greater public sympathy for
wildlife" (Sheai1,1976:idii). By 1855 the RSPCA was urging clergy and masters
of national schools to include kindness to animals in the system of education
among the poorer classes (Harrison,1973).
These four themes are very well illustrated in a letter to The Times on 6 June 1872
by Lady Burdett Coutts who was a member of the Ladies (Education) Committee
of the RSPCA. "One of our (the education committee) main objects is the
diffusion of information respecting animals, and an endeavour to promote their
humane treatment; firstly, because life is in itself too sacred to those who inherit it
to be tortured or tormented with impunity; secondly, because habitual and
unchecked licence in regard to wanton destructiveness of an animal life must re-
22 This too was directed at the lower classes.
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act most injuriously on man. The brutal practices occasionally, and not
infrequently brought under public notice by the press seem not to receive from the
directors and promoters of education the attention which the subject deserved.
Under our social system there is a deadly germ of cruelty habitually seething
which it is impossible not to connect with the criminal acts occasionally bursting
through legal restrains. Might it not be wise to impose additional checks, and to
impress on the cruel, the thoughtless, and the heartless, through the law, that life
whether in man or beast, is sacred in its eye and that animals endowed with
sensation are given to man for use, and may not be lightly regarded by him, and
must never be abused".
2)b) Arguments Against Legislating
One of the most prominent opponents to legislation against cruelty was William
Windham. "Laws never ought to be called in but where other powers fail"
(Amyot,1812,Vol.111:315) said Windham in the 1809 animal cruelty debates.
Another opponent of the animal cruelty legislation in the 1820s was Sir Robert
Peel who said, in 1824, that such matters were "too minute - too much the
property of local custom and regulation - to be fit matters for legislation"
(l-larrison,1973:816). A number of arguments that were made against legislating
have been identified by Harrison.
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2)b)i) Legislation Was Unnecessary
The most compelling argument was that cruelty was already in decline. As such,
legislation would be unnecessary. Windham argued in 1800 that bull-baiting "is
already so much fallen into disuse, that it seems as if the bill has been brought in
lest it should be quite abolished before it could be passed"
(Amyot,1812,Vol.1:339)23.
2)b)ii) Legislation Would Obstruct Humanitarianism
The purpose of legislating was humanitarian, to prevent cruelty. However, it was
claimed that, far from assisting humanitarianism, legislation might obstruct it.
"A £5 fine", said Mr Escott in a parliamentary debate on regulating
slaughterhouses in 1844, "was only calculated to make a man who had paid it,
vent his spite in a more virulent degree when he had an opportunity. We ought to
trust to education ..." An unforced kindness was more likely to benefit the
animals, more likely to benefit the moral growth of the population"
(Harrison,1973:814). Legislation might increase the incidence of cruelty and this
would be detrimental to the morals of society.
23 However, there was evidence of continued incidents of bull-baiting to counter this
(Harrison, 1973).
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2)b)iii) Parliament's Time Was Too Precious
Legislation against cruelty was also regarded by some as a trivial issue of relative
unimportance. Windham argued in 1800 that Parliament's time was too precious
to be spent on cruelty legislation "in times like the present, when questions of vital
importance are hourly pressing on our attention" (Amyot,1812,Vol.1:332). "They
were legislating for pigeons", said Earl Fortescue in 1884, during a debate on trap
shooting, "when affairs at home and abroad were calling urgently for attention"
(Harrison,1973:814).
2)b)iv) Legislation Would
Opponents of legislation argued that even if the need for legislation against cruelty
could be admitted in principle, in practice such legislation would fail. The
argument centred on the complexity of the legislation. This was of particular
importance given that it was directed towards the lower classes where illiteracy
was widespread. According to Harrison, these criticisms reflected a doctrinaire
distaste for state intervention. The Earl of Lauderdale and Joseph Hume, devotees
of political economy, were leading opponents of the legislation. According to
Harrison (1973:816), "there was much to be said at the time for Hume's 1849
argument that 'the multiplication of Acts might render the matter difficult instead
of simple'. For quite apart from the inefficiency and corruption rife in
contemporary government, illiteracy was widespread, and reliance on prosecuting
working people might divert effort away from the popular education which he and
other political economists energetically promoted".
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2)b)v) Legislation Would Interfere With Liberty
Opponents of the legislation also argued that it could be effective only if it
interfered with the liberty of individuals. It was claimed that this interference
would alienate public opinion24. Windham claimed that by introducing such
legislation "you inflict pains and penalties, upon conditions which no man is able
previously to ascertain. You require men to live by an unknown rule. You make
the condition of life uncertain by exposing men to the operation of a law, which
they cannot know till it visits them in the shape of punishment"
(Amyot,1812,Vol.3:310). The attack on 'grand motherly legislation' was
commonplace in Victorian parliamentary debate. The doctrine of laissez faire was
compelling.
2)b)vi) The Sectarian Purpose Of The Legislation
The final challenge was that animal cruelty reformers were pursuing some
sectarian purpose. Participation in 19th century charities did bring undoubted
social and sectarian benefits, especially to the evangelicals. "We ought to take
care", claimed Windham, "how we begin new eras of legislation ... we ought to
have a reasonable distrust of the founders of such eras, lest they should be a little
led away by an object of such splendid ambition, and be thinking more of
themselves than of the credit of the laws or the interests of the community". The
24 Which was regarded as crucial to legislative success. This argument is also seen in the debates
on Part II of the WACA. The extension of controls over habitats was regarded as unduly
interfering with the rights of the landowners.
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legislature should consider "whether those who engage in the attempt ... may not
do far more harm than good" (Amyot,1812,Vol.3:304).
To counter these arguments, campaigns were initiated to increase public concern
for animals. This was one of the areas discussed by Dicey, where evangelicals
and utilitarian radicals joined together in promoting humanitarian reform. The
writings of Bentham and J.S.Mill contained several passages justifying state
interference in this sphere.
3) THE PUSH FOR WILDLIFE PROTECTION LEGISLATION
It was not until the mid 1800s that any significant progress in wildlife protection
was made. Cruelty to animals had become one of the major humanitarian
preoccupations of the century and more orthodox ornithologists came round to the
idea of bird protection. Two trends have been distinguished from the early 1700s
that influenced the issue of protection of wildlife. The first was the establishment
of frequently ephemeral learned societies or clubs and the second was that of
establishing philosophical clubs where interested persons could meet and discuss
natural phenomena of all kinds (Sheai1,1976). By the mid 19th century, many had
evolved into natural history societies and clubs 25. The popularity of natural
history was an epiphenomenon of the increased opportunities for leisure with the
new prosperity of industrial Britain. The study of natural history "provided an
outlet for the contemporary obsession with travel and self improvement. For the
25 For more detail see Allen D (1976) and Barber (1980).
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devout Victorian, it comprised one of a restricted range of morally acceptable
pastimes ... Nature was a revelation of God's order and purpose. To study it,
therefore, was itself a devout act" (Lowe,1983b:333).
Membership of the natural history societies 26 stood at around 100,000 by the
1880s so there were large numbers of people aware of the significance of wildlife.
This is because, "implicit in natural history is an esteem for the objects of study
and an interest in preserving them, if only for the purpose of study"
(Lowe 1 983b:335). Most were specifically motivated not by a wish to protect
nature, but by a desire to collect and study it, in fact they were avid collectors.
The collecting zeal was somewhat intrinsic to natural history.
3)a) The Source Of Threat To Species
The period from the 1840s onwards saw growing disquiet amongst naturalists
about the excesses of collecting. Allen (1969:54) notes the concern of botanists at
the fern craze of the mid 1800s that resulted in "the clearing of large tracts of
countryside of all their more accessible ferns". Naturalists were exceptional in
their outlook on wildlife. According to Sheail (1976:2), "most people, including
Parliament, continued to be concerned about wildlife only when it encroached on
their livelihood and well-being".
26 The preservation of wildlife was included among the objectives of some of these new societies.
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Many continued to believe that concern about collecting was unfounded. In 1897
Russell (1897:616) commented that "Much foolish clamour and senseless abuse is
often directed against ornithologists, whose greatest ambition is to add some new
bird to the British list, for shooting the rarest birds as soon as they see them. The
charge may be true, but the offence is, on the whole, excusable. If a vulture is
foolish enough to perch on the rocks in Cork Harbour, as one did in 1843, it must
expect to be shot and placed in a museum. It is far better in the cause of science,
that the three rustic buntings which landed on our shores should be captured and
identified than that their lives should be spared. It is impossible to determine,
with any degree of certainty, the species of such stragglers without shooting them,
and the sacrifice of their lives adds to ornithological knowledge, and may possibly
throw light on the mysterious laws of migration".
The prevention of cruelty was uppermost in the minds of the preservationists.
This attitude is indicated by the comments of Professor Newton in a letter dated
26 March 1869. In referring to the proposed provisions in the Wildfowl
Protection Bill 1869 he said, "The chief object of the Bill is to stop the barbarous
and disgusting slaughter which ... is yearly perpetuated at places like Flamborough
Head" (RSPCA,Vol. 10). The protection of eggs was not seen as a fundamental
part of the protection of the birds. An exception was made in the Bill for those
taking eggs for food. In fact, Professor Newton said at a meeting of the RSPCA
on 10 March 1869, that he would object to any protection for eggs because the
taking of them contributed very little to the declining numbers of birds. The main
value of the birds was seen as the protection they afforded to seamen against
shipwreck as they warned of the proximity of the coast (RSPCA, Vol. 10).
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3)b) Methods Of Protection Available
Three methods of protection were considered for the preservation of wildlife from
cruelty and over-collecting: legislation, education and nature reserves. According
to Sheail (1967:22), "most commentators rejected nature reserves as ineffective
and costly. They were at best stop-gap measures when the other two methods
failed27. It was far more effective to pass legislation which would have an
immediate effect on cruelty and over-collecting". Education was regarded as
ancillary to legislating, assisting in its enforcement. Legislation did not always
work and this was recognised by the Committee established by the British
Association to consider enacting a close time for the shooting of sea birds.
Referring to the proposed Wild Bird Protection Bill of 1872, they commented that
"the measure appears to them to attempt too much and not to provide effectual
means of doing it. In their former reports they have hinted at, if not expressed,
the difficulty or impossibility of passing any general measure, which without
being oppressive to any class of persons, should be adequate to the purpose.
Further consideration has strengthened their opinion on this point. They fear that
the new Act, though far from a general measure, will be a very inefficient check to
the destruction of those birds, which from their yearly decreasing numbers, must
require protection" (RSPCA,Vol.12).
27 The debates on Part II of the WACA show a reversal of this thinking. Reserves or areas are
seen as the primary means of control with sanctions only as a last resort.
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The general view seemed to be that the most effectual protection to animals was
that afforded by public opinion. Such a change in attitude was regarded as
necessary for the protection of all other forms of wild life as well. However,
legislation was still seen by many as the foundation of protection. Opponents of
the Bill thought that the legislation would be even more troublesome than the
Game Laws and used this as a justification for denying the necessity of the
protection.
3)c) The Bird Protection Laws
One of the first successful campaigns on behalf of the preservation of wild birds
was the Sea Birds Protection Act 1869. Its purpose was to stop parties of
'sportsmen', mostly from towns, from slaughtering sea-birds during the breeding
season, when it was easier to kill very large numbers of birds (Sheai1,1976). Such
excursions had become more frequent following the construction of the railways.
Various tradesmen soon realised the benefits of such a cheap source of plumage
and offered to purchase the wings and other choice parts of the young birds28 . The
cruelty occasioned during these excursions and the dramatic fall in the number of
sea-birds at Flamborough Head and elsewhere had aroused little concern until, in
1867, the Reverend Francis Orpen Morris petitioned Parliament for the protection
of wild birds. He was unsuccessful in his attempt. The following year the
28 In order to secure even greater profits, the fashion of decorating hats with bird plumage was
encouraged.
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Reverend H.F.Barnes took up the cause. In the same year Alfred Newton29
complained of the sporting men from London and Lancashire who were wiping
out Yorkshire's sea-birds, in his address to the British Association Conference at
Norwich. In 1869 the Sea Birds Protection Act was passed, securing a close-time
for sea- birds during the breeding season. According to Harrison (1973:790),
"This Act was to wild birds what Martin's 1822 Act was to animals in general".
The debate surrounding the Act raised the issue of shooting and its impact on bird
populations. The birds' role in preserving the balance of nature and in keeping
down harmful insects was emphasised. The defence of wild birds rested largely
on evidence about their diet". However, Russell (1897:618) noted that the
schedules of protected birds included very few insect-eating birds that he thought
had a special claim as "friends of the agriculturalist".
The British Association committee', the RSPCA and the Association for the
Protection of British Birds promoted further legislation in 1872, 1876 and 1880.
These subsequent Acts were viewed by some commentators as an indication of the
failure of the legislation. As Russell (1897:615) said, referring to the 1869 and
1872 Acts, "It does not seem that either of these Acts was successful in attaining
its object, for they were shortly followed, in 1876, by an Act for the Preservation
29 Professor of Comparative Anatomy at Cambridge and a leading member of the British
Ornithologists' Union.
30 The Select Committee of 1873 on the protection of wild birds was almost exclusively
preoccupied with this topic.
31 Established to consider 'the possibility of establishing a close time for the protection of
indigenous animals'.
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of Wild-Fowl. This Act proceeded to impose increased fmes, which is commonly
the sign that legislation of this sort has been a failure". He considered it "useless
to attempt merely to protect certain defmed species because a malefactor almost
always managed to escape by protesting that he was in pursuit of some kind of
bird which was not mentioned in the Act"32. This constitutes a major problem
with legislation for the protection of birds. Very often a protected species cannot
be identified until after it is shot. The RSPCA's attitude to the 1880 Wild Birds
legislation was to enforce the Act to highlight the defects so that ultimately an
efficient law would be enacted.
4) CONCLUSION - OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF THE
PROTECTION OF SPECIES
It would appear that the primary objective of the species protection legislation was
humanitarian. "Nature preservation in its early days was almost entirely an
emotional issue, fired by outrage at the barbarity of fellow man" (Sheai1,1967:4).
The prevention of cruelty was therefore the main impetus behind the push for
legislative protection.
The recognition of cruelty was a result of the realisation of the links between man
and animals through scientific advances. The recognition of cruelty against wild
animals as opposed to domestic animals was a consequence of the growing
interest in natural history. The first legislative provisions related to birds that had
32 For further examples of the criticisms of these Acts, see Lloyd (1924).
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been subjected to some of the most obvious cruelties. "Without the conspicuous
cruelties and visibly intolerable destruction wrought upon these animated
creatures [birds], there almost certainly would have been no conservation
movement until a very much more recent period, and certainly not a movement of
such breadth and such zeal. Ornithology, unquestionably, was the pacemaker"
(Allen D,1980:35).
The natural history societies, as well as supporting legislation against cruelty,
were responsible for much damage themselves. The collecting of plant and insect
specimens took some time to be recognised as damaging and many believed that
the collecting of eggs did not require control. "The love of bird's nesting is deeply
rooted in the heart of boys; it is one of the outlets which a taste for natural history
takes; a taste which it is more desirable perhaps to foster than to check ... Public
opinion would not sanction an Act of Parliament of the requisite severity, and the
filling of our gaols with small boys which would follow" (Russell,1897:621). Part
of the reasoning behind this approach was the continued view of natural history as
a godly pursuit. Collecting was seen as an essential part of natural history and,
not being a pastime of the lower orders of society, was not seen as in need of
legislative control. It was only when collecting became so extensive that it came
within the remit of cruelty that action was taken. Other species, such as ferns, had
suffered at the hands of the collectors but there were no obvious cruelties to stir
the humanitarians to push for their protection. However, as concern about
collecting increased, science started to exert a greater influence. This emphasised
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the utility of certain species for man33 . As evidence on the diet of birds became
known the concept of ecosystems began to emerge.
The prevailing religious doctrines of the time meant that cruelty was seen as
morally degrading. Legislation and criminal sanctions were regarded as the
appropriate means of controlling this cruelty, particularly as the prevailing belief
was that the lower orders of society were responsible for cruelty.
Despite the great reliance on legislation to control cruelty and over-collecting,
education was regarded as the most effective long term protection for wildlife. In
the interim, legislation would limit the damage inflicted and education would
assist in the enforcement of that legislation. It was hoped that lessons at school
and other forms of propaganda would facilitate law enforcement and win greater
public sympathy for wildlife. As result, the history of the nature preservation
movement in the 19th century revolved around an endless succession of
Parliamentary Bills and the organisation of public appeals and educational
programmes (Sheai1,1967).
SECTION I PART B - HABITAT PROTECTION
1) RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO PROTECT
State intervention in habitat protection came relatively late in Britain. Whereas
steps had been taken to protect individual species by the end of the nineteenth
33 This argument was the primary justification for the old Game Laws.
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century, habitats had not even been considered as needing protection. "It took a
long time for public opinion to grasp ... the necessity for taking care of the
environment" (Nicholson,1974:v).There was no cruelty to habitats, "botany and
entomology were free from this extra ingredient of sport-induced aggressiveness,
their greater emotional neutrality meant that it took people far longer to be move
to outrage in their defence. 'Cruelty to plants' was hardly viable as a rallying cry"
(Allen D,1980:36). It was the influences of science and concern at collecting that
had emerged at the end of the nineteenth century that were to prove important.
"The first twinges of conscience arose ... not out of pity for the victims, not
through any emotional identification of the collector with what he collected, but
out of shock and indignation at the wanton damage to nature, the waste of not
unlimited natural raw material, that the more reckless were gradually noticed to be
perpetrating" (Allen D,1980:37). Ideas of nature's usefulness to man were
therefore resurfacing.
However, habitat protection was merely regarded as incidental to protecting areas
of aesthetic appea134, "the special concerns of naturalists were very much
subordinate to the overriding concern of preserving these areas simply as pieces of
countryside. The idea of reserves specifically for wild life was something that the
natural history had to generate for itself - and, in retrospect, it was remarkably
slow to do" (Allen D,1980:43).
34 In the 1860s the Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society succeeded in
saving Epping Forest, Hampstead Heath and several other major London commons from would-be
developers.
112
1)a) Philosophical & Social Influences
Instrumental in the evolution of a policy to protect habitats was a change in the
concept of the balance of nature. During the eighteenth century, this concept
connoted "a robust, preordained system of checks and balances which ensured
permanency and continuity in nature. By the end of the nineteenth century it
conveyed the notion of a delicate and intricate equilibrium, easily disrupted and
highly sensitive to human interference" (Lowe,1983:337). This changing
perception of nature arose because, with the industrial revolution, the emphasis on
Darwinism and man as a part of nature broke down and instead man came to be
seen as a major force in nature's destruction (Egerton,1973). This destruction led
to great concern at the loss of valued natural features, because faith in their
renewal had been destroyed. The permanency of nature was no longer guaranteed.
In turn, this led to the recognition of the rarity of nature and its vulnerability to
man's interference.
The central question then became which actions necessitated control. What
constituted destruction 35? Because of the re-evaluation of nature and man's place
in it, a different perception of what constituted destruction was formed. There was
a "reversal of the rationalist, progressivist outlook deriving from the
Enlightenment which, with its confidence in the perfectibility of all things, had
looked always to the improvement of nature and society through the exercise of
35 This changing perception of what constitutes destruction is central to any evaluation of the
system. It can only be judged for its effectiveness at preventing the type of damage that it was
intended to prevent.
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human reason" (Lowe & Goyder,1983:19). Actions that had previously been
considered as advantageous and for the 'improvement' of nature were now
classified as destructive and necessitating control. Development was now
associated with the destruction of wildlife. Man's destruction of nature through
urbanism and industrialisation reflected physically the pessimism felt about the
rest of society. The end of the nineteenth century saw an end to the optimism and
self-confidence of mid-century, sapped by the great Depression of the 1880s.
When coupled with a disappointing industrial performance, this led to an
antipathy towards the industrial spirit. The social and economic changes that had
occurred during the century were reassessed. Industrialisation, the source of their
wealth and power, was also responsible for their destruction. In this, nature
simply reflected the problems elsewhere. In this respect nature performed a
symbolic function, it provided a record of this destruction. The destructive power
of these forces was there for all to see. Nature provided a contrast to the
conventions of Victorian society. This diversity of nature gave character to an
area that was distinct from any others. This was in contrast to urbanised areas and
the tenets of industrialisation.
This led to the Victorians and Edwardians adopting a preservationist approach36.
Arguments were put forward for a duty to preserve for future generations37.The
idea of the collective good and its prevalence over property rights was reflected in
36 This preservationist approach can be contrasted with the US, whose system was based more on
an aesthetic interest in nature. For a detailed discussion see Warren & Goldsmith (1974).
37 This approach can be seen in the British Ecological Society Report of 1944.
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the establishment of the National Trust, which was set up to acquire buildings and
land for the public benefit. The National Trust was established in 1895 and its
aims as set down in the National Trust Act 1907 were "to promote the permanent
preservation, for the benefit of the Nation, of lands and tenements (including
buildings) of beauty or historic interest; and, as regards land, to preserve (so far as
is practicable) their natural aspect, features, and animal and plant life". The
importance of land acquired by the National Trust was its inalienability 38 . The
control of nature brought with it a stability and certainty in contrast to the
operation of the liberalist state. The preservationist approach has been explained
as part of a reaction by an influential minority to economic liberalism 39 . The
rejection of notions of laissez faire and a move towards collectivism was reflected
in the attitudes of conservationistso.
1)b) Nationalism
The individual character that was afforded to an area by virtue of its local nature
was important with the gathering tide of nationalism at the end of the nineteenth
century. Unfavourable comparisons were made with the effectiveness of the
German state in the protection of nature. Writing in 1913, Horwood (1913:629)
38 This is important in relation to compulsory purchase as they have a right of appeal to both
Houses of Parliament against any efforts to purchase such land. In fact the National Trust recently
attempted to use this power in relation to a proposed by-pass encroaching on the Golden Cap estate
in Dorset. See Independent 2-5-1994. However, the proposals for the bypass have now been
postponed and the compulsory purchase orders have been withdrawn. According to an officer of
the NT the procedure has been used successfully before.
39 Philosophers such as J.S. Mill who were an important part of the reaction against liberalism
were leading members of the voluntary conservation groups of the time.
40 For a detailed explanation of the role of collectivism see chapter 8.
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commented, "If there be one direction in which the British Isles is particularly
behindhand, it is in the matter of preserving and protecting the native flora. This
is the more apparent when it is observed that Germany or rather, it should be said,
Prussia, has a well-organised State Department for this purpose, whilst we in
England have neglected to take any such precaution". He reiterated this later
when he said, "It should be some incentive to us in this country to work towards
this ideal, that, as mentioned already, the Prussian Government has a well-
organised department of the State charged with the preservation and protection of
natural monuments. And we would ask, if this be possible in Prussia, can it not
also be made an accomplished fact in England?" (Horwood,1913:633).
1)c) Scientific Influences
The growth of ecology was also to have an impact on the development of nature
conservation policy. "At first everything was concentrated on preserving rare or
distinctive plants and animals by means of legislation, supported by publicity
campaigns. With the development of ecology as a science, the overriding need to
protect the habitat of the individual species became more apparent"
(Sheai1,1976:196). Habitats therefore assumed importance in the protection of
species. Research into ecology began around the end of nineteenth century, and
although their initial influence was limited, ecologists became important as they
began to appreciate the usefulness of nature reserves for their research. The
British Ecological Society was founded in 1913 and was to become an important
voice in conservation matters (Spellberg,1988). The influence of ecology was
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partly due to its scientific evidence of the utility of wildlife. Their interest
brought an appreciation of the need to protect habitats to preserve species. The
ecologists demonstrated that this protection could involve the manipulation of
habitats to maintain particular species. Although this was recognised as a possible
method of protection, the concept that this might be necessary was not entertained
by the wildlife preservationists42. Any ideas as to the protection of habitats
revolved around the idea of 'sanctuaries', with its associated concept of letting
nature alone.
The influence of science was emphasised in 1944 when the BES commented, "Our
native species of plants and animals, their distribution, habits and relationships,
have long been a major interest of British naturalists, who have been increasingly
disturbed by the progressive disappearance of species from many of their old
habitats as the advance of urbanisation destroyed the natural conditions. But it is
the rise in importance of the modem study of ecology that has brought into
prominence the seriousness of this threat to our native flora and fauna from the
scientific as well as from the aesthetic point of view" (BES,1944:50)44.
41 Arguments of the utility of birds can be seen in Russell (1897).
42 This type of manipulation of habitats was only seen as relevant to game preservation.
43 This approach was discussed by the BES (1944:64).
44 The importance of the aesthetic / amenity movement is discussed at 1)D)ii).
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1)(1) The Voluntary Groups
1)d)i) Nature Conservation
As there was no governmental policy on protection of habitats, the protection that
existed was by virtue of the voluntary groups. The method adopted by these
groups was the designation of selected areas or sites that are specially protected45.
By the start of the twentieth century there were a handful of nature reserves. For
example, the Breydon Society bought Breydon Water and declared it as a nature
reserve in 1888 and the National Trust acquired parts of Wicken Fen in 1899. The
NT owned thirteen sites of special interest to the naturalist by 1910 (Sheai1,1976).
However, this was more by accident than design, the emphasis of the National
Trust was on open spaces and scenery 46. However, "naturalists were worried at
the almost random way in which potential nature reserves were acquired, with
apparently little regard for the national significance of their plants and animals"
(Sheai1,1976:60).
The Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves (SPNR) was established in
1912 and was a creation of Lord Rothschild. Its objectives were "to preserve for
posterity as a national possession some part of our native land, its fauna, flora and
geological features". It concentrated on encouraging other groups to purchase and
manage nature reserves rather than doing this themselves. In 1926 the Norfolk
45 This is the dominant approach to this day, with numerous designations such as SSSIs, NNRs,
NC0s, Marine Nature Reserves (MNRs), Local Nature Reserves (LNRs) etc.
46 Many areas of aesthetic interest are also of wildlife interest because a diversity of species etc. is
often regarded as scenic.
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Naturalists' Trust was founded and one of its aims was to protect suitable areas by
establishing reserves. The Norfolk Naturalists Trust went on to buy Cley Marshes
in 1926 and had seven reserves by the 1940s. The Royal Society for the
Protection of Birds bought its first nature reserve (on Romney Marsh) in 1929.
The safety of these reserves lay in the exercise of ordinary property rights. The
limitations of this approach are well illustrated by the RSPB's first reserve, which
had to be abandoned when development on neighbouring land destroyed its
natural interest. The decline of this method of control was foretold by the BES,
they predicted that the protection which they perceived as being provided by the
large landowners would cease because of lack of funds. "This precarious
safeguard of rural beauty will disappear and public action becomes the only means
by which it can be preserved" (BES,1944:49).
According to Lowe & Goyder (1983), nature reserves "remained an esoteric
matter, viewed even by naturalists as a costly and impractical expedient only to be
contemplated as a last resort when a unique spot was threatened by an improving
farmer or speculative builder, and certainly no substitute for protective wildlife
legislation". Many naturalists were sceptical of the value of reserves. They
believed the cost of acquiring and guarding the land would be prohibitive, and the
very act of making a reserve would attract the attention of collectors. The creation
of reserves would simply be an excuse for not tackling the much harder task of
eradicating collecting and bird-catching. The priority was the introduction and
enforcement of legislation against cruelty and over-collecting. According to
Sheail (1976:55), the view was that "a vigorous educational campaign would play
a major role in enforcing the various Acts, orders and by-laws. Convictions and
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stringent penalties would soon make watchers redundant and sanctuaries irrelevant
to wildlife protection". Nature reserves were regarded by most people as a
subsidiary and very expensive means of supplementing legislation, they were
merely a stop-gap measure. The primary concern was with legislation regarding
cruelty towards animals and collecting.
1)d)ii) Amenity
The Council for the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE) was established in
1926. It was concerned with the best use of land from an amenity viewpoint. It
was founded to co-ordinate the activities of the various voluntary bodies, promote
legislation, keep planning schemes under surveillance, and provide an advisory
service to every landowner seeking to preserve the amenity of their property.
Amenity based groups such as the CPRE were an essential component of the push
for national protection for wildlife". "The SPNR realised between the wars that
the only way to become effective was to work closely with those organisations
concerned with amenity and outdoor recreation. By joining forces, naturalists
obtained far greater opportunities for publicising the needs of wildlife and the
benefits of nature preservation" (Sheai1,1976:68). "Naturalists ... were so weak in
countering the ever-increasing dangers to key areas that it was logical for them to
participate in the wider concern for the countryside, and especially the
preservation of amenity" (Sheai1,1976:xiii).
47 For a discussion of the commonality of interest between the conservation, amenity and built
heritage preservation groups, see Lowe & Goyder (1983) Ch 1.
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In 1929, an inter-departmental goverment committee was established under the
chairmanship of Christopher Addison to consider the establishment of national
parks. The committee completed its report in 1931. The establishment of national
parks would have three objectives: to safeguard areas of exceptional natural
interest against disorderly development and spoilation, to improve the means of
access for pedestrians to areas of natural beauty, and to promote measures for the
protection of flora and fauna. Nature conservation thus came to be seen as a by-
product of amenity protection. The problem with this was that the provision of
recreational facilities was irreconcilable with the preservation of wildlife. The
solution forwarded to the Addison Committee by the British Correlating
Committee was the enclosure of areas within national parks for the protection of
wildlife. In addition to this, they proposed the establishment of separate national
nature reserves for the sole purpose of wildlife preservation.
1)e) Conclusion - The Objectives Of Habitat Protection
The perceived objectives of habitat protection differed between the voluntary
groups and the ecologists. The voluntary groups espoused preservationist, anti-
city concerns which were interlinked with issues of amenity. "Common to all the
preservation groups of the period was a moral and aesthetic revulsion to the
contemporary industrial city. They hoped to preserve things and places that had
not yet been corrupted by urban and industrial expansion" (Lowe,1983:339).
Scenery and wildlife went hand in hand. The SPNR saw the purpose of reserves
as "for the enjoyment of lovers of wild nature, the pursuit of scientific knowledge,
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and the well-being of the community in general" (SPNR, Annual Report,1918).
However, this preservationist approach was not shared by the ecologists who
"stressed its potential contribution to the economic exploitation of marginal land,
such as the afforestation of uplands or the reclamation of marsh and heathlands -
just the sort of land-use changes which were anathema to the early
conservationists" (Lowe, 1983:341).
Essentially three things can be identified from this period as influential in the
desire to protect habitats.
(1) Anti-industrialism (the spiritual and aesthetic reactions) was one of the most
influential, particularly when coupled with the changing concept of nature.
(2) Nationalism was important with the patriotic attachment to indigenous flora
and fauna and Anglo-German rivalry.
(3) The growing understanding of ecology.
The voluntary groups, focusing on the first two were the driving force behind
introducing protection through the establishment of nature reserves. However,
their efforts to obtain national legislative protection were unsuccessful. Yet the
need for protection had been recognised. The primary influence was the
preservationist, voluntary lobby but later the scientific influence of ecology was to
become the driving force in national legislative protection of habitats. The basis
of the protection provided was that of threat from urbanism and industrialisation,
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and the approach adopted was preservationist in nature, the setting aside of
particular areas as nature reserves. The solution was private and involved no state
intervention.
2) HABITAT PROTECTION - THE PUSH FOR LEGISLATIVE
PROTECTION
2)a) Reconstructionism
"A profound change in the value of sanctuaries began to occur during the inter-
war period, stimulated by the destruction of the habitat through changes in land
use and management" (Sheai1,1976:55). With the preparations for Post-War
reconstruction, opportunities arose to influence government policy on
conservation. A national policy for protection of nature was now a possibility. In
1941 the SPNR called a conference to consider Nature Preservation in Post-War
Reconstruction. Two of the most important recommendations were the concept of
conservation areas and the appointment of an official body to consider proposals
for nature preservation.
The report of the Scott Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas was
published in August 1942. This affirmed the need to secure a carefully controlled
balance between agriculture and the use of land for residential and industrial
development. The report recommended the establishment of national parks and
gave support to the notion of national nature reserves. The Dower Report"
48 This was published in 1945 and its aim was the development of the proposals of the Scott
Report.
123
defined national parks as "an extensive area of beautiful and relatively wild
country in which for the nation's benefit and by appropriate national decisions and
action, (i) the characteristic landscape beauty is strictly preserved, (ii) access and
facilities for public open-air enjoyment, including particularly cross-country and
foot-path walking, are amply provided, and (iii) wild life and places and buildings
of historic, architectural or scientific interest are suitably protected" (Dower
Report, 1945).
In 1942 the SPNR appointed a Nature Reserves Investigation Committee (NRIC)
to develop the case for nature conservation and draw up a list of proposed
reserves49. The NRIC proposed two types of nature reserves; species reservesso
and habitat reservesn . However, the distinction was rather artificial. As Tansley
(1945:39) pointed out, "rare species usually live in particular habitats and they can
only persist if the special conditions of those habitats are maintained". The case
for nature reserves was strengthened when, in 1942, the Minister of Town and
Country Planning confirmed that the government had accepted a responsibility for
preserving the natural beauty of the countryside and for providing facilities for
outdoor recreation. "This was highly significant for the proponents of nature
conservation because in accepting a responsibility for amenity the government had
to some extent accepted an obligation for wildlife, since plants and animals were
widely regarded as an essential ingredient of amenity" (Sheai1,1976:105).
49 This committee produced a number of reports which are detailed in The Huxley Report
(1947:7).
so Designed to protect rare species of plants and animals.
51 Designed to preserve samples of characteristic habitats with their particular plant communities
and accompanying animals.
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The subsequent year the British Ecological Society established its own committee
to investigate the need for nature reserves and nature conservation. The BES
thought that they were the most appropriate body to consider the issue and draw
up the list of reserves because they had the technical knowledge. "What is wanted
is first of all unequivocal public recognition of nature conservation as a national
interest, implemented by a national scheme and supplemented by local effort"
(BES,1944:74). "Haphazard procedure in nature preservation, valuable as it has
been in the past, now requires to be replaced by a systematic and comprehensive
plan of national scope" (BES,1944:78). The emphasis for nature conservation was
directed towards its scientific value. The debate so far had centred on National
Parks and amenity but the BES believed that they would be inadequate to meet the
requirements of nature conservation. "In the first place there will be too few of
them, and secondly they cannot be managed with primary regard to scientific
needs ... For the purposes of scientific work it is necessary to preserve a
considerable number of areas which are generally much smaller, chosen because
they represent natural habitats bearing single or several plant communities"
(BES,1944:57).
A Wild Life Conservation Special Committee (The Huxley Committee) was
formed, and was given the task of considering the references to wildlife
conservation in the Dower Report and to recommend any amendments or
additions that might be desirable. The recommendations of this committee in
1947 are considered to be the most influential report of this time. The report,
hereafter referred to as the Huxley Report, expressed agreement with the Dower
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Report as to the desirability of the adoption of wildlife conservation "as an
integral part of a comprehensive programme for conservation and development of
our national resources". The effect of this would be to "bring this country into
line in this respect with other progressive countries" (Hwdey,1947:34)52. Part of
the task that the Huxley Report identified was to determine "what general
measures falling within our special field of competence are required to preserve
and strengthen53 the foundations upon which the whole edifice of nature
conservation must stand" (Htndey,1947:5). As part of this, the Huxley Committee
recommended the scheduling of sites of special scientific interest.
2)b) Voluntary Groups
The previous approach of the voluntary groups had been to protect sites through
private ownership. The growth of the state and its corresponding ability to control
the actions of individuals altered this approach. The ethos of collectivism
extended to conservation. They sought to utilise this ability and "promoted the
regulatory function of the state particularly in relation to land-use planning"54
(Lowe & Goyder,1983:23). To do this they had to work with amenity and
recreation groups because "naturalists were a comparatively small and weak
pressure group" (Sheai1,1976:68). A fusion thus occurred of the scientific,
52 Nationalism was therefore still an influence.
53 The use of the words preserve and strengthen imply that the foundations were already in
existence. This could only mean the system of nature reserves owned by voluntary groups.
54 It was, in fact, through the land use planning system that habitats were first protected by the
state.
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amenity and educational aspects of nature conservation. In the words of the BES,
"the motives for nature preservation which are not specific to ecological science
are so mixed with those which are that it becomes misleading to deal with the
latter alone and to omit all reference to the former" (BES,1944:46).
Although the BES approached conservation from an essentially scientific point of
view, they placed a very great emphasis on the amenity side. "The first object of
nature preservation on a large scale, and the aim which naturally and rightly meets
with the most widespread interest and support, is the maintenance for enjoyment
by the people at large of the beauty and interest of characteristic British scenery ...
To preserve unspoiled and free from the chances of development, which wholly
destroys its character and charm, as much as possible of this landscape"
(BES,1944:49). This fusion was not appreciated by the NRIC who adopted a
science-based approach to nature conservation. "To suggest that these complex
problems can be treated merely as an adjunct of schemes for the preservation of
amenities is to admit a fundamental ignorance of the immensely intricate network
of facts and hypotheses that must be considered and unravelled before any plan
worth pursuing for the scientific conservation of nature can be made"
(NRIC,1945:10). However, the links with the amenity groups were to prove the
most fruitful for achieving national protection55.
55 It is interesting to note that amenity and nature conservation are now regarded as totally
separate. Lobbying on the WACA was done independently.
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2)c) The Source Of Threat To Habitats
Many important sites for wildlife had survived so far because they had no
commercial value 56. However, this situation began to change. Development came
to be seen as the major threat. "Under existing conditions destructive changes are
possible at any time and place as a result of the activities of the speculative
builder, of the establishment of new factories or other industrial or public works,
of mining and quarrying, and also, though in a different way, of the activity of the
Forestry Commission" (BES,1944:49). Therefore in finding a solution to
conservation the emphasis was on planning and management to sort out
competing land uses.
Agricultural expansion was not contested in 1940s and 1950s, since the memory
of food shortages during war was still strong. It was not believed that agriculture
would pose any real threat to nature conservation. According to the BES, "It is
unlikely that the total arable area will be further increased to any great extent
because the limits of existing land that would repay cultivation have nearly been
reached" (BES,1944:52) 57 . The commonly held belief was that agriculture and
conservation were not contradictory land uses. "Traditionally, farmers were
regarded as the custodians of the countryside, protecting amenity and sustaining
wildlife as a by-product of their husbandry of the land. For this reason, the
56 Either for agriculture, forestry, building or industrial development.
57 This idea was later seen to be wrong with the increasing mechanisation of agriculture and the
provisions of grants and incentives. See Shoard (1981) for more details.
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National Trust deplored the depression in farming which characterised that late
1920s and early 1930s. It considered neglected pastures and woodlands, ill-kept
hedges and farm buildings, just as harmful to the amenity of the countryside as ill-
placed buildings and industrial development. The Trust rejected any idea of a
clash between progressive and prosperous farming and the naturalist"
(Sheai1,1976:56).
2)d) Underlying Assumptions of Habitat Protection
"In the immediate Post-War period a strong degree of consensus emerged over the
appropriate means for protecting the countryside in Britain. Essentially it was
assumed that protecting agricultural land from industrial and residential
development and providing an appropriate framework of price support for farmers
would combine to produce an attractive rural environment" (Vmter,1991:48).
The idea of the sanctuary was still prominent. All that was needed was to find an
'unspoilt' area and to fence it off. This laissez faire school of conservation
persisted and caused contention with the newer ecologically based
conservationists who insisted that, in Britain at least, such unspoilt areas barely
survived. Thus they proposed that interventionist management was the
appropriate method. "If you 'let Nature alone' ... you frustrate the very aim you
have in view" (BES,1944:58). However, most conservationists were reluctant to
follow this path. The focus of conservation was still on a sentimental, escapist
view of nature rather than as a manageable ecosystem and there was concern about
whether they possessed the technical knowledge to perform this management.
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However, although the need for protection had been recognised, it did not extend
to the control of agricultural operations. At the heart of this thinking was the
notion of custodianship, with farmers perceived as the natural custodians of the
countryside58 . In the event of any conflict, conservation would have to take
second place. According to the BES, "We cannot of course preserve the whole of
what remains. The claims of new building, of agriculture and forestry, must take a
prominent place in Post-War development". Steps should be taken to conserve so
much "as is reasonable and practicable, for our mental refreshment, for the
enjoyment of its beauty, and for the purposes of study and education"
(BES,1944:47)59. This custodianship model has been explained by Winter as "a
direct consequence of the preoccupation with the countryside displayed by the
English upper and middle classes from late Victorian times. It was a
preoccupation with a culturally specific definition of countryside, in which
landscape, buildings and wildlife encapsulate environmental concerns. Many of
the leaders of the environmental groups which emerged in the inter-war period or
earlier perceived no conflict between their concern to preserve a picturesque
countryside and the need for a healthy agriculture" (Winter,1991:48).
So, development was the villain in need of control. However, there is a
fundamental conflict between development and conservation. According to the
BES, "greater development of the country's natural resources is inevitable if
58 It was this custodianship model that was to prove most controversial during the passage of the
WACA.
59 Education is a recurring theme in the conservation debate and has been propounded as the
solution since early Victorian times.
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Britain is to retain her position among the leading nations of the world: at the
same time a national scheme of conservation becomes an urgent necessity if we
are not to hand down to our descendants a land hopelessly impoverished in a most
precious part of its heritage. Conservation is not a sectional interest. Its
importance to the community as a whole is comparable with that of development
and is inextricably knitted up with efficient development" (BES,1944:52). The
NRIC believed that any protective designation should not interfere with the
existing usage of the land. "However attractive it might be to set aside areas
which would eventually become museum pieces illustrating the cultivation and
habits of by-gone days, that is not what the Committee propose. They fully
recognise that the principle of conservation, where applied to areas other than
national reserves, can be carried only so far that it does not unduly conflict with
other national interests in agriculture, forestry, water conservation, carefully
planned development, and the enjoyment of existing amenities" (NRIC,1945:7).
This ethos pervades all subsequent enactments regarding habitat conservation.
2)e) The Formation of the Nature Conservancy
To protect wildlife from the ravages of development, nature reserves would have
to be established. This raised two fundamental questions: who would buy the
reserves, and who would manage them? It was proposed by the Huxley Report
that the Government should take formal responsibility for conservation through a
new specialist service. This was supported by the SPNR and the BES. The
Nature Conservancy was thus established in 1949 and one of its main roles was to
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create a series of protected sites across the nation 60. The responsibilities of the
Nature Conservancy were to provide scientific advice on the conservation and
control of the natural flora and fauna of Great Britain; to establish, maintain and
manage nature reserves in Great Britain, including the maintenance of physical
features of scientific interest; and to organise and develop the related research and
scientific services.
Despite the fusion in the minds of the public and in the discussions of the various
reports, nature conservation was split from amenity, recreation and landscape
matters at an institutional leve1 61 . Nature conservation was the responsibility of
the Nature Conservancy and amenity was the responsibility of the National Parks
Commission62.
3) PROTECTION INTRODUCED FOR HABITATS
3)a) The National Parks & Access to the Countryside Act 1949
The major revolution in the government's attitude to conservation was
encapsulated in the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act of 1949.
With what are really only minor modifications, that Act and the thinking behind it
still govern the way that nature is conserved in Britain today. Along with the
60 The Nature Conservancy derived its statutory powers in relation to nature conservation from the
National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, detailed below.
61 For a discussion of a more fundamental split between the interests of amenity and nature
conservation in the voluntary groups see Allen (1980).
62 Which later became the Countryside Commission.
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Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 63 this provided the foundation of the
national programme of nature conservation.
The NPACA introduced protection for the areas of finest scenery. It adopted the
site designation approach64
 and allowed a number of different designations such as
Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, National Parks, Sites of Special Scientific
Interest and Nature Reserves. The fusion of these aspects, at one level to indicate
the need for protection, led to their separation at an institutional level. The Act
divides the scientific from the recreational aspects of nature. Much of the
prompting for the protection was from the access lobby and this led to a duality of
functions for the Act, landscape conservation and recreation65.
The 1949 Act formalised the belief in the notion of custodianship by relying on
development control for the protection of the majority of habitats. This control
was contained in the TCPA of 1947. However, this was limited in its application
because almost all agricultural and forestry practices were exempt from planning
control. This reinforced the notion of custodianship and the belief that, "left alone
and protected from urban encroachment, the countryside would take care of itself'
(Davidson,1974a:310). It was also in part due to the preoccupation of planners
63 This Act formed part of the reaction to urbanism and the increase in building in the 1930s. It
sought to impose control over most forms of development.
64 The Huxley Report had considered the possibility of a comprehensive scheme of wildlife
protective legislation but considered that it was beyond their remit. lithe Huxley Report had taken
this approach the voluntary approach that we have today may never have existed.
65 The division of natural science from social policy was further exaggerated by the later division
of the Nature Conservancy in 1973 into the executive and managerial Nature Conservancy Council
and the research oriented Institute of Terrestrial Ecology.
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with rebuilding. Planning was not seen as an issue for the countryside per se but
for the prevention of urban sprawl that threatened this countryside. There was
also at this time an emphasis on reviving the farming industry so development
controls over agriculture were inappropriate.
The need for compromise was however recognised in some quarters. "In
particular cases decisions between rival claims to the use of land may well be
difficult. Compromise and give-and-take will be very necessary in the 'country-
planning' that will have to be undertaken, and not only between different possible
economic uses but also between these and the preservation of natural beauty"
(BES,1944:49). The implication, though, was that conservation would have to
give way.
3)b Conclusion - Objectives and methods of Habitat Protection
"Justifications for conservation swung from the moral-aesthetic standpoint of
earlier in the century to arguments of public benefit through amenity and scientific
study" (Lowe,1983:343). A number of objectives were now perceived for
conservation. The anti-urban sentiments were still present along with the
recognition of the destruction that it caused. Ecology had highlighted the
necessity of protecting habitats to preserve species 66 and the usefulness of habitats
for scientific study, and the amenity argument for the preservation of 'natural
beauty' was also strong.
66 In the words of the BES 'it is always the habitat, as the essential condition of the continued
existence of the species, which it is important to safeguard' (BES,1944:79).
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The British Ecological Society did not consider that this multiplicity of views
resulted in conflict. "The various aims and objects of nature preservation, widely
different as they appear to be, are in reality very closely linked. The values
involved are first of all those which are now commonly, though most
inadequately, described as 'amenity' values. These are perhaps the most important
of all, since they touch the deepest sources of mental and spiritual refreshment,
both conscious and unconscious, and of which the specifically aesthetic value is
really a part. Then there are the scientific, the educational, and indirectly the
economic values, and each, ..., reinforces the others. The case for extensive,
carefully and scientifically planned, nature conservation thus becomes extremely
strong". "The ecological interest almost exactly coincides with the aim of
preserving the characteristic charm of British scenery". "There is no conflict
between these two interests - one may actually be made to serve the other"
(BES,1944:50). It is noteworthy that, although the BES wanted habitat
conservation on the grounds of its value for scientific research, they framed their
argument to fit with that of the amenity movement. This was possibly to present a
'united front' and thus increase their chances of influencing government policy.
The Huxley Report on the other hand saw the amenity and scientific movements
as being much more distinct. "The problem of nature conservation had already
been approached, publicly and independently, along two distinct lines of thought
which not unnaturally led to somewhat different conclusions. The one, which
may loosely be described as the aesthetic approach, placed the main emphasis
upon preserving, at least in selected areas, the characteristic beauty of the
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landscape and upon providing ample access and facilities for open-air recreation
and for the enjoyment of that beauty within those areas. This was a matter which
primarily and directly concerned the Ministry of Town and Country Planning.
The other, the scientific approach, while in no way underestimating the
importance of aesthetic values and of their appreciation by the public, was
primarily directed to the advancement of knowledge as such, as well as to the
application of that knowledge to the affairs of the nation" (Huxley,1947:3).
Despite this difference of opinion, it became a generally held belief that nature
conservation should provide opportunities for both scientific study and amenity67.
Huxley recognised this fact but also foresaw difficulties with their integration.
"Their special requirements may differ, and the case for each may be presented
with too limited a vision; but, since both have the same fundamental idea of
conserving the rich variety of our countryside and sea-coasts and of increasing the
general enjoyment and understanding of nature, their ultimate objectives are not
divergent, still less antagonistic. There are many sections of the public with
particular interests, whether recreational, economic or scientific, which are within
their own spheres entirely legitimate and must be taken into full consideration. To
secure that these interests are all fairly met and brought into a workable scheme,
while at the same time safeguarding the natural conditions upon which they all
ultimately rest, presents a problem not without its difficulties" (Huxley, 1947:4).
67 For example see BES (1944:67). They believed that by fulfilling as many of the purposes as
possible, nature conservation would get the widest public support.
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The Huxley Report also claimed that protection was needed because they believed
the nature reserves owned by the voluntary groups to be of little use. "Places of
outstanding charm and interest have been 'protected', but, through lack of
knowledge, indifferent management, or stupidity, their value has waned"
(Huxley,1947:6). The BES also thought that more protection was necessary but
thought that nature reserves had worked well so far. "It is clear that if any
considerable part of our remaining wild life is to be conserved these haphazard
methods are not enough, valuable as they have been in the past" (BES,1944:65).
It had been recognised that national policy for nature conservation was necessary
because the nature reserves owned by the voluntary groups were not enough to
ensure the protection of habitats. The amenity lobby had joined in with the push
for such a policy as part of the National Parks and the result was the enactment of
the NPACA 1949. This was based on ideas of custodianship and education
because the threat to habitats was from development rather than agriculture.
SECTION I PART C - OBJECTIVES AND METHODS: A COMPARISON OF
SPECIES AND HABITAT PROTECTION
Different values and objectives can be seen in respect of the species and habitat
protection. The main impetus for species protection was the prevention of cruelty
and the control of the lower orders of society. Criminal sanctions were thus
regarded as an appropriate way to control cruelty. Habitat protection on the other
hand shows a more diverse range of values and objectives. Arguments of amenity
and science interacted with anti-urban sentiments to identify development as the
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threat to wildlife. Such damaging development was best controlled through land
use planning rather than criminal sanctions and this is reflected in the provisions
of the NPACA. In addition, the notion of custodianship meant that agricultural
operations were excluded from this control. Thus the initial objectives of the
protection suggest that hypothesis 2 is capable of a negative proof, indicating why
criminal sanctions were not used.
SECTION 2- EVOLVING OBJECTIVES OF HABITAT PROTECTION
Section 1 indicated that the objectives of the habitat protection system in 1949
were a determinant in the decision not to use criminal sanctions for the protection
of habitats at that time and to use a planning based control. This was justified
because the source of damage was development. It must now be asked whether
these objectives remained the same until 1981 when the habitat protection system
was extended68. If they did not, can the new objectives explain the continued non-
use of criminal sanctions? If this negative question can be answered affirmatively,
the positive element must also be considered. Will the objectives also explain the
choice of a voluntary approach rather than, for example, the extension of planning
control over agricultural activities?
68 Although it remained substantially similar in nature to the previous controls.
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1) EXTENSION OF PROTECTION IN 1968
During the 1970s it was still perceived that the way ahead lay with voluntary
codes. No attempt was yet made to alter the structure of habitat protection. In
1974 Warren & Goldsmith (1974:7) claimed that "the conservation of natural
resources has been69 and will continue to be achieved by co-operation between
planners, administrators and natural scientists operating within voluntary or
governmental frameworks who can use a range of tactics such as protection79,
management, economic incentive, legislative restriction, or education"n . This
philosophy was obvious in the enactment of the WACA in 1981. Voluntary
methods were definitely favoured. The recommendations of the Countryside in
1970 conferencesn were put into effect in the Countryside Act 1968
(Green,1981). Section 15 of the Countryside Act introduced the management
agreement for SSSIs, the mechanism that was to become the foundation of
protection for habitats. Section 11 of the Countryside Act 1968 requires that
every minister, government department and public body, in exercising their
functions under any enactment, shall have regard to the desirability of conserving
the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside.
69 Their belief that the system had worked so far was soon to be destroyed with the publication in
1981 of loss and damage statistics for SSSIs.
70 What is actually meant by this term is unclear.
71 It is interesting to note that the WACA utilised all of these methods for the protection of
habitats, although legislative restriction and education, the methods propounded for the protection
of species by the Victorians, were the least used.
72 The first of which was convened in November 1963 and the second in November 1965.
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2) THE NEED TO EXTEND HABITAT PROTECTION
2)a) The Voluntary Groups
Popular interest in conservation and media attention gathered momentum through
the 1960s and 19700. The membership of the conservation groups had grown
rapidly. The NCC sought to reform the voluntary conservation movement as a
more effective political lobby. This was an indirect effect when, in 1973, the
Nature Conservancy was split into separate research and conservation functions.
The NCC was established with responsibility for the conservation side. Research
went to the Institute of Terrestrial Ecology. The effect of this reorganisation was
to give access to political power to the conservationists (the NCC was responsible
directly to the DOE). During the 1960s and 1970s the Council for Nature co-
ordinated this force and its influence on government agencies. This was taken
over by Wildlife Link74 in 1979. "While the voluntary conservation organisations
are barred by their charitable status from taking direct political action and
canvassing their policies, they are able to inform Parliament, the media and the
public through Wildlife Link of the pertinent facts about problems"
(Perring,1983 :429).
73 See Brookes et al (1976) regarding media coverage of the environment during the period 1953 -
1973. An analysis of the proportion of space devoted to environmental issues in The Times
showed a steady coverage until 1965 and then a three-fold increase.
74 A committee of the Council for Environmental Conservation.
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2)b) Social & Scientific Influences
Between 1963 and 1970, the 'Countryside in 1970' conferences were held. These
provided important arenas for discussions of the ways in which the countryside
had changed since the war and the conflicts that had been generated between the
main rural interests. "A major theme was that, with the industrialisation of
agriculture and the increasing recreational use of the countryside, measures to
conserve wildlife populations could no longer be confined to nature reserves"
(Lowe,1983:344). There was a change in the whole ideology of protection. Ideas
of preservation from harm now became conservation of resources. "It was clearly
not enough to designate a reserve in order to preserve species from current and
potentially harmful practices: the communities had to be conserved by means of
scientifically formulated management programme? (Sheai1,1976:196).
The increasingly important role of science in this concept of conservation can be
seen in the report of the Royal Society in 1977. "There is the objective to
conserve an ecological situation as it exists and there is then the objective to
conserve an ecological area for scientific investigation. These objectives are
different, although they may at times be combined" (Royal Society,1977:6).
Habitat protection was now regarded as an essential element of species protection.
"Implicit in the conservation of species is the conservation of the living systems,
the ecosystems, of which these species are a part, because in this way their
variation, evolution and activities can also be conserved" (Royal Society,1977:6).
Habitats also became valued in their own right rather than purely as a means of
protecting species.
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2)c) The New Source Of Threat To Habitats
The source of threat was changing. Pollution was an important area of concern.
Incidents such as the heavy spring mortalities of birds and mammals that occurred
in 1959, 1960 and 1961 where seed corn had been dressed with organochloride
pesticides played an important role75. In addition to the pesticide incidents there
were a number of other environmental disasters that received a great deal of
publicity. The Torrey Canyon oil spillage also contributed to make environmental
issues topical. The voluntary groups, which had been founded since the war, in a
period when most developments involving a large environmental impact have
been government linked, tended to focus on government as the source of much
harm. The effect of the pollution scares was great. It had extended the protection
of nature to the protection of man.
In addition, agriculture came to be seen as an important threat. "During the 1960s
and 1970s, wildlife was increasingly affected by changes in land use and
management, and perhaps most significantly by the ploughing up of old
grasslands, drainage schemes, the application of fertilizers and herbicides, and
woodland planting programmes. Many of these changes were piecemeal and
aroused little immediate concern. Large scale industries encountered greater
opposition" (Sheai1,1976:240). According to Baldock (1989:36) "by the
beginning of the 1980s, agricultural policy, especially the CAP, had been
75 See Moore (1987) for a detailed discussion.
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identified as a key threat to nature conservation". King and Conroy (1980)
detailed the destruction of sites from agricultural operations. In relation to
agriculture, therefore, the threat took some time to realise. "The 1974-79 Labour
Government was committed to continued agricultural expansion, and
environmental considerations were relatively minor concerns both in government
policy and the political processes directly surrounding agriculture"
(Winter,1991:49). The emphasis was on the expansion of food production with
little recognition of its implications for rural land use. This expansionism was
only arrested due to lack of demand and not for environmental reasons.
Agriculture as a threat was only realised around 1980 with the publication of
Marion Shoard's book Theft of the Countryside and the publication of loss and
damage statistics for SSSIs by the NCC (Goode,1981). The essential purpose of
the new controls was to halt the destruction from agriculture, and not just in
specific areas but in the wider countryside.
2)d) European and International Obligations
2)d)i) Directive of the Council of the EEC on the Conservation of Wild Birds
79/409/EEC
Although implementation of the Directive, known as the Birds Directive, required
some changes to British legislation it was to a large extent based on existing
British legislation. According to Lord Chelwood the Birds Directive "is modelled
almost entirely on the British birds protection Acts. They came to us for advice
from the very beginning and they have incorporated all the best features of our
legislation" (Hansard, HL 415,16-12-1981, 1028). The RSPB, who had been
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responsible for the drafting of much of the bird protection legislation in the UK,
were involved in the drafting of the Directive. The House of Commons scrutiny
committee that considered the proposals also recommended a number of
amendments that brought it even closer to the British legislation so that few
amendments to Protection of Birds Acts were necessary. Most commentators in
the committee also thought that the UK already met the requirements for habitat
purposes as well. However, as Haigh (1989b:295) points out, "Notwithstanding
the influence of the Protection of Birds Acts 1954-67 on the form of the directive
some changes in legislation were necessary both in respect of habitat protection
and relating to protection of birds themselves".
The need for these amendments initiated the introduction of the Wildlife and
Countryside Act, although, according to Haigh (1989b:296), "It is possible that
the government would have introduced an Act dealing with countryside matters
and wildlife habitats had there been no Directive if for no other reason than to
implement the obligations of the Berne and Bonn Conventionsm
 but the Directive
ensured that existing bird protection legislation had to be amended. The RSPB
were seeking to have the existing Acts amended and the Directive provided the
opportunity". The main changes required by the Directive were to habitat
protection. The directive influenced the timing of the legislation although it is
hard to show that it also influenced the content.
76 Discussed below.
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Only the provisions of the Directive relating to habitat protection will be discussed
heren. Article 2 requires measures to be taken to maintain populations of all
species of wild birds that occur naturally in their European territories. Populations
must be maintained at a level that corresponds to "ecological, scientific and
cultural requirements, while taking account of economic and recreational
requirements"78. The primary duty is maintaining populations; economic and
other considerations are secondary79.
Article 3(1) requires Member States to take measures to preserve, maintain or re-
establish a sufficient diversity and area of habitats for all species of wild birds that
occur naturally in their European territories. Under Article 3(2) these measures
shall primarily include: (a) creation of protected areas; (b) upkeep and
management in accordance with the ecological needs of habitats inside and
outside the protected zones; (c) re-establishment of destroyed biotopes; (d)
creation of biotopes.
Article 4(1) provides that species listed in Annex I "shall be the subject of special
conservation measures concerning their habitat in order to ensure their survival
and reproduction in their area of distribution". To this end member States are
required to classify "the most suitable territories in number and size as special
protection areas". Similar measures must be taken under article 4(2) for regularly
77 For a full discussion of the provisions see Lyster (1985).
78 This is almost identical to article 2 of the Berne convention.
79 See for example Commission v Spain [1993] Case C-355 90 andR v Secretary of State for the
Environment ex parte RSPB Times August 2nd 1996.
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occurring migratory species. In doing so particular attention should be paid to the
protection of wetlands. Article 4(4) requires Member States to take steps to
"avoid pollution or deterioration of habitats or any disturbances affecting the
birds" in the special protection areas and to strive to do so outside those areas.
2)d)ii) The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat 1971
This is known as the Raznsar Convention. It was drawn up after a series of
international conferences and technical meetings held under the auspices of the
International Waterfowl Research Bureau in the 1960s 80. It was signed on 2
February 1971 and came into force on 21 December 197581 . Article 2 provides for
the designation of wetlands for inclusion in a list of Wetlands of International
Importance. These should be selected because of "their international significance
in terms of ecology, botany, zoology, limnology or hydrology" and should include
wetlands of international importance to wildfowl at any season. Further wetlands
can be added to the List by Contracting Parties and boundaries of wetlands already
in the List can be extended. Wetlands can be deleted from the List or their
boundaries restricted because of urgent national interests under article 2(5). Under
Article 2(6) contracting parties shall consider their "international responsibilities
for the conservation, management and wise use of migratory stocks of waterfowl,
80 For a full discussion of the provisions see Lyster (1985). See Matthews (1993) for discussion
of the history and development of Ramsar convention. See de Klemm & Crdteaux (1995) for a
discussion of the legal developments to the convention since it came into force.
81 As of 1993 there are 67 parties, including the UK, all but one of which have ratified
(IUCN,1993).
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both when designating entries for the List and when exercising its right to change
entries in the List relating to wetlands within its territory".
Article 3 requires Contracting Parties to "formulate and implement their planning
so as to promote the conservation of the wetlands included in the List, and as far
as possible the wise use of wetlands in their territory". Article 4 requires the
promotion of conservation of wetlands and waterfowl by establishing nature
reserves on wetlands82. Under Article 4(2) when a Contracting Party deletes or
restricts the boundaries of a wetland included in the List, it "should as far as
possible compensate for any loss of wetland resources, and in particular it should
create additional nature reserves for waterfowl and for the protection, either in the
same area or elsewhere, of an adequate portion of the original habitat".
2)d)iii) Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals
197983
The Convention, known as the Bonn Convention, arose from Recommendation 32
of the Action Plan from the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment 1972. The recommendation was that governments should consider
the need to enact conventions and treaties to protect migratory species or those
82 Whether they are included in the List or not.
83 For a full discussion of the provisions see Lyster (1985).
84 Held in Stockholm.
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inhabiting international waters. The Convention was concluded on 23 June 1979
but did not enter into force until 1 November 198385.
Article 2(1) provides for the acknowledgement of the importance of the
conservation of migratory species and for the taking of action to this end
"whenever possible and appropriate, paying special attention to migratory species
the conservation status of which is unfavourable, and taking individually or in co-
operation appropriate and necessary steps to conserve such species and their
habitat". Unfavourable conservation status is defined in Article 1(1)(d) as when
the conditions set out in 1(1Xc) are not met. The said conditions are: (1) the
species is maintaining itself on a long term basis as a viable component of its
ecosystems; (2) the range of the species is neither currently being reduced, nor is
likely to be reduced on a long term basis; (3) there is, and will be in the
foreseeable future, sufficient habitat to maintain the population of the species on a
long term basis; and (4) the distribution and abundance of the species approach
historic coverage and levels to the extent that potentially suitable ecosystems exist
and to the extent consistent with wise wildlife management
Article 2(3Xb) requires Parties to "endeavour to provide immediate protection for
migratory species included in Appendix I". Under Article 3, Appendix I includes
all migratory species that are endangered. According to Article 1(1)(e)
endangered means that the species is in danger of extinction throughout all or a
85 28 States signed originally, including the UK, although as of 1993 there were 48 signatories, of
which 38 have ratified (1UCN,1993).
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significant portion of its range. Under Article 3(4) Parties in the range of
Appendix I species shall endeavour, inter alia, to "conserve and, where feasible
and appropriate, restore those habitats of the species which are of importance in
removing the species from danger of extinction".
Article 2 (3)(c) provides for Parties to conclude agreements covering the
conservation and management of migratory species listed in Appendix II of the
convention. Under Article 4, Appendix II includes all migratory species that have
an unfavourable conservation status and which require international agreements
for their conservation and management. It also includes those which have a
conservation status "which would significantly benefit from the international co-
operation that could be achieved by an international agreement". Under Article
4(3) Parties in the range of species listed in Appendix II "shall endeavour to
conclude agreements where these would benefit the species". Guidelines for these
agreements are provided in Article 5. The object of these agreements is to "restore
the migratory species concerned to a favourable conservation status or to maintain
it in such a status". Under Article 5(5) these agreements should provide for
"conservation, and, where required and feasible, restoration of the habitats of
importance in maintaining a favourable conservation status, and protection of such
habitats from disturbances", "maintenance of a network of suitable habitats
appropriately disposed in relation to the migration routes", and "where it appears
desirable, the provision of new habitats favourable to the migratory species".
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2)d)iv) Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural
Habitats 197986
The Convention, known as the Berne Convention, was signed on 19 September
1979 and came into force on 1 June 1982.87  The aims of the Convention, set out
in Article 1, are "to conserve wild flora and fauna and their natural habitats,
especially those species and habitats whose conservation requires the co-operation
of several States". There is a general requirement under Article 2 to take measures
to maintain populations of wild flora and fauna at a level "which corresponds in
particular to ecological, scientific and cultural requirements, while taking account
of economic and recreational requirements and the needs of sub-species, varieties
or forms at risk locally". Article 3(1) requires Contracting Parties to take steps to
promote national policies for the conservation of wild flora, fauna and natural
habitats. In addition, under Article 3(2), Parties undertake to have regard to the
conservation of wild flora and fauna in their planting and development polithes
and measures against pollution.
Specific requirements relating to habitat protection are provided in Article 4.
Under Article 4(1) Parties shall take legislative and administrative measures to
ensure the conservation of the habitats of wild flora and fauna species and
endangered natural habitats. In respect of these areas, Article 4(2) provides that
Parties shall also have regard to their conservation requirements in planning and
86 For a full discussion of the provisions see Lyster (1985).
87 As of 1993 there were 26 signatories, including the UK (1UCN,1993).
150
development policies "so as to avoid or minimise as far as possible any
deterioration of such areas". By virtue of Article 4(3) parties undertake to give
special attention to the protection of areas of importance for specified migratory
species88.
3) OBJECTIVES & METHODS OF WACA
Because of the requirements of the Berne, Bonn and Ramsar Conventions and the
EC Birds Directive, new legislation was necessary for the protection of habitats89.
The intended protection in the Wildlife and Countryside Bill involved an
extension of protection to only a limited number of sites. The majority were to be
protected under the 1949 and 1968 system of planning control over development
and management agreements when the NCC considered it "expedient in the
national interest to do so". The extension of protection by including agricultural
operations in the planning system was not considered. In fact, planning control as
an alternative was never debated in detail because the format of the government's
proposals in the Wildlife and Countryside Bill pushed amendments in the
direction of extending the application of the proposals or the use of criminal
sanctions. The format of Parliamentary debate does not allow for a totally
different approach to be proposed.
88 These are listed in Appendices II and III of the Convention.
89 A number of amendments were also required for the purposes of species protection, although
these were more limited in nature.
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The primary objective of the controls introduced in 1981 was the control of
agricultural damage. This was a decisive shift away from the objectives of 1949,
which related to the control of development oriented damage. However, there is
still a difference between the objectives of the habitat and species protection
systems", so hypothesis 2 may explain why criminal sanctions were not used for
the protection of habitats. It does not explain the choice of the voluntary
approach.
The need to reinforce the protection was due to a change in the source of &Triage
from development to agriculture. Yet the supposedly reinforced protection is
based on that introduced when custodianship was the dominant belief. As the
NCC pointed out in their 8th Annual Report "the concept of stewardship of the
land is intrinsic to the Act's provisions" (NCC,8th Annual Report:2). The
situation seems faintly ridiculous, a system designed around landowners as
guardians of the countryside attempting to control the actions of those landowners.
As Davidson (1974b:378) points out, "conditions since 1949 have changed
dramatically. Landscapes within National Parks, as well as outside them, are now
threatened by developments of many kinds: the expansion of agriculture and
forestry operations; new water conservation schemes; more mineral working; road
improvements; pressures for commuting and second homes; and the
intensification of outdoor recreation activity. At the same time there has been
9° The objectives of the species protection system have continued to centre on the prevention of
cruelty and collecting. See for example the restrictions in the WACA on certain methods of killing
considered to be cruel, and the licensing requirements for collecting. There is also an element of
rarity involved, indicated by the differing protection afforded to birds in the schedules; however,
this is merely an element of the problem of collecting.
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growing public interest in the quality of the rural environment and a concern for
its protection, and this concern is expressed not simply for those areas of the finest
scenery like the national Parks which are subject to landscape designations, but for
the countryside as a whole".
When the NPACA was enacted, the way that conditions would change,
particularly in relation to agriculture, was not anticipated. The population grew
instead of a forecast decline, a more affluent, space-demanding and mobile society
evolved and agriculture underwent its second revolution. This has had obvious
implications for the conservation of nature, yet this seems to have been ignored in
the choice of protection. "The threat to wildlife posed by changes in the use of
farmland was first discerned between the wars, and in 1944 the NRIC described
farming as the most serious threat to wild plants and animals But most observers
believed the extensive reclamation of land during the war would end once peace
returned. The ploughing up of old grasslands and the exploitation of marginal
timber reserves would cease" (Sheai1,1976:222). Writing in 1945 A.G. Tansley
commented that "the total loss has not been very severe, and it is offset by the gain
in the agricultural arena. It is scarcely probable that the extension of agriculture
will go much further, for the limits of profitable agricultural land must have been
reached in most places" (Tansley,1945:63). This attitude towards agricultural
development influenced the content of much post-war legislation. No restrictions
were placed on land reclamation or afforestation in the Town and Country
Planning Act of 1947 1. "This meant that the notification of Sites of Special
91 Farmers and foresters did not have to seek the consent of local planning authorities before
ploughing up old pasture, installing under-drains or felling woodland.
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Interest was completely ineffective in preventing ... fundamental changes in land
management talcing place on key biological sites" (Sheai1,1976:222). The 1947
planning system, on which we effectively still rely for the protection of habitats,
"is powerless to resolve many rural conflicts, with its lack of control over the
operation of major land activities and its emphasis upon land use rather than land
management" (Davidson,1974a:313). As Rose (1986b:68) points out, "the
designation was introduced at a time when the NC felt that allusions to the
scientific utility of nature conservation sites would be most persuasive with local
and national governments. As years passed ... the SSSI became less and less
relevant".
CONCLUSION
The objectives of protection do not seem to have been determinants in the choice
of mechanism. Thus hypothesis 2 is not proved positively and cannot explain the
adoption of the voluntary approach, particularly as the method and the objectives
seem to be contradictory. However, as the objectives for species and habitat
protection were different it is possible for a negative proof to be made to explain
why criminal sanctions were not used. However, the purposes of habitat
protection, although different from those for species protection, could have been
achieved by criminal sanctions. Thus a negative proof regarding criminal
sanctions is not made when considering the purpose of the controls.
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CHAPTER 5
HYPOTHESIS 3
Just as interest groups were important in the introduction of the early species
protection legislation' it is also likely that they were influential in the introduction
of the WACA. A large number of groups were involved with the passage of the
WACA. The focus will be on the larger groups as it would be impossible to
assess the influence of every group that had an interest in the Act. As a guideline,
the groups consulted by the DoE were the Water Space Amenity Commission,
British Ornithologists Union, British Trust for Ornithology (BTO), British
Waterfowl Association, Committee for Environmental Conservation2, Council for
Nature, Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE), Country Landowners
Association (CLA), Fauna Preservation Society, Friends of the Earth (FOE),
Game Conservancy, National Farmers Union (NFU), National Trust (NT), Royal
Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), Society for the Promotion of Nature
Conservation (SPNC), Wildfowl Trust and World Wildlife Fund. To assess their
influence it is first necessary to ascertain how any influence may have been
brought to bear. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish the types of group
involved. According to Rush (1990:9), this "has important implications for the
way in which groups operate and in the attitude of government towards them".
1 See Chapter 4.
2 Which became Wildlife Link.
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1) TYPES OF PRESSURE GROUP
A classic distinction between types of pressure groups is between sectional and
promotional groups 3 . Sectional groups promote and protect the specific economic
interests of their members and include producer groups. Promotional groups
generally have an exclusively political function (Miers & Page,1990) promoting
the 'cause' of the members. They "promote or defend legislative or administrative
change for ideological reasons rather than to forward their members' particular
financial interests" (Marsh,1983:3). Of the groups involved, the NFU can be
categorised as a sectional group. The environmental groups are promotional
groups (Brookes & Richardson, 1975).
In addition to different types of groups, there are different theories of interest
group intermediation, corporatism and pluralism. Thus the constitution of the
groups can be theorised in two ways. It is therefore necessary to attempt to
determine the influence that various groups had and how this differed according to
whether they were themselves operating under corporatist or pluralist methods of
intermediation.
3 Also sometimes called respectively economic and ideological groups. Grant (1978) argues that
this distinction is inappropriate, preferring instead to classify groups as insider or outsider.
However, this draws on issues of access and presupposes corporatism as the dominant
intermediation system and, as will be seen later in the chapter, it is not necessarily so
straightforward. So for the purposes of this chapter, the sectional/promotional distinction will be
used.
156
2) CORPORATISM
2)a) Definition
There seems to be no agreed defuiltion of what corporatism is. This fact is
recognised by Williamson (1989:7) who comments that "there is no minimal
descriptive definition shared by one and all as to what constitutes corporatism"4.
Many definitions have been proposed over the years as theories on corporatism
have evolveds.
Williamson (1989:16) proposes two usages of the term corporatism. The first is
"interest intermediation as a mode of organising and controlling functional
interests", the second is "as a mode for making and implementing public policy".
However, the proposed approaches to corporatism are wider even than this.
Cawson (1986:22) proposes three approaches to corporatism based on theories of
political economy. The first definition is "a novel system of political economy,
different from capitalism and socialism"; the second is "a form of state within
capitalist society, where corporatism is seen as emerging alongside and then
dominating a parliamentary state form"; and the third is "a distinctive way in
which interests are organised and interact with the state".
4 This ambiguity can be seen particularly in articles such as Cox et al (1986a), referring
specifically to the NFU where there is a lot of emphasis on self-regulation as a requirement of
corporatism. As will be seen later in this chapter, this is not an essential requirement of
corporatism although its existence is a strong indicator that a corporatist bargain has been reached.
5 The development of corporatist theory is considered by both Williamson (1989) and Cawson
(1986) and will not be discussed here.
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This divergence is recognised by Lewis (1990:63), who comments that "work on
corporatism has varied between that which sees the phenomenon as heralding a
new state form, as one among competing theories of the state, as a contribution to
the problems inherent in social theorising, and, more humbly, as one among
several possible forms of policy intervention".
The range of theories to choose from is therefore wide. However, Cawson argues
that his third category is the most convincing6 and this is consistent with Lewis's
preferred definition of corporatism as a form of policy intervention and a
combination of Williamson's categories. This idea of corporatism as a method of
policy implementation is also favoured by Birkinshaw (1990:25) who claims that
corporatism represents "a third force in terms of government strategy in distinction
to 'state' and imarker7.
The idea of corporatism as a way in which interests interact with the state for the
purposes of policy intervention involves a fusion of interest representation and
policy implementation. This is consistent with the classic definition of
corporatism proposed by Schmitter (1979). According to this, corporatism is a
"system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into
6 Although the grounds on which he dismissed the first two categories are questionable as they
presuppose that the third definition is the correct one and thus the arguments are flawed. For
example see page 23 where he dismisses the first category on the basis that Thatcherism used non-
corporatist devices, but this argument only works if the definition of corporatism is category three
and it falls down if category one is actually the correct definition.
7 For the purposes of this chapter, however, the focus will be on corporatism as a form of interest
intermediation rather than as a form of intervention or implementation. The WACA represents a
hybrid between bureaucratic and market intervention and corporatist self-regulation does not play a
role.
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a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered
and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created)
by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their
respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection
of leaders and articulation of demands and supports" (Schmitter,1979:13)
This definition focuses more on the interest representation side and less on policy
intervention, but the intermediation and intervention sides can be treated
separatelys. If they are taken together "it is not a question of interest groups
persuading the government of a preferred policy, which is then implemented by
civil servants as government policy. Rather, leaders of functionally organised
interests negotiate agreed policies with state officials and agencies, and part of that
negotiation is that the same leaders agree to implement those policies through
their ability to bind the actions of their organisations' members"
(Cawson,1986:25). However, implementation is not a crucial component of a
corporatist bargain, although it is important. The ability to self regulate, for
example, means that a group is more likely to be afforded representational status.
8 As will be seen later, it is arguable that intervention is an ancillary side and self regulation is not
a necessary component.
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2)b) Levels Of Corporatism
2)b)i) Macro Level
This is the level that has traditionally received the most discussion among
theorists. It relates to "the highest level of aggregation within the nation state,
around the functions which different socio-economic classes perform in the
division of labour" (Cawson,1986:72). This therefore concerns intermediation at a
national level with the peak organisations of capital and labour. Most discussions
of this level relate to economic plamiing9.
These so called 'peak organisations' are not just, for example, a trade union of
electricians, which may have a representational monopoly in that particular sector,
but an organisation encompassing all such trade unions across the class.
According to Cawson (1986), one of the main factors limiting the applicability of
macro corporatism in Britain is the inability of organisations to enforce their
decisions, because the constituent units are in competition. This therefore limits
effective implementation of policy bargains negotiated by the peak organisation").
9 See for example Winkler (1975)
10 Because the ability to self regulate is not present.
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2)b)ii) IvIeso Level
The definition of meso-corporatism is somewhat less clear. Cawson (1986)
focuses upon the nature of the group involved, whereas Williamson (1989)
focuses upon the issue involved.
According to Cawson (1986), meso-corporatism concerns sectoral interests,
whereas macro-corporatism involves class interests. Classes are derived from the
relationship with the means of production. Sectoral interests form part of these
classes. "Different branches of production give rise to different sectoral interests
which may be organised into such bodies as employers' organisations and trade
associations" (Cawson,1986: 72).
Williamson argues that meso-corporatism is not about the type of body concerned
but about the issue concerned otherwise it would be possible to have cross-level
corporatism if different types of group are concerned with the same issue.
According to Williamson (1989:159), "meso-corporatism occurs where there is
sectoral differentiation in intervention, either within the framework of broad
industry-wide policy or as a consequence of a sector-specific policy". It therefore
focuses on the effect rather then the process of intermediation. Williamson
therefore argues that if the "actual or intended intervention was industry-wide in
its scope this would be an example of macro-corporatism" (Williamson,1989:159).
Of these two approaches, Cawson's is the more popular and is consistent with the
distinctions made earlier between types of group.
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2)b)iii) Micro Level
State agencies negotiate policy directly with firms. "Public policy is agreed
through direct negotiation with producers" and "is implemented through such
firms agreeing to modify their actions, that is, they agree to undertake certain tasks
(such as make particular investments in particular places, or not make redundant
particular workers) in exchange for grants, incentives or other such inducements"
(Cawson,1986:74). Examples of micro-corporatism are present in land use
planning (Jowell,1977) with firms negotiating directly.
3) PLURALISM
A criticism often levelled at theories of corporatism is that the characteristics
identified as corporatist can be explained equally well using pluralism as a model.
To distinguish corporatism and pluralism a definition of pluralism is necessary.
Again there is no agreed definition but that proposed by Schmitter (1979:15) is a
"system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into
an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non hierarchically
ordered and self determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are
not specifically licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or otherwise controlled in
leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise
a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories". The
use of the term 'state' is somewhat erroneous as pluralists do not use this concept.
The use of the word government in its place gives a more accurate definition.
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With pluralism, large numbers of groups compete for members and resources.
The more members a group has, the more resources it has. This is because "the
leadership of a group which can point to a large following can persuade political
leaders that it might have an important effect on electoral processes, and that
favourable policy decisions might shift electoral support behind those politicians
who are seen by the members to favour their interests" (Cawson,1986:29)11.
With pluralism the government has a limited role of allocating resources. The
allocative decisions reflect "the balance between the interest groups within society
at any given time. As such, while interest groups may make continuing
representations to government, which may even become institutionalised, the
government remains independent of, and opposed to, too close contact with the
interest groups" (Marsh,1983:2).
4) DISTINGUISHING PLURALISM AND CORPORATISM
The existence of corporatism is dependent upon the type of group involved12 . As
has already been mentioned, pluralism involves multiple competitive groups,
whereas corporatism requires some form of monopoly of representation.
According to Cawson, there are two criteria to be fulfilled to classify bargaining
as corporatist rather than pluralist. The first is if the lobby has a monopoly
11 So a group with monopoly representational status is likely to be a corporate group and is likely
to have many political resources with regard to pluralism and so will be of influence in both
models.
12 This fact justifies the earlier adoption of Cawson's categorisation of meso-corporatism rather
then Williamson's.
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representative capacity. The second is "the political cohesion ... to itself act as
the administrative partner of the state, disciplining and controlling its membership
to accept the compromises worked out in negotiation with state agencies"
(Cawson,1986:36). This means that the distinction between pluralism and
corporatism is that "the corporatist relationship between state agencies and
organised interests is two way; the pluralist relationship is one-way - from the
group to the state - in that policy implementation is the preserve of the state.
Under a corporatist arrangement interest organisations are an integral part of the
administration; they are not merely consulted over the implementation of policy"
(Cawson,1986:37). This second requirement is also stressed by Cox et al.
(1986a:475) "What is crucial to corporatist intermediation is the direct link with
regulation, whereby representative interest groups assuMe some responsibility for
the self-regulation and disciplining of their own constituency in return for the
privileges afforded by their relatively close relationship with government".
However, this emphasis on self-regulation as a requirement for corporatism is
incorrect. As mentioned earlier, the intervention side of corporatism can be
treated separately.
Associations play an important role "in implementing public policy in terms of
ensuring compliance, but they do not necessarily entail the associations acting as
implementation structures, certainly not in any predominant role"
(Williamson,1989:212). If they do self-regulate this is just a more developed form
of corporatism. "If the essence of corporatism is an institutionally stable set of
arrangements for the mutual advantage of both public and private actors, then
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securing the implementation of 'public' tasks by private parties would seem to
represent corporatism with a vengeance" (Lewis,1990:74).
According to Williamson (1989) it is the ability to influence the members of the
group so that they comply with the bargain that has been negotiated that is
importantn . Implementation by the interest association is an extra but this is not
the same as ensuring members' compliance. To secure this compliance, the
association "will have serious sanctions to wield, and will also have important
bargaining resources with which to confront members. In addition, it may have
some not insignificant authority because, while it imposes decisions on the
members, it is at one and the same time protecting them from something possibly
worse - direct state regulation.... The potential threat in specific instances may be
enough to encourage most producers to avoid the risk and go along with the more
amenable self-regulation by their associations" (Williamson,1989:211). All that is
necessary is the ability to self-regulate by that group so that it is afforded
representational status. However, the existence of self-regulation is unnecessary
to classify a bargain as corporatist.
In addition, account must be taken of the distinction between types of group as to
their purpose. The functional or economic interest groups have the ability to
become corporate groups when they are near a monopoly situation regarding
13 As will be seen later in the chapter, this is the reason why many corporatist relationships ceased
in the 1970s when the trade unions concerned were no longer able to secure compliance by their
members.
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representation of interests in that functional category 14. Cause or ideological
groups will not become corporate groups and will operate under pluralist
processes. Thus "different systems of interest intermediation apply to the two
types of group. For example, while the recent expansion in the number of groups
has occurred in the ideological field, it is the economic groups which in the main
have been incorporated into a more formal decision-making process and which as
such have had most chance to influence policy" (Marsh,1983:3).
This distinction can also extend to the type of issue involved. According to
Cawson (1986:36), corporatism does not include bargaining on "the content of
legislation before parliament, which is then implemented through bureaucratic or
legal structures". This process should "be seen as part 'of those pluralist processes
which remain an important part of the political life of liberal democracies". Thus
a mixture of corporatist and pluralist approaches is possible. As Lewis (1990:64)
points out, "it is not only possible but common for both pluralist and corporatist
styles of political behaviour to be found within the same functional state activity.
Indeed, modem politics at large will operate with both styles of intervention and
representation".
In addition to the possibility of a mixture of pluralist and corporatist approaches in
any given area it is also important to note that pluralism and corporatism are not
strictly alternatives but different processes that are end points on a continuum.
14 In this situation they are likely to be able to influence their members for the purposes of
implementation
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Thus it is possible with a mixture of approaches for neither of them to represent
the ideal types as portrayed in Sclunitter's definitions but rather to be classified as
more like one than the other.
5) APPLICATION TO BRITAIN
Before considering the possible influence of interest groups on the formation of
the WACA it is necessary to consider whether corporatist or pluralist processes
were operating in Britain generally in 1981 and as such at which end of the
corporatist/pluralist continuum intermediation was operating.
The expansion in the number of ideological groups documented by Marsh (1983)
might suggest greater use of pluralist intermediation. However, in the economic
field the number of groups has declined and their contacts with government have
become more formalised which would suggest a more corporatist approach.
As was mentioned earlier, it is possible to have a mixture of approaches in use.
This is because intermediation patterns vary among different policy communities,
with corporatist intermediation more likely in economic policy making than in
social policy making. In addition, in any one area intermediation may vary
between the groups involved with perhaps only one group enjoying a corporatist
relationship with the state. Also, these relationships are subject to change over
time as a consequence of changing political and economic circumstances. It can,
therefore, be difficult to state categorically the nature of intermediation generally
in Britain or even within a single policy community. As Cawson (1986:126)
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points out, corporatism "may ebb and flow at different periods with respect to
different policies and interests" and there is not necessarily a development to
increasingly extensive macro-corporatism. There is evidence of the existence of
limited macro-corporatism in Britain looking at the TUC and CBI and also to
some extent the NEDC (Metcalfe & McQuillan,1979; Marsh,1983) although this
was declining when the WACA was introduced's.
One description applied to Britain at the macro level is that of corporate
pluralism 16. Corporate pluralism represents an intermediate point on the
continuum. A corporate sphere of groups can be identified but representational
monopoly has not been achieved. These corporate groups "are frequently
consulted by governments, in the stages both of policy formation and
implementation, but their role falls short of being an instrument of implementation
through their capacity for self-regulation" (Cawson,1986:42). With the continuing
importance of pluralist processes promotional groups "can exert, at least in the
short term when issues are alive, considerable influence upon policy by campaigns
and mobilisation" (Cawson,1986:42).
Middlemas argues that in the period 1911-1945 Britain displayed a 'corporate
bias', which can be equated to corporate pluralism, which attained its high point
during the second world war (Middlemas,1979)". However, Jordan (1981) argues
15 See later discussion of the decline of corporatism under Thatcher.
16 Or neo corporatism.
17 It was at this time that the NFU's statutory representational status under the Agriculture Act
1947 was created.
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that the UK is not corporatist. This argument seems to be based on a
misconception of corporatism, focusing only on the macro level. Jordan focuses
on interaction with the government and has an extensive discussion of cabinet
responsibility. This means that the concentration is on interaction at later stage in
the process of policy formation than we are concerned with here, and is on access
rather than influence. This approach also adopts the idea of pluralism and
corporatism as extremes and not as a continuum. It is important to distinguish the
relationship between pressure groups and elected governments which Jordan
focuses upon and the relationship between the state and corporate groups that we
are concerned with. Corporatism involves both representation and intervention.
It is generally accepted that the UK shows a corporate bias (Middlemas,1979) or
is neo-corporatist (Lewis,1984). Recognition of the different levels of
corporatism means that corporatist bargaining doesn't need to be tripartite in
nature, as it is at the macro level, to be corporatist, there just needs to be interest
intermediation. The position along the pluralism/corporatism continuum therefore
depends on the policy area involved and the level at which it is being scrutinised.
As Cawson (1986:78) points out, there is "evidence for corporatist practices in
specific sectors even where corporatism may be weak or non-existent at the macro
level".
When the Thatcher government came to power in 1979, it was against a
background of increasingly corporatist trends in the British state. The Thatcher
administration is often portrayed as representing the demise of the corporatist
state, with the destruction of the power of representative groups. According to
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Holliday (1993), however, the corporatist regime was already collapsing by the
end of the 1970s, even before Thatcher's interventions.
These corporatist relationships were breaking down as a result of a combination of
factors. Most corporatist relationships were with trade unions, which encountered
difficulties in ensuring that members complied with agreements. These
difficulties and the consequent breakdown of the authority of the corporatist
relationships can be seen in the problems encountered during the winter of
discontent i8 with the collapse of incomes policies that were central to the
operation of macro-corporatism. As Holliday (1993:309) points out, "organised
interests in Britain were not sufficiently organised to ensure that liberal
corporatism worked". The relationships were therefore declining before Thatcher
took office.
The Thatcher government was committed to reversing the corporatist trend s'. It
sought to redefine the relationship between the state and the economy. This
involved limiting the functions of the state20 to restore its authority. This was
because it saw the expansion of the state as having caused political bargaining to
replace market exchange. According to Gamble (1989a), to create a free economy
and a strong state the politicisation of decision making, which was the
18 The winter of 1978-1979 when groups of workers rebelled against the wage restraint policies to
which the national representatives had acceded.
19 The government deliberately strove for the marginalisation of most representative groups, but
most particularly of the TUC
20 Which had been extended during the social democratic era
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consequence of state intervention, had to be reversed 21 . Therefore, the primary
intention of the government was the rolling back of the state by reducing
government intervention in the economy, thus promoting the free market 22. A
range of techniques was used in pursuit of this goal, including the extension of
property ownership, privatisation and the attempts to dismantle corporatism23.
A strong state, with authority at the centre, did not need to seek consensus about
its policies. The reliance on collaboration by organised interests was seen as an
indicator of a weak government. "The whole ethos of government changed, from
policy making by consensus to a more centralised mode" (Holliday,1993:309).
The old consensual approach was categorically rejected, but little ground was
made on reducing the state. The Thatcher Government continued to run an
extended state despite proclaiming a limited one24. Consultation with groups did
not cease immediately. In some areas it continued as before for a number of years.
Even several years on, corporatist relationships were not totally abolished.
21 As well as the traditional liberal commitment to a market economy, this reflected a party
political calculation. The Conservatives found it difficult to run a state in which the trade unions
played a key role in policy making.
22 However, the commitment to a free economy was always subordinated to the aim of restoring
the state and ensuring Conservative dominance within it. For a detailed discussion of these issues
see Chapter 7.
23 These techniques were not all deployed from the start. Initially, the focus was on the
dismantling of corporatism and in the mid to late 1980s the privatisation regime came into play.
See Gamble (1989b) for details.
24 Notwithstanding this, they approached policy problems as if the state were limited and excluded
the possibility of collaboration which was often required to implement their policies. A good
example of this was the poll tax. Of course not all areas would have benefited from consultation.
Some changes (such as legislation on the trade unions) would have been very difficult to make by
consultative means. However, in some cases a more corporatist approach would have served
Thatcherism's own ends.
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Business interests seemed to fare better under Thatcher than the trade unions. In
particular, the CBI maintained its access to government throughout the Thatcher
decade25. "Corporate bodies that included trade unions were more likely to be
downgraded than those (like the professional bodies, agricultural boards, and City
institutions) that did not ... and if a corporatist or quasi-corporatist form provided
a means for increasing business influence, there would be no qualms about using
it" (Crouch & Dore,1990:36). So, although many organised interests have been
marginalised, some have maintained their contacts with government and new
groups have become involved. As Gamble (1989a:18) points out, government
"has freed itself from the clutches of some lobbies and special interests, but by no
means from all. Rather it has become beholden to a different set of organised
interests and lobbies. Like its predecessors, too, it finds itself obliged to manage
its empire and to promise superior performance and effective delivery of services".
Crouch and Dore give the example of the Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group,
which has "assumed a central role in persuading farmers and landowners to adopt
conservation practices" (Crouch & Dore,1990:31), as one of these new groups.
Despite this continuation of corporatism, the relationships with these groups were
on a different level. Thatcher tended to consult, if at all, on an ad hoc basis. This
consultation was no longer due to representative status but because "the broad
trend of government policy happened to favour some interest groups above others"
(Holliday, 1993:312). The government would use corporatist forms when they
25 This can be explained by the CBI's support of the government once it realised that monetarist
policies favoured industry. The CBI adapted to the new style of interaction with the government
whilst the unions continued to attempt access as they had in the heyday of British corporatism.
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provided "a useful adjunct to its own authority" (Crouch & Dore,1990:36). Thus
the prevailing doctrine of the time did not totally destroy corporatism, but it was
substantially dented26. As Holliday (1993:308) points out, "there is no doubt that
liberal corporatism no longer functioned with Thatcher in power"27.
The decline in corporatism meant that most groups have had to rely instead on
pluralist intermediation such as direct lobbying. According to Lewis and Wiles
(1984:78) "success at the new lobbying partly depends on being ideologically in
tune with the government". As can be seen from the debates on the WACA28, the
NFU and the government were in agreement on the use of the voluntary approach
and market mechanisms29.
6) APPLICATION TO THE WACA
A large number of groups were involved with the WACA. Their influence may
have differed depending on whether they were in a corporatist relationship with
26 For example, the NEDC, commonly regarded as the primary institutional embodiment of British
liberal corporatism, though not abolished, was substantially downgraded in importance.
27 At the end of the Thatcher administration, many groups had substantially diminished power and
influence but those most seriously affected were the trade unions. By the time Thatcher left, trade
union membership was down, strikes were at their lowest levels for half a century and trade union
access to government was substantially reduced. From a position of 13.5 million trade union
members in 1979, in 1995 there were only 7.2 million
28 Discussed in chapter 6.
29 The lobbying continued after the Act in respect of the code of guidance on SSSIs and the
financial guidelines for compensation for farmers denied agricultural grants. The NFU and the
CLA were involved with the development of both, unlike the conservation groups which were not
consulted until after the drafts had been published. This again represented the close corporatist
relationship which the NFU maintained with the government, giving them the ability to exert
influence from an early stage.
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government or were operating within a pluralist arena. As can be seen from the
previous discussion either situation is possible because such a mixture is common
and because of the move from corporatist practices to pluralist practices in certain
policy areas.
6)a) Corporatism
Of all the groups involved in the WACA only one, the NFU 30, is a sectional group
and seems even to approach the criteria necessary to be classified as corporatist31.
Grant (1983) claims that the NFU is one of the most effective pressure groups in
Britain, because it represents an industry having received more state aid than any
other outside the state sector. This has been achieved "without any sacrifice of
decision-making autonomy on the part of the individual producer ... by a group
that is too small in size to exert a significant influence on the outcome of elections
and which does not have the direct economic sanctions available to, say, the City
of London or a key trade union" (Grant, 1983:129). Their influence does not
therefore stem from possessing the political resources necessary for influence
under a pluralist model.
A comparison of the NFU with Schmitter's definition of corporatism 32 is
favourable. There is, of course, no exact match, but that is no bar to a
30 For an interesting discussion of the special characteristics of the agricultural industry in the UK
and the USA see Wilson (1977).
31 Monopoly representation, stable access to the state, capacity for self-regulation.
32 Discussed above: section la.
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classification of the NFU as a corporate group. Schmitter's definition represents
an ideal type, and if the idea of a continuum between pluralism and corporatism is
used, the NFU's relationship with MAFF appears to be very definitely towards the
corporatist end. As Grant (1983:130) points out, "in a country in which libertarian
traditions help to prevent interest groups acting as intermediaries between the state
and their members in the corporatist fashion, the relationship between farmers and
the state comes closest to an effective working corporatist arrangement". Indeed
Cawson (1986) gives agriculture as an example of a sector in which meso-
corporatist practices are dominant. One of the major advantages possessed by the
NFU is its size and membership. Holbeche (1986) estimates that 85% of farmers
are members of the NFU. According to Grant (1983:129), the NFU is "the largest
sector specific employers' association in Britain"33. All of this points to a near
monopoly representative status.
In addition to this, the NFU has a statutorily based, negotiating relationship with
the state under the Agriculture Act 1947. According to Cox et at (1986a:480),
"the 1947 Agriculture Act laid the foundation proper for corporatist arrangements
in agriculture". The Act requires the government to consult 'such bodies of
persons who appear to them to represent the interests of producers in the
agricultural industry' when setting subsidies. This has been interpreted to mean
the NFU. "This has been recognised as a major, if not the pre-eminent, example
33 In 1992 B Holbeche, the parliamentary adviser of the NFU, estimated that the NFU had around
100,000 members (pers.comm.)
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of corporatism in British industry, entailing both representation and self-regulation
of agricultural interests" (Cox et a1,1986a:480).
Although it was argued earlier that self-regulation is not a necessary component in
the classification of a relationship as corporatist, it is a good indicator of that fact.
The NFU does, in fact, self-regulate quite successfully34. According to Metcalfe
and McQuillan (1979:277), "the NFU devotes considerable time and resources to
resolving internal differences among subgroups in the farming community". This
ensures members' compliance with agreed policies and thus justifies their status as
a corporate group. As Grant (1983:131) points out, "such a corporatist
arrangement can only continue to work if the NFU is able to discipline its own
members so that they abide by arrangements arrived at with government and
generally co-operate with the implementation of government agricultural policy.
On the whole, it has to be said that the NFU has done this job well, indeed more
effectively than any other industrial association".
According to Cox and Lowe (1984:149), the relationship between the NFU and
the state "has enabled the farming community to retain a strategic advantage in the
framing of legislation even in the face of increasingly strident and articulate
criticism". So their corporate status may well have been influential in the framing
of the WACA. However, their representational status under the 1947 Act relates
to agricultural matters. Their relationship is therefore with MAFF. The WACA
34 Although this element is not present in the WACA.
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was drafted by the DoE and does not directly concern agriculture. Thus this is
outside their corporatist relationship with MAFF.
However, Grant (1983) argues that the NFU's influence does extend beyond
purely agricultural matters and encompasses areas such as taxation policy. In
addition, Cox and Lowe (1984:155) claim that the NFU has "more extensive
dealings with the Department [of Environment] than most conservation groups, on
matters such as the protection of agricultural land, town and country planning,
minerals, pollution control and water management". This point was made by
Holbeche (Pers.comm) who stressed the importance of contacts between the DoE
and the NFU that had been in place since the Porchester Report. This was
reinforced by consultation on the failed Labour Countryside Bill 1978. Thus the
NFU had good communication links with the DoE.
However, account must be taken of the Thatcherite move away from corporatist
structures. The WACA was introduced by the Thatcher government and as such it
must be considered whether the NFU's corporate status suffered under the
Thatcher regime, thus affording it less influence that might earlier have seemed
possible. The first point to note is that the 'internal' problems of the trade unions
of ensuring members' compliance, which partly led to the demise of their
corporate status, did not affect the NFU, which was highly organised and had for
years ensured compliance with agreements35. However, it was subjected to the
35 See Cox et at (1990a) for details of the NFU's activities in this respect
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'external' problems associated with the election of the Thatcher government with
the outright attempts to dismantle corporatism.
The NFU were, however, one of the groups to benefit from the continued contact
with limited numbers of groups. The reason given for this by Crouch & Dore is
the link with the European Community in respect of agricultural regulation. As a
consequence "corporatist structures in agriculture have been left largely intact"
(Crouch & Dore,1990:31). Another explanation is that the NFU are more akin to
the business interests than the trade unions and business interests fared much
better under Thatcher.
Any decrease in the power of the NFU in the Thatcher years seems to have been
salvaged by their ideology matching the government's, giving the NFU influence
in lobbying. They may also have been saved by the fact that many in government
are farmers and there is not the same pressure to destroy the power of the NFU as
the other major trade unions. The NFU were more akin to the CBI than the trade
unions and the CBI retained influence. The Government was "most decisive in
pressing home its attack upon those institutions in British society which lend
support to the Labour Party and to the regime of social democracy". Changes
were "pushed through because they brought important strategic gains to the
Conservatives, and helped consolidate their dominant electoral position"
(Gamble,1989:16). The NFU did not represent a threat to market mechanisms and
did not lend support to the Labour Party.
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According to Grant (1983:130), "one benefit of such a corporatist arrangement
from the farmers' viewpoint, apart from the fact that it effectively involves them in
the process of agricultural policy formation, is that legislative control of the
farmers is used only as a last resort". However, according to Cox et al
(1986a:486), "the NFU finds it expedient, in some cases, to accept or even
advocate the imposition of formal controls on farmers". Cawson (1986) argues
that such bargaining on legislation is not corporatist but pluralist. However, this
ignores the benefits to be gained by the imposition of such controls. The
legislative control usually includes benefits and incentives as part of the package
and this would seem consistent with the controls introduced in the WACA with
management agreements. The reason Cox et al (1986a486) give for this approach
by the NFU is that it gains "considerable influence over both the form of controls
and the manner of their administration. At the same time it avoids the strains on
its own authority that any attempt to discipline its own members would entail".
The corporate status of the NFU could, therefore, have been influential in the
framing of the WACA. As Marsh (1983:8) points out, even in the environmental
area, the NFU is "closely incorporated in the decision-making process while the
environmental groups invariably operate as outsider groups". These
environmental groups "inhabit the very different, competitive sphere of politics"
(Cox & Lowe,1984:151), i.e. they operate under pluralist processes.
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6)b) Pluralism
The ideological groups involved in the WACA definitely do not have corporate
status and their efforts are "more visibly directed towards influencing the media
and lobbying MPs" (Miers & Page,1990:40). Conservation groups "are not of
central importance to the effective performance of government or the economy
and consequently do not have the close symbiotic relationship with senior civil
servants which corporate interest groups enjoy" (Cox & Lowe,1984:155). Their
main involvement is therefore at a later stage in the legislative process than the
corporate groups. "Where the group has not had the opportunity of expressing its
views previously, its influence will depend, in part, on the stage of the preparatory
process at which it is consulted and, in particular, on whether it is consulted before
the principles of the legislation have been settled" (Miers & Page,1990:42). As
the parliamentary adviser to the NFU pointed out, "there is no question that once a
piece of legislation reaches Parliament you may be able to tinker around the edges,
but the prospect of getting any significant changes are very remote indeed...
therefore it makes it that much more important to seek to try to get it right before
it ever enters Parliament" (Holbeche,1986:46).
According to Brookes and Richardson (1975:319) it is "essential for groups to ...
establish a consultative relationship whereby their views on particular legislative
proposals will be sought prior to the crystallisation of the governments' position.
Failure to influence policy formation at this stage relegates the groups' role to that
of fighting a rearguard action at successive stages of the policy-making process".
This point is also stressed by Walldand (1968:38) who argues that "the most
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effective time for groups to operate is after a decision to legislate has been taken,
but before a Bill has actually been drafted and published. Once the Government
has publicly committed itself to the main lines of a Bill, disagreement and
opposition by interested parties can only usually be manifested by public or
Parliamentary campaigns, which groups are not well-fitted to undertake". The
NFU's ability in this respect is also much greater. Grant (1983:132) notes that
"when the CBI decided to improve its parliamentary lobbying arrangements in the
late 1970s, it modelled its system on that of the NFU".
Even if bargaining involving legislative control is categorised as pluralist, the
NFU are at an advantage over the other groups. The NFU are very proficient at
lobbying as can be seen from the passage of the Act documented in the next
chapter. According to Lewis and Wiles (1984:78), "success at the new lobbying
partly depends on being ideologically in tune with the government". The NFU
and the government were in agreement on the use of the voluntary approach. So
even if pluralist structures were in use, the NFU is still likely to have had more
influence than other groups.
With regard to lobbying, the NFU has the additional benefit of contact with the
back bench specialist agriculture committees. As Grant (1983:132) recognises,
"the importance of these committees is enhanced by the number of MPs,
particularly on the Conservative side, who are farmers or who have other
agricultural connections"36. In contrast, the ideological groups are dependent to a
36 The importance of this will be shown in the next chapter discussing the parliamentary phase.
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great deal on the NCC and the Countryside Commission and, as has been argued
by Cripps (1979), their influence was extremely limited. The only involvement of
the promotional groups in the pre-parliamentary stage was in response to the
consultation papers. Given that no changes were made to the approach between
the publication of the consultation paper and the publication of the Bill, it seems
that the promotional groups had no influence at this stage.
6)c) The Intermediation Process: The Pre-Parliamentary Stages
As mentioned above the pre-parliamentary stages are really the most important
period in which to influence government policy. This gave an automatic
advantage to the NFU whose corporate status meant that they were consulted
before the promotional groups. According to Cox and Lowe (1984:156) "within
days of the Conservatives taking office, both the CLA and NFU had separate
meetings with Agriculture and Environment ministers to discuss their legislative
plans". The government announced its intention to introduce the WACA the
following month. The NFU were therefore able to influence the policy from its
inception. Indeed even the government's statutory advisers on conservation, the
NCC, were not consulted until the public consultation phase. The proposals were
drafted by civil servants in the DoE's rural directorate and not the NCC. The only
promotional group to be consulted before the publication of the consultation
papers was the RSPB. This is because they were closely involved in the formation
of the EC Birds Directive and their European officer was a member of the
Commission's expert committee responsible for the implementation of the
Directive.
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According to Holbeche (pers.comm), the government were unsure of their
approach so the NFU pushed towards the voluntary approach. This influence may
have been decisive, although the government may well have had favoured policy
options of which this was one. Consultation Paper Number 4, which concerned
the conservation of habitats, was published by the DoE in August 1979 and was
emphatic in its recommendation of a voluntary approach. The proposals made in
Consultation Paper Number 4 were to "take measures to ensure that practices
which might threaten sites are notified by the owner or tenant in order to avoid the
possible destruction of habitats without the issues being carefully examined in the
interests of the Nation as a whole". This represents a perfect summary of the
voluntary approach introduced in the WACA. It therefore seems that no change
took place after the publication of this document37, despite responses by
promotional groups as to the inappropriateness of this approach. Indeed, it was
only at this stage that the promotional groups became involved in the process.
The RSPB had "major reservations on the proposals" which they considered
would be "most harmful" (CPRE archives 1979 80). An information paper
published by the DoE in August 1980 claiming to have taken account of such
responses reproduced the same scheme for habitat protection. This all seems to
point to the validity of the claim by Cox and Lowe (1984:163) that "the
relationship between the [farming] industry and government made possible a
corporatist solution, and the political strength of the agricultural lobby ensured
that this option was adopted, even in the face of a critical public opinion".
37 In fact, as will be seen in the next chapter, changes to the extent of the controls did occur but the
underlying philosophy of voluntariness was not changed.
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7) CONCLUSIONS
The NFU seems to have been influential in the early stages of the legislative
process for the WACA in promoting the voluntary approach as the underlying
philosophy of the Act. However, this did not determine the exact controls
introduced as changes were made during the parliamentary phase 38 . The corporate
status of the NFU enabled them to enter the policy process at the earliest possible
point. The promotional groups who were operating under pluralist intermediation
were not involved until much later and were therefore much less influential.
However, even though the NFU were involved at this early stage, this does not
necessarily provide an explanation for the introduction of the voluntary approach.
If this was to represent an approach 'forced' upon the government by the NFU,
there would surely be some form of benefit to the government in making this
bargain otherwise they would have adopted their own preferred approach. Self-
regulation by the NFU would represent such a benefit. However, there is none
involved in the operation of Part II of the WACA so that there is seemingly no
benefit for the government. As Lewis (1990:64) points out, "it is the bargaining
element that is crucial; gains for both 'state' and interest groups, though not
necessarily in the same measure, must be present". This may indicate that the
government was already committed to this approach and that the NFU were
merely in accord with this. As access to government records on this subject is not
38 These are documented in chapter 6.
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possible it cannot be said categorically whether the NFU had any real influence or
not. They certainly had the opportunity, but opportunity to influence and actual
influence are of course different things. According to Richardson Jordan and
Kimber (1978:61), "where policy making emerges from a relationship as close as
the agricultural lobby and MAFF it is difficult to give the pedigree of any one
idea". As Holbeche (1986,44) pointed out, "although it is nice to have this
reputation of being effective if you look at the evidence we lose far more cases
than we win". Thus hypothesis 3 is not proved.
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CHAPTER 6
HYPOTHESIS 4
This chapter tests hypothesis 4. This hypothesis is that Parliament and pressure
groups influenced the choice of the voluntary approach. The proposed protection
for habitats in the Wildlife and Countryside Bill was contained in clause 26 1 . In
the explanatory memorandum to the Bill, the clause 2 was described as enabling
the Secretary of State to "make orders designating areas which are of special
interest by reason of their flora, fauna or geological or physiographical features,
and requires notice to be given of certain proposed operations and time to be
allowed for taking appropriate action". However, its application was intended to
be restricted, giving protection through the advance notification system to only a
small number of sites that satisfied certain criteria. These became known as
'super-SSSIs'.
1) THE INFLUENCE OF PARLIAMENT
Legislatures can be categorised as either 'arena', in which debate is conducted and
issues are aired, but few decisions of any substance are taken, or Vansformative',
which play a much more active role in policy making. Drewry believes that the
UK Parliament belongs to the former category because a Parliament "is for talking
1 Clause 27 contained the provisions for compensation if an order was made.
2 As originally published.
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rather than doing" (Drewry, 1993:154). This view of the UK Parliament as an
arena legislature is also held by Punnet (1976:217), who comments that "the
legislative function of the Commons is limited to the discussion, perhaps the
amendment, and then the final approval of Bills that are introduced by the
Government"3 . It would therefore seem that Parliament's only function regarding
legislation is discussion of its contents.
However, such a view is perhaps rather simplistic. Norton (1984) takes an
intermediate position and argues that Parliament falls into the category of a
'policy-influencing' legislature, able intermittently to reject or even amend
executive inspired measures's. Griffith also believes that Parliament exerts an
influence on some Government Bills. However, he believes that the result is
usually a close match to the Government's intentions (Griffith,1974). Adopting
the intermediate position, Parliament does have influence but it is very limited and
usually within parameters set by Government. On the other hand, Griffith & Ryle
(1989) contend that many policy changes are made as a result of parliamentary
pressure5.
3 The reason Punnet gives for this is Government domination of the Commons timetable and the
assured Government majority in the House.
4 He does not contend that this is a permanent position. He traces the role of the House of
Commons and shows that the role as a policy influencing legislature came to the fore in the 1970's.
The legislature is still not a transformative one but is now fairly effective at policy influencing.
5 They give the example of a point raised in standing committee in the Commons about which
nothing is done. The point is taken up in the Lords and eventually the government agrees to it and
an amendment is made. They regard this as a classic example of policy change.
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However, it is almost impossible to quantify the influence of Parliament because
"much of it has to do with the invisible deterrent effects of Parliament upon
ministers, who may shrink from the prospect of having to justify an unjustifiable
policy in public" (Drewry,1993:155). So much of Parliament's influence is
invisible and nothing to do with the process of debate, thus making it difficult to
categorise our legislature. Because of the limitations of the formal parliamentary
system, it is sometimes considered that the important part of the parliamentary
period is not the formal mechanisms of examination of the Bill in debate but the
informal meetings and discussions that go on (Griffith,1974). This view accords
with that of Mr Saxton of the DOE Wildlife Division who commented that "It
appears much debate was conducted in the 'corridors' of the House" (personal
letter,7-9-1994). This is also recognised by Adams, who sees the debates reported
in Hansard as "but the tip of the iceberg as regards what was really happening
during the passage of the Bill" (Adams,1986:94).
Punnet regards this as a consequence of legislative procedure. "Before it is
presented to Parliament its proposals will be examined by the Cabinet, a cabinet
committee, the department of state concerned, and any sectional interests which
may be affected. These discussions behind the scenes may be continued during
much of the Bill's passage through Parliament, and in many cases they are of more
practical significance than is the parliamentary process" (Punnet,1976:226). It
must also be remembered that the stage of parliamentary debate is less important
and politically significant than the period before publication of the Bill.
According to Griffith (1974), the most important part of the process (in terms of
the form of control that will be introduced) is the public consultation period, when
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the Government are consulting with interested parties. This is when the proposals
are most likely to be significantly changed. After this point, substantial changes
are unlikely, particularly as Ministers may see themselves as committed to the
approach. The extension of protection from a limited number of 'super-SSSIs' in
the original bill to all SSSIs in the fmal Act may be regarded by some as a
substantial change. However, the reliance on the voluntary approach was not
changed. Indeed, the Secretary of State for the Environment introduced the
Wildlife & Countryside Bill with the comment "we are not prepared, as a
Government, to support amendments that would change this basic approach"
(Hansard,HC,27-4-81).
The basic approach is formulated during the usually long period between the
problem attracting Government attention and the introduction of the Bill, which is
why the pre-parliamentary phase is so important As pointed out by Ashford
(1981:44) "in so far as there is a deliberative stage in the legislative process, this is
now found much earlier than the parliamentary stages, in the interplay between
political parties, pressure groups, Departments and cabinet". This means that
"failure to be closely involved with policy formation at its pre-public stage often
means an uphill campaign at later stages against courses of action to which
officials and major interests are committed" (Cox & Lowe,1984:155). The early
consultation of the NFU and CLA has already been discussed in the previous
chapter and there was obviously great scope for influence at this time.
However, it is purely the influence of the debates that we are concerned with here,
how the process changed the proposals on habitat protection. This influence
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seems to be much easier to determine than influences before this point or of
parliamentary deterrent effects because there were a number of changes made to
the Wildlife and Countryside Bill during the parliamentary phase and much of the
lobbying by groups was very visible.
The decline in the importance of Parliament in the legislative process is explained
by Miers and Page as a result of increased pressure on time and the parliamentary
workload. Thus consideration of legislation has to be supplemented by
"consultation and negotiation with outside groups both before and during the
parliamentary stages of the legislative process" (Miers & Page,1982:137). By the
time the Bill is presented to Parliament, "ossification is well advanced"
(Griffith,1974:14). So, once published, "challenges V. n the fundamental thrust of
any Government promoted bill face considerable difficulties" (Cox &
Lowe,1986:60). In particular, the Government's majority means that it is "seldom
compelled to withdraw or to substantially modify measures, and that it is even less
frequently defeated" (Miers & Page,1982:136) 6. Such a state of affairs means that
any amendments ministers may wish to make seem to be concessions to the
opposition. However, even these changes "will invariably be of a marginal nature
and certainly will not in any way revise its main principles" (Cox &
Lowe,1983:48). The influence of Parliament is therefore limited. As will be seen,
the voluntary approach was extended in its application to cover all SSSIs and this
can hardly be regarded as marginal, however, the conservationists could not
6 Because of this, it is safely assumed that a government can obtain the passage of virtually all the
Bills that it introduces. This is true also of amendments. See for example the table of government
bills in Walkland (1968).
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persuade the Government to abandon the use of the voluntary approach. The main
principles remained intact.
This view of the inability of Parliament to influence legislation to any great degree
is reinforced by the perceived weakness of the procedures in standing committee
and committee of the whole House. Because of the format of formal speech
followed by formal speech, only a superficial examination really takes place.
Ministers are able to evade questions and it is very difficult to make a Minister
shift his ground (Griffith,1974). Mackintosh believes that the debates "merely
give the opposition a chance to reiterate its objections ... the procedure is
admirably adapted to permit the opposition to make its case several times over and
for the Government to explain the virtues of the measure an equal number of
times. What the procedure does not permit is an exploration of alternative
approaches, an understanding of the views of outsider groups (unless they think it
worth briefing MPs) and there is no scope for public opinion to form and react
before the Government has committed itself to a definite approach to the problem"
(Mackintosh,! 977:141).
However, Griffith (1974) contends that the process of debate is different for those
issues that are seen as socially important 7. When considering these issues, debate
in committees is more intense. The examination is more to do with the underlying
principles of the Bill than with the detailed phrasing of clauses. This could
possibly be said to reflect the passage of the WACA, which was subject to intense
7 He gives the examples of race relations and housing.
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debate. However, he does not contend that this lively debate actually changes
anything. Though he recognises that Parliament can have an impact, that
Government can be flexible, this is "largely on their own terms or, very rarely,
when the opposition to some part of their proposals is strong and widespread"
(Griffith,1974:256).
So it seems that our Parliament is essentially an arena legislature because most
decision making takes place before Bills reach Parliament. However, it does have
transformative features, but generally on the Govemmenfs terms or when the
issue is very contentious or opposition widespread. As will be shown, this model
reflects the position in relation to the passage of the WACA. Amendments were
made8 to the proposals for habitat protection but the 71untary approach remained
the central tenet of the Act, despite strong opposition. Drewry (1993:168) notes
that "it should be remembered that, in the 1980s, with the Thatcher Government
facing little effective resistance in the Commons where it had very large
majorities, the House of Lords played a very significant role in checking the
Government". Indeed it was the Lords that passed the 'Sandford' amendment, only
for it to be removed later in the Commons 9. However, Punnet (1976:227)
contends that "the vast majority of changes that are made to Government bills
during their passage ... are a result of amendments proposed by ministers
themselves". Table 1 in Appendix 1 shows that this contention is prima facie
8 2300 amendments were tabled for the Act as a whole.
9 See later discussion of the report stage in the Lords and Standing Committee D in the Commons.
192
correct in relation to the WACA, however, its validity will be tested later in this
chapter.
2) PRESSURE GROUP INFLUENCE
As mentioned in Chapter 5, pressure groups can be classified as two types, (1)
sectional groups & (2) promotional groups. Sectional groups are those where the
attitudes of the members result from common characteristics e.g. all members are
farmers, and are capable of corporatist relationships with the state. Promotional
groups are those in which all members share certain values e.g. preservation of
the countryside, which operate within a pluralist framework. Of the two types,
sectional groups tend to be more powerful politically ., ecause of the nature of the
sanctions that they can use and the groups' usefulness to Government
(341977)w.
These pressure groups can operate on a number of levels: activity can be in
relation to the executive' I , Parliament or the general public. According to Punnet
(1976:140), "of these three levels of activity, pressure on the Government and the
civil service is the most direct and important sphere of influence, as the
concentration of constitutional authority in the hands of the central Government,
and in the executive machine particularly, means that pressure on Parliament and
10 This is often related to the likelihood of corporatist relationships which give more influence.
11 As it is with corporatist relationships.
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the public is only used as a means of indirectly influencing the Govemment"12.
This phenomenon is also recognised by Ball (1977:108) who states that "as a
general rule, with the increase in executive power and area of responsibility in the
twentieth century at the expense of the legislatures, pressure groups will attempt to
concentrate their activities at administrative levels". Thus, influence at the pre-
parliamentary stages is much more significant than that during the parliamentary
phase. This gave an automatic advantage to the NFU because they had access at
the earlier stages13.
As Punnet (1976:142) recognises, "Government consults with interested parties
before legislation is produced, and the information provided by these interests is
often essential in the preparation of a Bill". Examples of this include the
consultation of the NFU and the consultation of the RSPB on Part I of the Bill'''.
According to Punnet this pressure can be discreet and hidden, making it more
effective and this can certainly be said of the NFU. The principle seems to be that
"most noise equals least success" (Punnet,1976:141). As Ball (1977:109)
comments, "pressure groups activity at parliamentary level is generally more
spectacular and less secretive, but it is doubtful whether the publicity it receives is
always commensurate with its importance".
12 This is consistent with the declining importance of Parliament in influencing legislation as
discussed earlier.
13 This is detailed in the previous chapter.
14 This was very important as the RSPB had been involved with the Birds Directive.
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If groups do not have such direct access, pressure is normally applied through
Parliament. The committee stage provides scope for furthering a cause when the
details of legislation are under consideration. However, the greatest chance of
influencing legislation in Parliament is when party alignment is broken. There are
also informal ways of influencing Government, because many ministers are or
were members of pressure groups 15. This fact was utilised by many
conservationist groups. The CPRE, for example, produced a list of peers and MPs
who might look favourably upon their standpoint (CPRE archives 1980-81). In
determining the influence of groups, "the degree to which a group maximises its
potential membership and the extent to which similar interests are divided
between rival organisation are important" (Ball,1977:113),_An example of this is
the NFU which has nearly 85°0 of all farmers in England and Wales as its
members (Holbeche, pers.comm.). On the other hand, the conservation groups are
widely spread, many having overlapping aims and the membership is thus
diversified. Monopoly of representation is therefore important in pluralist as well
as corporatist frameworks.
When considering the role of lobbying during the parliamentary phase it is
therefore necessary to recognise that little is usually be achieved at this stage.
However, conservation had always been regarded as a non-political issue, making
it more likely that the groups would have influence i6 because voting would not be
strictly on party lines.
15 Many Conservative MPs have strong fanning links.
16 This view of conservation as non-political was soon destroyed (Caufield,1981).
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3) LOBBYING DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY PHASE
Lobbying was intensive throughout the passage of the Act. Conservation groups
were faced with the considerable lobbying expertise and extensive parliamentary
contacts of the NFU". The conservationists were disadvantaged by the strength
of the NFU and CLA as any amendment opposed by them was unlikely to
succeed' s. Therefore, the RSPB, RSNC and NCC held informal discussions with
the NFU and CLA to discuss their objections and to ascertain which proposals
may be blocked.
Because of its resources, the NFU was able to uhdertake the most extensive
lobbying. It was the only group to be present at all stages of the Bill's passage
through both Houses. It had three representatives from land use division working
full time on the Bill. Their lobbying was closely co-ordinated with that of the
CLA, to present a united front. The emphasis in parliamentary briefs, of which
there were 13 from the NFU and 10 from the CLA, was on goodwill and voluntary
means. Formal constraints were regarded as "wholly negative and a threat to
efficiency" (Lowe et a1,1986:140). Their position was strengthened by their
involvement in the drafting of the Bill and they presented voluntary means as
17 As the range of a group's parliamentary contacts is strongly correlated with its income,
reflecting the expense involved in any extensive lobbying, the NFU were in a strong position. See
Lowe & Goyder (1983).
18 In fact there were two exceptions to this, 215 at Commons report and the Sandford amendment
173ZB at Lords Report However, the Sandford amendment was removed in the Commons
standing committee D and 215 was only conceded because of lack of parliamentary time. See
Appendix 1.
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being the only acceptable approach. However, central to this was the requirement
of sufficient funds to implement the legislation. The concern of the farming
community was that if the funds were not made available, and thus the voluntary
approach did not work, this would be seen as a lack of co-operation on their part.
The leading conservation groups o each had a member of staff with prime
responsibility for the Bill. The RSNC was the only group to use an experienced
lobbyist. The RSPB and RSNC worked closely together, the former taking the
lead in relation to Part I of the Bill, the latter on Part II. The CPRE and CNP,
worked together on part II of the Bill", issuing joint briefing papers and press
notices. Despite this co-operation, there was no consensus on the Bill among the
conservationists. Landscape and amenity interests achieved a consensus on the
need for order making powers to protect areas of landscape or wildlife interest and
a new system of agricultural grants and subsidies 21. This even went so far as
proposals being agreed with the Countryside Commission. However, they were
rejected by the Nature Conservancy Council.
Such an approach was typical of the NCC who were extremely reticent. Lacking
staff and resources they took essentially a pragmatic approach to the Bill.
According to Lowe et al(1986:141), the NCC "found its expression in adjustments
of position and demand according to perceptions of administrative feasibility and
19 The CPRE, the CNP the RSPB and the RSNC.
20 Continuing the co-ordination they had developed for the Labour Countryside Bill of 1978.
21 To encourage farm enterprises which might contribute to conservation in addition to food
production.
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the politics of the possible and, given the philosophy so firmly embedded in the
Bill, it necessarily conceded most of the arguments of the farming and landowning
community". They were lobbied by voluntary groups to change this. However, as
Caufleld (1981:295) points out, "the anomaly of appointing landowners to decide
public policy on nature conservation continues to give rise to potential conflicts of
interest"22. A large proportion of appointment to the NCC were, and are, from
farming backgrounds (Lowe,1983a).
Despite their status as a statutory bodies, the NCC and CC acted in many respects
as lobbying goups23. The CC took the approach of co-operation plus safeguards.
The voluntary approach was accepted as generally acceptable but the need for
reserve powers was stressed, to cope with farming iiaavericks. FOE and some of
the Labour opposition took a 'rejectionist position'. They argued that farming
operations should be brought within the ambit of planning controls, because the
two sets of values, institutions and interests were opposed. However, the majority
of amendments tabled by the opposition that were designed to extend protection
were based on the voluntary approach. The consistency of approach in, for
example, amendments 167A at Lords Report, 354 337 in standing committee D
and 69 at Commons Report, to extend protection to all SSSIs is somewhat
surprising. It seems to indicate a degree of pragmatism as to what would be
22 Though she also points out that the NCC had done its duty by calling publicly for statutory
controls for all SSSIs.
23 Briefmg MPs at informal meetings and through circulated papers, formulating and seeking
support for amendments, issuing press releases and briefing journalists.
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accepted. The voluntary approach was already firmly established and the only
option was to extend or alter its remit.
4) THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
4)a) Introduction Of The Bill
On 25-11-80 the Wildlife and Countryside Bill was published. The following day,
the DOE issued a press notice stating that "powers are to be sought for Ministers
to make orders requiring advance notice of specified operations on selected sites
of special scientific interest". It was this limitation of protection to only a few
'selected' sites that caused most concern and the Bill's publication was swiftly
followed by criticisms from a number of groups.
The Exmoor Society claimed that "The conflict between agricultural improvement
and nature and landscape conservation is not resolved by the Bill. The Ministry of
Agriculture provides grant aid for farmers that positively encourages them to
intensify their land management and destroy wildlife". "The Bill does not go far
enough to protect SSSIs. It has been proposed to select a few SSSIs nationally for
special powers of protection. The SSSIs themselves are, however, already a very
limited selection of sites and if the national heritage of wildlife is to be conserved,
all SSSIs should be afforded greater protection". The society did not believe,
however, that even the protection proposed for the limited number of sites would
be enough because it was reliant on management agreements. "The evidence of
the working of management agreements shows up their long-term weakness.
They are unsatisfactory in their failure to protect areas of interest. The
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compromises involved in management agreements have led to losses of important
habitat which must be avoided" (CPRE archives, letter of 12-12-80). The CPRE
and the CC therefore proposed amendments to extend protection to all SSSIs and
to include 'natural beauty' as a ground for designation. These proposals were not
accepted by Michael Heseltine. In a letter to the CC on 15-1-81 he indicated that
changes were unlikely: "our policies underlying this part of the Bill are what they
are" (CPRE archives 1980-81).
The Wildlife Link Conunittee m met on 11-12-80 and members were advised to
concentrate on asking Conservative peers to table amendments for them. A
summary of the Committee's views was produced which called for notification of
damaging activities on all SSSIs. It also proposed that grant aid should not be
given for drainage, land-clearance etc. on SSSIs and that the protection in clause
26 should be available to all sites and not just a selected number.
On the 12-12-80, the NCC published a press release that also expressed concern at
proposals to protect only a few selected sites. "The NCC welcomes the intent of
the recently published Wildlife and Countryside Bill to strengthen the protection
of wildlife and its habitats. It is concerned, however, that the proposals to protect
only a selection of SSSIs do not go far enough". The press release also criticised
the controls that were currently in place and would be the protection for the
majority of SSSIs. "These arrangements do nothing to protect SSSIs from
24 Part of the Council for Environmental Conservation which includes inter alia RSPB, RSNC,
FOE and Greenpeace.
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changes in land-use such as intensification of agriculture (e.g. land drainage,
ploughing of old pastures and application of pesticides and fertilizers) or
afforestation, because these are not subject to planning control. Existing non-
statutory consultation arrangements with the Agriculture Departments, the
Forestry Commission and other public bodies are inadequate safeguards".
As noted by Hugh Clayton in an article in the Times on 10-12-80, there was
"concern among conservation lobbies that the powers in the Bill have been
weakened after pressure from farmers' unions on a Government in which many
ministers own farms". He believed that "the Bill has been received with quiet
satisfaction by the National Farmers Union and the Country Landowners
Association". This satisfaction did not, however, extend to all such groups. There
was concern from the Timber Growers England & Wales about lack of
consultation and the absence of an appeals procedure (TOO press release 27-11-
80).
4)b) Consideration In The Lords
The Bill was scrutinised first in the House of Lords. This procedure was used,
partly because of pressure on the parliamentary timetable, and partly because of
the idea that conservation is not a politically contentious issue. This was seen as
favourable to the conservation groups because of the possibility of indirect
influence as "many hereditary peers are large landowners and have a personal
interest in many aspects of rural conservation and historic preservation. Secondly,
party links and party discipline are much weaker in the Lords than in the
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Commons" (Lowe & Goyder,1983:69) and influence is much greater when party
alignment is broken25 . However, it was later seen as a tactical mistake. Cherfas
and Caufield (1981:675) commented that "the Wildlife and Countryside Bill was
intended to be a non-controversial, bi-partisan piece of protective legislation, but
it has met nothing but trouble since its introduction into the House of Lords last
autumn". A Government MP admitted "we sent it there first because the
department had two major bills in the last session and we thought we could save
time ... we didn't realise that it would get so bogged down there"
(Caufield,1981:294)26.
4)b)i) Second Reading
The second reading debate started on 16-12-80. The CPRE had prepared
parliamentary briefing notes for this debate that claimed: "the Bill misses
opportunities for effective action rather than seizing them" and that "the Bill
displays undue sensitivity to agriculture". They called for extension of clause 26
to all sites. The RSPB produced a general background brief for Lords second
reading and worked with RSNC throughout Part IL
According to Lowe, "three-quarters of those who spoke in the second reading
debate were landowners, knowledgeable about, and not unsympathetic towards
25 Although as noted earlier, it was still considered desirable to persuade conservative peers to
table amendments for the groups.
26 This delay became crucial later when the opposition resorted to threats to talk the Bill out.
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farming. The majority were also office-holders in conservation groups" (Lowe et
a1,1986:141). The debate and criticism were extensive27, and many of the issues
raised were to reappear on numerous occasions during the passage of the Bill.
4)b)i) Committee
On 27-1-81 the Bill went to consideration at committee. The question of limiting
protection to only selected sites was raised again by the Royal Town Planning
Institute in their parliamentary briefing paper of January 1981: "the limitation of
the order-making procedure to 'certain' areas of special scientific interest is too
restrictive and too bureaucratic. Since Lill SSSIs are, by definition, areas where the
characteristics of the site should be conserved, it is inadequate to limit the
notification of operations threatening sensitive sites to a selection of SSSIs. This
selection would involve yet another formal designation procedure. In its present
form the Bill would, by creating two tiers of SSSI, effectively downgrade the
priority afforded to non-designated SSSIs, and would add to the work involved in
assessing the justification for designation".
This sentiment was echoed by the NCC in a press release of 11-2-81: "the NCC is
calling for prior notification of activities inimical to nature conservation for all
SSSIs; so that there will be a limited period during which the NCC can negotiate
with the owner for a management agreement with financial incentives. This
27 See for example Hansard HL415 cols. 983 - 996, 1006 - 1094.
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procedure for advance warning would in fact be in line with the current
arrangements for grants for agricultural improvement on SSSIs".
At the same time, loss & damage statistics of SSSIs were published (Goode,1981).
The NCC survey suggested about 13% of SSSIs suffered damage to their wildlife
interest every year. "As the Government's advisors on conservation, the disparity
between their data on the rapid rate of damage to sites and the Government's
refusal to introduce stronger measures to protect them was obvious and politically
embarrassing" (Adams,1986:101). The Government's response was that "any
damage arose from a lack of knowledge or understanding by individual farmers of
the wildlife importance of their land, rather than from any wilfulness or inexorable
pressures" (Lowe et a1,1986:143)28.
Five amendments29 were made to clauses 26 & 27 in committee, although two of
these were merely consequential amendments38. The three substantive
amendments were all proposed by the Government. Amendment 376A restricted
the conditions upon which an order under clause 26 could be made'. Amendment
387A, which was linked to 376A, introduced the requirement of national
importance before a site could be designated, and extended liability for damage on
28 These figures did, however, cause the government embarrassment and may well have been a
factor in the tabling of amendment 167ZA at report which allowed for the preparation of voluntary
codes for the protection of all SSSIs.
29 For details of all amendments see Appendix 1.
39 402A & 405A were consequential upon 387A.
31 The national interest was no longer relevant.
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such a site beyond merely the owner or occupier to any person 32. However, in
(2)(b) it introduced the requirement of specifying in the order any damaging
operations. The other successful amendment was 427 relating to clause 27 that
merely provided for Scotland regarding tribunals.
A large number of amendments proposed by conservationists were withdrawn on
the promise of Government action. Examples include: amendment 376 imposing
a requirement of notification by the NCC of the features of interest and PDOs
which would apply to all SSSIs33, amendment 389 which extended liability for
damage to action on adjoining land34, amendment 410 which removed the
possibility of imprisonment as a penalty 35, amendment 411 which provided for
restoration of damaged sites36, amendment 413 which provided for registration as
a local land charge37, and amendment 426 which proposed to restrict the
availability of compensation38.
32 This was more due to the difficulties of defining owners/occupiers than any wish to extend
liability - see Hansard H1A17 12-2-81 col. 324, Earl of Avon.
33 This was incorporated into the successful government amendment 167ZA at report after
pressure from the NFU & CLA.
34 This was raised again at report as amendment 167BA but the government decided not to act
after this.
35 At report this was achieved by the successful government amendment no. 167BC.
36 This was again raised by Lord Melchett at report as amendment 167C and was finally
successful as the government amendment 77 at third reading.
37 This was later incorporated into the new Section 28 in the Commons and in Section 29 in
amendment 365
38 This reappeared as 167E at report but no further action was taken.
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4)b)iii) ggpxt
The Bill went to report on 10-3-81. The next day the NCC issued a Press release
stating that "the chairman of the Nature Conservancy Council, Sir Ralph Verney,
has today written to the Secretary of State for the Environment to say that the
council is giving public support to the all-party amendment on the Wildlife and
Countryside Bill whereby the NCC would be notified of all threats to Sites of
Special Scientific Interest and given the opportunity to seek voluntary agreements
over the land". "The need for a mechanism ensuring prior notification to NCC of
potentially damaging activities is further emphasised by the final results of the
NCC survey of SSSIs for the year 1980. This shows that agricultural activities,
including the cessation of traditional management, are the principal cause of
damage to biological SSSIs". The amendment referred to was 167A, which was
ultimately unsuccessful, the Government amendment 167ZA being agreed to
instead.
At the report stage three amendments were successful. The Government
amendment 167BC removed the possibility of imprisonment as a penalty 39. The
other Government amendment was 167ZA, which involved the insertion of a new
clause providing for the notification to owners, of all SSSIs, of the special interest
of the site and PD0s, and for the preparation of a voluntary code°. This code of
39 This stemmed from amendment 410 at committee proposed by Lord Middleton, Lord Stanley of
Alderley, Earl de la Warr and Earl of Caithness.
40 The notification requirement was based on amendment 376 at committee proposed by Lord
Buxton of Alsa and Lord Craigton. The introduction of a voluntary code of guidance was partially
due to the publication of loss and damage statistics.
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conduct was provisionally welcomed by the NFU and CLA as long as adequate
funds were made available. However, the conservation groups did not regard this
as adequate protection, they wanted powers to prevent destruction on SSSIs.
The major success in the Lords was amendment 173ZB proposed by Lord
Sandfordo . This proposed to allow MAFF to make grants for conservation
purposes. It was agreed to on a vote of 48 to 4642. Lowe et al (1986:142) believe
that "the Government and the NFU were caught unawares, having not fully
appreciated the significance of the amendment, and having assumed that it would
be withdrawn .... In the event, the Government's defeat was regarded as a major
tactical victory for the conservationists, but MAFF ministers and officials saw the
new clause as a totally unacceptable intrusion upon\ agricultural policy and
resolved to emasculate it later in the passage of the Bill"43.
4)b)iv) Third Reading
On the 30-3-81 the Bill went to third reading in the Lords. Only two relevant
amendments were passed here. The first successful amendment was number 77, a
Government proposed amendment, which provided for restoration of damaged
41 An influential Conservative peer and former Minister.
42 As can be seen from the number voting the House was not well attended at this stage.
43 It was later removed by the Commons Standing Committee and replaced with NC49.
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sites designated under section 2944. The second successful amendment was
number 82, which provided for water authorities to consult with the NCC45.
4)c) Commons
The Wildlife Link Committee met on 14-4-81, before second reading in the
Commons, to discuss their tactics. They provided their members with lists of
sympathetic Conservative MPs to contact about SSSI protection. There had been
a meeting with the NCC on 2-4-81 where they considered writing to the Council
for Europe to ask for a ruling on whether the Bill met its requirements on habitat
protection, but nothing came of this proposal. Wildlife Link decided to continue
pressure for protection of all SSSIs as in the all-party 'amendment proposed at
report in the Lords46.
Before the start of the commons stages, the NCC produced a note on their views
of the Bill. In this it called for registration of all SSSIs as local land charges and
for reciprocal notification of intended activities on all SSSIs. It did not believe
that the voluntary code in clause 28 would be effective. "The code will have the
statutory backing of Parliament but there will be no penalties to deter those who
chose to ignore it. The NCC has advised Government that a Code of Conduct,
even backed by the landowning and farming organisations, would not be effective
44 This was based on amendments 411 (committee) and 167C (report).
45 This was based on amendment 177A at report.
46 Amendment 167A.
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in restraining either that small minority of farmers who care nothing for
conservation or those who feel, in present economic circumstances, they have no
option but to maximise production". In relation to clause 29, they called for, inter
alia, order making powers for the Secretary of State through which the owner or
occupier could be prevented from proceeding with an activity on payment of
compensation.
The NFU also issued a parliamentary brief for the second reading in the
Commons. In this they praised the voluntary approach, giving their full support to
the voluntary code. However, in response to calls for full protection for all SSSIs
they claimed that "the introduction of compulsory notification of agricultural
operations on all SSSIs would be likely to result in the nnnecessary antagonism of
a section of the farming community which has generally indicated its willingness
to reach voluntary agreements for conservation purposes"47.
The Bill went to second reading on 27-4-81 and it was indicated that the
Government intended to reverse a number of changes (such as the Sandford
amendment) made to the Bill in the Lords".
47 Despite their opposition, such controls were introduced in government amendment 215 at
Report in the Commons.
48 For example see the speech of Mr Heseltine at Hansard HC3 col. 532 - 533: "Although I am
Very sympathetic to what is known as the Sandford amendment, I do not believe that the use of the
agricultural grants machinery is the appropriate vehicle".
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4)c)i) Committee
On 12-5-81 the bill went to Standing Committee D, which consisted of 21 MPs.
According to Cox and Lowe (1983:66), "when the members of standing
Committee D were named, environmental groups expressed their disappointment,
that back bench Conservatives, who had expressed their support for the
conservation case in the second reading debate, had not been selected". Because
of the limited number involved in standing committee D, lobbying was restricted
in Commons and was away from the attention of the media49. Because of the
stated Government intention to reverse changes made in the Lords, voting in the
committee was on party lines. According to Caufield (1981:296) conservationists
were powerless "in the face of an unyielding Government with a large majority of
obedient backbench MPs". Thus the tactics of groups such as Wildlife Link to
approach Conservative MPs was abandoned in favour of the opposition.
One thing was in the conservationists' favour, time. The Bill was pushing close to
the end of the parliamentary session and the opposition threatened to talk it out50.
This was designed to "force the Government either to accede to conservationists'
demands about amendments to the Bill or else lose the bill altogether" (Cherfas &
Caufield,1981:675). As Mr Tam Dalyell pointed out "The opposition would
prefer to see the Bill reach the statute book. That is our preferred position, but we
49 Unlike the extensive cross-bench lobbying which occurred in the committee stage in the Lords,
and which had attracted much publicity.
50 They were able to do so because of the royal wedding - this meant that the House would rise on
24th July (Cherfas & Caufield,1981).
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do not want it at just any price. Candidly, what will determine our attitude
towards the timetable will be the Government's attitude towards the Sandford
amendment ... we would be prepared to try to put the whole Bill in jeopardy by
forcing the Government to go back to the floor of the House for a guillotine
motion" (Standing Committee D,12-5-81,col 3). He even went so far as to state
that "were a statement to be made this week or early next week that Ministers are
prepared to retain the spirit of Sandford, Ministers and Back Benchers might be
astounded at the succinctness and comparative brevity of our arguments"
(Standing Committee D,12-5-81,col 4). However, to a substantial degree, the
Government outmanoeuvred the opposition. This was done "with unkept
promises that various amendments would be considered, principles upheld and
spirits observed. By the time the opposition realised that the Government's
responses were not going to be satisfactory, the Bill was as good as through its
committee stage" (Caufield,1981:296).
The successful amendments were all Government sponsored. They were
amendment 365 introducing registration as land charges for NCOs in Scotland51,
409 removing the Sandford amendment and NC49 replacing the Sandford
amendment, described by Adams as "an anodyne clause requiring the Minister of
Agriculture to consider the aims of conservation" (Adams,1986:103). Instead of
enabling MAFF funds to be used for wider purposes than agricultural production,
the new clause simply required the Minister of Agriculture when considering grant
applications to further the aims of conservation, but only in so far as may be
51 413 at Lords Report, 414 at Lords report and 202 proposed by the opposition.
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consistent with the agricultural purposes of a scheme. This was met with the
comment from Tony Jones of CPRE and Fiona Reynolds of CNP: "having
promised to retain the spirit and purpose of the Sandford amendment, Government
presented the House of Commons with a treacherously emasculated version. The
MAFF grant remains restricted to the narrow profit-oriented purposes of
agricultural business" (Countryside Campaigner,Jan.1982). The new clause also
required an authority that objected to a grant to offer a management agreement.
This change pleased MAFF who were the main pressure behind this amendment,
and the CLA and NFU who were constantly emphasising the resource
implications of goodwill. They "welcomed the measure as providing the
necessary financial safeguards and recompense for farmers affected by
conservation objections" (Cox & Lowe,1984:160). However, it was a double
blow to the conservationists; not only had the duties of the Minister of Agriculture
been severely curtailed, but it also seemed to give farmers a legal right to
agricultural grant-aid52.
On 12-6-81 the NCC had published a press release stating that "the NCC
welcomes the Government's decision during the Commons Committee stage to
reconsider these issues: namely habitat protection (SSSIs), agricultural grants (the
Sandford amendment), Marine Nature Reserves and the duties of water
authorities. Of particular importance is the need for owners and occupiers of
52 Since if they are denied aid on conservation grounds they must be compensated for the resulting
hypothetical 'losses' from budgets of the conservation agencies. This was one of the issues hotly
debated when the Standing Committee's amendments were considered by the Commons in July.
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SSSIs to inform the NCC of any intention to carry out potentially damaging
changes of land use". They believed that if these improvements occurred the Bill
would "represent a major contribution to nature conservation in Britain". Of
these, the reciprocal notification requirement for SSSIs was accepted in the report
stage, Sandford was removed and replaced with a new clause in a severely altered
form, MNRs were accepted, and duties were imposed upon water authorities in
NC30 on report. The NCC were fairly successful and it is arguable that they
should have asked for more. Though there is the possibility that the NCC felt that
it should only ask for that which it could achieve rather than asking for full
protection which it was highly unlikely to get.
4)c)ii) Repoli
On 13-7-81 the Bill went to report. As Lowe et al (1986:144) point out, "by this
stage, conservationists had redefined their objectives to those changes which they
considered the minimum necessary to make the Bill acceptable". On 7-7-81 the
NCC had circulated a parliamentary brief asking again for reciprocal notification
on all SSSIs53, justifying it on the grounds that it would put the NCC in a better
position to advise the Government on the need for a clause 29 order. It achieved
this with a requirement of three months notice being imposed in amendment
" Currently, such notification only occurred in relation to grant applications. This was because in
August 1980 new procedures for capital grants were introduced which meant that prior approval
from ADAS was not needed. This meant the loss of advice on safeguarding wildlife. The
concession made was that if the application was in relation to an area in a NP or SSSI the
landowner must consult NPA or NCC. This introduced the idea of notification by fanners but the
NCC and the conservation groups wanted to extend this to all potentially damaging operations, not
just those for which grants were applied for.
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215 54 . This provision altered the context of NCOs. They would now be applied
when "an irretrievable breakdown of voluntary negotiations on any SSSI"
occurred, rather than "just to safeguard a strictly limited number of sites as the
Government had intended" (Lowe et a1,1986:145). However, this amendment was
not welcomed by the NFU and CLA. They had very definite views on what
would constitute excessive control and this was it. On hearing of the Government
intention to table this amendment the CLA declared in its parliamentary briefing,
"the Government has now abandoned the voluntary approach". The NFU said that
it must "state its disappointment that the Government has appeared to have
withdrawn its previous commitment to a voluntary procedure"55.
Other concessions were the registration of SSSIs as a local land charge 56, and the
requirement of three months' notice to an owner/occupier of intention to designate
as an SSSI57. According to Lowe et al (1986:146), "the NFU and CLA had
pressed for this right of appeal, though they were unhappy that the appellate body
was to be the NCC and not an impartial body". Compensation was also provided
for any depreciation in land value resulting from the imposition of an NCO and
54 Canfield attributes this success to the time card being again played by the opposition, working
this time because of calls for an emergency debate on the riots.
55 Given the lengthy discussion before the Act between the NFU and the Government on the form
of controls, and their professed commitment to it, the NFU was understandably unhappy.
However, the voluntary approach was not really affected by this provision, but the NFU's
objections may have been based on the worry that the Government would make further concessions
to the conservationists. In fact, it was contended by Caufield that the NFU were quite prepared to
accept the principle of reciprocal notification, and that it was the secret cabinet committee dealing
with the Bill (headed by William Whitelaw and including Francis Pym - both substantial
landowners) who were the sticking point.
56 Included in amendment 215.
57 Amendment 214.
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losses from the prohibition on certain activities 58 . There was also an increase in
the amount of fines in section 31 59 . Other successful amendments were NC31
replacing Sandford for SSSIs, NC 32 providing for a voluntary code for SSSIs as
this had been removed from clause 28 by amendment 215, clause 36 providing for
the duties of water authorities was removed and replaced with NC30. NC33
provided for ministerial guidance for payments under management agreements
and the use of an arbitrator.
4)d) Lords
On 15 -10-81 the Bill went back to the Lords for consideration of the Commons
amendments. An attempt was made to remove the clau7 requiring the payment of
compensation for objecting to an agricultural grant. Lord Buxton and Lord
Onslow proposed an amendment60
 to make the offer of a management agreement
optional and not compulsory for the NCC when objecting to grants. However, the
amendment did not receive the backing of the NCC. The CPRE, the RSPB, the
Council for National Parks and the RSNC called a joint press conference and
sought to marshal the fullest support in the Lords. However, in the debate, much
was made of the lack of support from the NCC. Earl Ferrers, a MAFF junior
minister, quoted from a letter from the NCC that said, "The Nature Conservancy
Council has given the Government its support for the present wording of the
58 Amendment 149.
59 Amendments 188 and 189.
60 Amendment 76A
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clause, because it removes the uncertainty which has bedevilled negotiations
between the conservation agencies and farmers and landowners in the past. It also
places a firm commitment on the Government to make adequate resources
available to deal with those agreements" (Hansard:HL424,15-10-81,516). The
amendment was defeated 57 to 59. Lord Arbuthnott, the deputy chairman of the
NCC, voted with the Government61.
All the Commons amendments were accepted by the Lords. The successful
amendments, 58A, 58B, 63A and 105B, were all technical in nature and changed
nothing substantial.
4)e) Commons
On 29 -10-81 the Bill went back to the Commons for consideration and was
published the following day.
5) CONCLUSIONS
In considering the influences during the parliamentary phase it is impossible to
distinguish between party influence and pressure group influence. This is
because, given the relationship between the NFU and the state, much of their
61 He was a former president of the Scottish Landowners Federation. Disappointed
conservationists rounded on the NCC accusing it of treachery and of caving in to political pressure.
There is strong circumstantial evidence for this interpretation of events - the chairman of the NCC
was a former president of the CLA.
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lobbying was through the Government, and the conservation groups generally
lobbied the opposition particularly when the Bill went to the Commons. Thus
opposition amendments were favourable to the conservationists' case.
Government amendments were more diverse with many favouring the
conservationists. The conservationists therefore seem to have exerted some
degree of influence at this stage. According to Perring (1983:430), "there is no
doubt that Wildlife Link ... had a significant influence on the fmal shape of the
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981".
To assess the achievements of the conservation groups, there must be an
appreciation of the resources and the strength of commitment that supported the
voluntary approach. As mentioned before, the NFU in particular were extremely
powerful. In this context, the influence seems more than just minimal as might
have been expected. Indeed, Tam Dalyell, one of the Labour MPs on Standing
Committee D, quoted a senior clerk of the House of Commons who could not
remember "a major Government bill, put forward by a Government with a
substantial majority, which had been so materially altered by the time it came out
of the parliamentary sausage machine" (Dalye11,1981:243). This was despite the
fact that, according to Max Nicholson, "the Government lacks any basis of
responding to the issue other than giving in to the strongest pressure group"
(Guardian,March 1981), which in this case was the landowning lobby.
As Caufield (1981:296) points out, "at the outset of the Bill few conservationists
believed that they would be able to change it substantially ... but a number of
back bench revolts in the House of Lords raised the conservationists' hopes". The
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passage of the Bill had attracted considerable public attention and "in this
atmosphere, a combination of filibuster by the Labour opposition and pressure on
ministers from some Conservative Ma's and peers won limited concessions from
the Government" (Cox & Lowe,1984:159). The most important factor seems to
have been the opposition threat to talk the Bill out of time. According to Dalyell
(1981:243), "denying a Government parliamentary time and room for manoeuvre
before deadlines is the most effective way of altering bills".
In relation to SSSIs, sixteen amendments were passed in the Lords62. Of these
fifteen were Government amendments 63. In the Commons, thirty-four
amendments were made only one of which was not a Government amendment".
So, of fifty amendments made only two were not Government sponsored.
This would seem to fit with Punnets contention that the majority of changes to
Government Bills are a result of amendments proposed by ministers
(Punnet,1976). However, it should be noted that of these successful Government
amendments, twenty-three 65 were not substantial in nature (technical or
consequential amendments) and fourteen were as a consequence of amendments
previously tabled by conservationists. This seems to cast doubt upon Punnets
62 See Appendix 1 table 1.
6 The only non-Government amendment to be successful was the Sandford amendment 173ZB
which was removed later
64 232
65 402A, 405A, 427, 217, 218, 219, 71, 147, 148, 150, 151, 190, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161,
58A, 58B, 63A, 106B and 106C
66 167BC, 167ZA, 77, 82, 365, 214, 215, 149, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, NC31.
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contention. Although, on the face of it, they were all Government amendments,
they were substantially similar to amendments proposed by conservationists, and
their introduction by the Government must be at least partly due to the actions of
the various pressure groups67.
This view would accord with the idea that such Government amendments are seen
as concessions to the opposition. This seems to be the view of Lowe et al
(1986:143), who comments that "the Government introduced several amendments
of its own in the Lords. Some were concessions seemingly intended to placate
conservation groups and defuse the increasingly unfavourable publicity that the
Bill was attracting as journalists latched onto the conservationists' criticisms".
However, although their introduction may seem to indicate success, Caufield
(1981:294) contends that "the Government conceded only on minor and technical
points". Although I would agree that nothing occurred to change the basic
voluntary approach, the amendments must be seen as more than merely marginal.
Indeed through amendment 77 restoration of sites was introduced, an important
provision, if limited in its application, and amendments 214 and 215 gave all
SSSIs a degree of protection.
67 Although Adams believes that, of all the amendments earned agamst the Government m the
Lords, none f these was strongly opposed by the 'farmmg lobby', and of those which were so
opposed, none was passed_ This is 'incorrect when looking at amendment 215 at Report in the
Commons.
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The Government had been forced to make a series of amendments. After the
parliamentary phase the essence of the provisions for protection of SSSIs had
changed little. Their application had been extended to all SSSIs but the voluntary
approach was paramount. The differences were the removal of the possibility of
imprisonment if work was carried out during the specified period, the provisions
in section 31 for restoration of sites, section 32 with respect to agricultural grants
(requiring the NCC to offer a management agreement if they objected to a grant),
section 33 providing for voluntary codes of guidance to be issued by the Minister,
section 41 regarding advice from the Minister of Agriculture, section 48
concerning duties of water authorities, and section 50 concerning the financial
guidelines for management agreements. The voluntary approach remained the
underpinning of the protection.
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CHAPTER 7
HYPOTHESIS 5
This chapter will test hypothesis 5. This is the proposition made by writers such
as Blowers (1987), Lowe & Flynn (1989) and O'Riordan (1989), that Thatcherite
ideology was a determinant in the introduction of the voluntary approach to
habitat protection. Thatcherite ideology will be explained and then compared with
the provisions of the WACA to see if a positive proof of the hypothesis can be
made, that it influenced the choice of the voluntary approach. It will then be re-
considered to see if a negative proof can be made for why planning control or
criminal sanctions were not adopted.
1) WHAT IS THATCHERISM
The Thatcher administration saw the advent of what has been called 'New Right'
ideology'. The 'New Right' refers to a diverse ideological and political movement
whose emergence has been attributed to the turbulence of politics in the 1970s,
central to which was the weakening of the authority of the state (Kavanagh 1987,
Gamble 1989, Dunleavy 1988). According to Gamble (1989b:1), "the apparent
inability of successive governments to respond to a number of deep-seated
problems convinced many on both Left and Right that a radical overhaul of the
objectives and institutions of government had become necessary if government
1 For example see Lowe & Flynn (1989), Barry (1990), Gamble (1989), Plant (1988), Kavanagh
(1987).
221
was to regain effectiveness and legitimacy". Thatcherism represented one of the
initiatives conceived to rejuvenate the policy framework.
The previous policy framework was based on the idea of social democracy. There
was a consensus that had dominated British politics since the 1950s about the
broad aims of public policy. This consensus included an extensive role for the
state to ensure full employment, a guaranteed level of welfare provision, an agreed
level of public ownership of resources and the involvement of pressure groups in
the political process (Barry, 1990). Thatcherism was about abandoning or at least
redefining this consensus which had failed during the 1970s (Ramsden 1992,
Gamble 1989). Neo-liberal ideas "displaced the Post-War ideological dominance
of Tory paternalism and related notions such as social consensus and the
desirability of the mixed economy and the welfare state" (Lowe &
Flynn,1989b:22). According to Jackson (1985:12), Thatcherite policies "broke the
mould ... and sought to replace it with an alternative based upon free market and
monetarist principles".
The New Right has both liberal and conservative strands, a "mixture of classical
liberal individualist principles and traditional Conservative values of authority and
legitimacy" (Barry,1990:21). Plant has identified a number of elements of New
Right politics that reflect this mixture: (1) rejection of central government
planning (2) critique of corporatism (3) critique of the welfare state (4) preference
for 'market solutions12 (5) political centralisation (Plant,1988). (1), (2), (3) and (4)
2 This term is explained below at 2B.
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represent the liberalist principles of a free economy. (3) and (4) represent the
liberalist principles of a limited state. (2) and (5) represent the Conservative
principle of paternalism and a strong state. The central tenets of New Right
politics are that the economy should be free and the state strong but limited. Of
these, "the first and most important innovation was the rehabilitation of the market
system as an important engine of prosperity and liberty" (Barry,1990:22).
However, there is doubt as to whether the preference for New Right principles can
be strictly attributed to Thatcherism. The term 'Thatcherism' is controversial.
According to Gamble (1989b:3), "doubts have been cast on both the novelty, the
coherence, and the radicalism of Thatcherism as a political project and on the
existence of a Post-War consensus which Thatcherism claimed to overturn". It is
arguable that it was merely a form of Conservativism rather than a distinct
ideological stance. Barry (1990:18) argues that even though the policies of the
Thatcher government have been at odds with the pre-1979 consensus, their
"theoretical and conceptual sources pre-date her first election victory". According
to Plant (1988:9), "this free-market form of eonservativism has deep roots in the
conservative party but has been eclipsed since the 1930s". This view is also held
by Blowers (1987:278) who argues that "there are indications that the changes,
while profound, do not constitute a hiatus with the past. In several respects the
Thatcher government marks a transitional phase in politics".
Ramsden goes a step further and argues that the Conservatives do not have any
ideological foundation at all. "The search for ideology in party policy ... runs the
risk of identifying as underlying ideological changes policy choices that are no
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more than the consequence of fashion, of tactics and of new leaders who use a
different vocabulary and practise a different style" (Ramsden,1992:80). However,
in trying to ascertain what Conservative ideology is, he notes that the first policy
document of Heath committed the party to rolling back the state and curbing the
powers of the trade unions. 1965 set the course for Thatcherism: "the tactical
shifts of the 1970s and the change of leadership in 1975 served only to conceal
continuity over the 25 years of the Heath-Thatcher era" (Ramsden,1992:81).
Even if the policy approach of the 1980s cannot be strictly attributed to
'Thatcherism', it may be attributable to Conservativism, and the argument that
Conservative ideology determined the approach in the WACA can be addressed.
2) DISTINGUISHING 'MARKET SOLUTIONS' AND 'MARKET
MECHANISMS'
The first distinction that must be made is between the 'market system' and the
'collectivist system' as Thatcherism was directed towards the revival of the market
system. This has been described by Ogus (1994:1) as where "individuals and
groups are left free, subject only to certain basic restraints, to pursue their own
welfare goals. The legal system underpins these arrangements but predominantly
through instruments of private law". Market solutions rely on the market system
to achieve desired ends. In contrast, the collectivist system is where "the state
seeks to direct or encourage behaviour which (it is assumed) would not occur
without such intervention. The aim is to correct perceived deficiencies in the
market system in meeting collective or public interest goals" (Ogus,1994:1). The
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collectivist system therefore involves regulation, market mechanisms being one
type of regulation.
2)a) Market Solutions
Under a market system the law has a facilitative function. It performs this by
providing formalised arrangements involving rights and obligations enforceable in
the courts. Examples of these arrangements include contractual and proprietary
rights. Issues are resolved through the use of private law. These arrangements
control conduct but are fundamentally different from regulation, primarily because
they are private. In addition, "it is left to individuals and not the state to enforce
rights; and obligations are incurred voluntarily in the sense that they can always
be displaced by agreements between the affected parties, if they are found to be
inappropriate" (Ogus,1994:2). Market solutions are typically decentralised3.
2)b) Market Mechanisms / Regulation
Unlike market solutions, regulation' , has a directive function and involves control
by a superior. "Individuals are compelled by a superior authority - the state - to
3 Although Thatcherism shows a preference for such market solutions, it also favours political
centralisation which is contradictory. This shows the tension between the liberal and conservative
strands of New Right ideology. According to Gamble "the gulf between market liberal and
conservative conceptions runs deep" (Gamble,1989a:14).
4 Four definitions of regulation are detailed by Graham (1994): (1) governing according to rules;
(2) all activity of the state which determines or controls or alters the operation of markets; (3) one
of a variety of instruments of policy implementation which can be contrasted with instruments such
as subsidies and taxation by its command-and-control characteristics; (4) the legal rules and
measures which express such command and control arrangements. It is the second definition
which is being utilised here. The third definition is often used by writers considering economic
instruments and this leads to the inconsistencies of definition discussed below at note 7.
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behave in particular ways with the threat of sanctions if they do not comply"
(Ogus,1994:2). Because the formulation and enforcement of regulation are carried
out by the state it is usually centralised.
Different types of regulation exist. A common distinction made is between social
and economic regulation. Social regulation covers such things as nature
conservation where the market cannot provide the desired result5. Economic
regulation concerns such things as monopolistic industries where the regulation
aims to provide a substitute for the market and competition.
These types of regulation can be performed in a number of ways. The most
obvious is the command-control style regulation involving the use of authority by
way of criminal sanctions. Indeed, as Ogus' definition of regulation given above
shows, this is the typical idea of what regulation involves. However, as Ogus
(1994:3) later points out, "regulation can take the form of an 'economic
instrument which is not directive: individuals or firms are legally free to
undertake certain activities which, from a public interest perspective, are regarded
as undesirable, but if they do so, they must pay a tax or charge" 6. In addition, the
5 This could be for a number of reasons such as lack of information for consumers and third-party
effects.
6 Verbruggen (1994) adopts a different approach, givmg three categones of policy instruments:
communicative instruments, direct regulation (command-and-control) and economic instruments.
This distinction is echoed in the work of Nutzmger (1994) who contrasts economic instruments
with regulatory instruments However, all three can validly be regarded as types of regulation as
an alternative to a market system which is consistent with Ogus's approach and definitions of New
Right ideology. This is also confirmed by Opschoor & Vos (1989) who recognised that there is
often no real distinction between the so-called regulatory and economic instruments.
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definition of economic instruments 7 can be taken a step further to include not only
penalties through taxes and charges but also subsidies and grants. It is these
economic instruments that are referred to as 'market mechanisms' 8 . Veljanovski
(1990) describes this as 'market-based regulation'. According to Handberg
(1980:111) the choice between such economic instruments and coercion "is a
function of how important the goal or policy is to the society. As the goal
becomes increasingly important to the society, there is a greater likelihood of
invoking sanctions as opposed to incentives".
The distinction between market solutions and market mechanisms is, therefore, the
distinction between a free market and regulation using taxes and subsidies, the
tool of treasure.
3 MARKET SOLUTIONS, MARKET MECHANISMS & THATCHERISM
As mentioned above, the primary element of Thatcherism is a preference for
market solutions. The emphasis is therefore on a free market system. According
to Gamble (1989b:14), "The nation which Thatcherism seeks to build is based not
on the equal rights of citizenship guaranteed through state action but on the
7 For a detailed discussion of the use of economic instruments in environmental protection see
Opschoor & Vos (1989) and Opschoor & Turner (1994).
8 de Savornin Lohman (1994) proposes a further differentiation between financial instruments and
economic incentives. Financial instruments are designed to raise revenue for specific
environmental expenditures. Economic incentives are primarily designed to have incentive effects.
There is also a mixed category of financial instruments that have incentive effects. On this
categorisation, the provisions in Section 28 WACA are economic incentives. However, they will
be referred to throughout as market mechanisms because the fine distinctions drawn by de Savornin
Lohman are not necessary for the purposes of this chapter.
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property rights of individuals"9. The New Right rejects central government
planning as inefficient. Free markets are more efficient at promoting growth,
relieving poverty and co-ordinating individual decisions. "Keynesianism and the
universalist welfare have been discredited and a new public philosophy has been
established which stresses the superiority of market allocation to any form of
political or bureaucratic allocation and advocates the application of free market
principles in deciding the content and priorities of public policy"
(Gamble,1990:334). This preference for market solutions has been most
prominent in relation to the economy "where the Thatcher government has
emphasised the morality of the market and its superiority over state intervention"
(Lowe & Flynn,1989b:22).
This rejection of planning necessarily involves a critique of corporatist
arrangements between government and the major interest groups in the field of
economic management. According to Plant, these arrangements "emphasise a
mistaken collective responsibility for planning the economy. In the view of the
radical right the state should play no role in seeking a consensus about economic
policy between major interest groups. Decisions about prices and investment
cannot be made by such groups" (Plant,1988:11).
9 It may be argued that this emphasis on property rights reflects a societal deference to the power
of property and a wish to preserve it. However, this argument is inconsistent with the controls
imposed over, for example, listed buildings (Suddards & Hargreaves,1996; Ross, 1991) and does
not hold favour with those working in the field (Dave Pritchard, pers. comm.).
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In respect of welfare provision, whilst reducing state expenditure, private
hospitals, health insurance and private education were encouraged. This
preference for market solutions and the desire to limit the state's role has resulted
in a denial of state responsibility for planning, growth, employment levels and for
specific levels of welfare for its citizens. This has been combined with the
privatisation programme) that was designed to make the privatised industries
more responsive to market forces. Besides ensuring the role of the market in
allocation, this has also been part of "the more general strategy of questioning the
role of the state in spheres in which its function seemed entrenched"
(Plant,1988:14). This is because, along with this emphasis on economic
liberalism, there is another ideological dimension to New Right politics: "one of
the most important New Right ideas has been the concept of the over extension of
the modern state" (Gamble,1989b:8). As Ogus (1994:10) points out, "The period
since the end of the 1970s has generally been perceived as one of 'deregulation'.
In an attempt to limit the state, "there has been a determined attempt to roll back
the frontiers of the state and to substitute market forces whenever possible for
state action" (Plant,1988:8)". This has been achieved by asset sales, contracting
out and privatisation (Dunleavy, 1988). "The reaffirmation of faith in the
efficiency of competitive markets and the commitment to controlling public
expenditure and limiting the public sector have obviously had a very significant
impact on regulatory policies"(Ogus,1994:11).
10 For example the privatisation of the utilities.
11 For example Local Authority contracts under Local Government Act 1988 and the Deregulation
& Contracting Out Act 1994.
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Thus the objectives of Thatcherism have been "The revival of market liberalism as
the dominant public philosophy, and the creation of the conditions for a free
economy by limiting the scope of the state while restoring its authority"
(Gamble,1990:336). The free economy was to be achieved by deregulation,
privatisation and curbing the power of the unions. "The role of the state was to
remove obstacles to enterprise, to relieve the burden of public spending and to
enforce law and order. A strong state was seen as compatible with a free market"
(Blowers,! 987:277).
However, the desire to roll back the frontiers of the state in the economic sphere
does not extend to all spheres of political activity. The Crservative strand of the
New Right stresses the strength of the state, particularly in respect of law and
order. This trend is often referred to as patemalismu. "Although paternalism is
not often invoked in policy discussions, it may be safely assumed that it remains a
powerful motivation for regulation even when other justifications ... are also
appropriate" (Ogus,1994:52). In certain areas, rather than weakening the state by
a process of political decentralisation to parallel economic decentralisation, state
power has become more centralised and concentrated. Thus, "one of the most
fundamental changes has been the redrawing of boundaries between public and
private sectors ... In order to roll back the state in some areas it has been rolled
forward in others" (Gamble,1989b:12). The result of this is that "some areas of
12 Different theories exist as to types of paternalism, from individualist and anti-individualist
perspectives. These are discussed by Ogus (1994) at pages 52-53. However, for the purposes of
this discussion it is not necessary to determine why paternalism exists, just to recognise that it does.
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social regulation have continued to grow, notably those pertaining to the
environment" (Ogus,1994:10).
4) MARKET SOLUTIONS, THATCHERISM & THE CHOICE OF THE
VOLUNTARY APPROACH
A number of writers have argued that environmental policy, of which nature
conservation is often seen as a part, has been substantially influenced by New
Right ideology. According to Blowers (1987:290), "under Mrs Thatcher's
government, environmental policy has exhibited a pronounced ideological
change" reflecting the emergence of New Right ideas. This fact has also been
noted by Lowe and Flynn (1989b:24) who comment, that the "single minded
commitment to the removal of obstacles to business growth and private enterprise
has coloured the Government's approach towards environmental protection". As
Potter and Adams (1989:1) point out, "despite the many reshuffles and political
repackaging the 1980s have seen a remarkable consistency of ideology and action
in the countryside".
Some writers have argued that conservation policy in particular has been affected
by New Right ideology. If this is correct, Conservativism may be a determinant in
the choice of the voluntary method of habitat protection. A number of the
elements of New Right ideology may have been influential on Conservation
policy and these will be considered in turn. The first is the critique of
corporatism, the second is the preference for market solutions and the third is
paternalism.
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4)a) Critique of Corporatism
The critique of corporatism and the desire to move away from consultation and
planning has meant "somewhat diminished consultation opportunities for
environmental interests and reduced levels of formal political access" (Lowe &
Flynn,1989a:264). Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the so-called 'post
corporatist state' under Thatcher and how this may have influenced the
introduction of the voluntary approach.
4)b) Preference For Market Solutions
According to O'Riordan (1989:4), "Thatcherism is distinguished by an ideological
commitment to shift the burden of responsibility of effort and payment from the
state to the private sector. As a corollary, collective regulation gives way to
individualistic voluntarism. So it has been with nature conservation". Because of
the emphasis on economic liberalism, "there has been little sympathy with any
regulatory controls if they are perceived to obstruct growth or development"
(Lowe & Flynn,1989a:261). This also reflects the desire for a limited state, that
state intervention and regulation should be kept to a minimum. "In Thatcher's
countryside, there is apparently no room for the selective state intervention that is
a vital component of effective conservation" (Potter & Adams,1989:2).
This argument for Conservative ideology being a determinant of the voluntary
approach in the WACA rests on the classification of that voluntary approach as a
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'market solution'. The focus of New Right politics is the free economy, and the
market system ideal of voluntarily entered obligations is echoed strongly in the
provisions of the WACA for habitat protection. Management agreements are
entered into voluntarily and the medium of contract is used to control the
relationship between the landowner and the NC. Control is therefore through
private law. A Thatcherite preference for the market system might therefore seem
to have influenced the introduction of the voluntary approach to habitat protection.
However, while contract is used, habitat protection is not purely a matter of
private arrangements. Management agreements are generally only entered into
after the moratorium period. This is a 'command-control' mechanism involving
criminal penalties. The voluntary approach in the WACA cannot be reconciled
with the desire for economic liberalism. Management agreements are not about a
free market, they are about state subsidy for protection. In all other areas, the
Thatcher government has striven to reduce state subsidy of industry through the
privatisation programme.
4)c) Paternalism
It has been argued that Conservative paternalism has been influential in this
sphere. New Right ideology has been diluted in the attempt to strengthen
traditional values (Plant,1988). "The Thatcherite commitment to deregulation and
the morality of the market is antithetical to a vision of the government as the
paternalistic guardian of the environment" (Lowe & Flynn,1989b:29). Social
regulation has therefore increased in this area. "The development of Conservative
environmental policy has reflected ... a strong undercurrent of Tory
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patemalism" 13 , although "it is increasingly coupled with exploration of market
means of policy delivery including a move towards a contract rather than
bureaucratic model of regulation" (Lowe & Flynn,1989b:22). Although
regulation is increasing, it is taking a different form with a preference for market
mechanisms.
The provisions of the WACA are regulatory in nature, based on subsidy rather
then the free market, but adopting 'market mechanisms'. According to Milton
(1991:12), "economic measures - tax incentives and deterrents, grants and loans -
are ways of intervening in the market to influence individual choice" and have
been used "quite extensively and explicitly in wildlife and countryside
conservation". Section 38 of the WACA, which relates to grants by the NC, is
given as an example of a regulatory economic instrument by Ogus. As well as
such direct subsidies, there is also the provision of compensation through
management agreements and the exemptions from Inheritance Tax. A similar
situation is referred to by Ogus with Nitrate Sensitive Areas under the Water
Resources Act 1991, sections 94 - 95, where "compensation may be offered for a
loss of profits resulting from a voluntary restriction on the use of harmful products
or processes" (Ogus,1994:249).
13 See for example Paterson (1984) on the paternalist approach of the Conservatives towards
conservation.
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4)d) Conclusions On Thatcherism & The Voluntary Approach
The influence of paternalism has meant that the WACA involved some extension
of the state through additional powers for the Nature Conservancy Council, but
"there has also been an emphasis on private and voluntary initiative, stimulated by
grant and tax concessions rather than statutory controls" (Lowe &
Flynn,1989b:26). A possible explanation for this is offered by Blowers
(1987:279): "conservation policy illustrates a mixture of ideology and
pragmatism. Compromises had to be achieved between the potentially competing
interests of farmers and those concerned with the protection of the rural
environment, both regarded as naturally part of the Conservatives' constituency"14.
The habitat protection provisions are therefore based on market mechanisms and
not market solutions. This is because, not only is it accepted that market solutions
are incapable of protecting the countryside, "even the most right-wing economists
regard nature conservation and amenity preservation as classic examples of public
goods. Market economics do not cater well for collectively wanted benefits for
which there is no definable price or mechanism to register willingness to pay"
(O'Riordan,1989:4). Conservation is an example of what Ogus (1994) calls
'community values' 15, the goals of which the unregulated market has only a limited
capacity to achieve. "In the first place ... it fails to take account of the demands
14 The importance of the idea of co-operation is considered by Vogel (1983) in respect of
environmental protection. The conclusion drawn is that this 'co-operative regulation' has
contributed to the effectiveness of the provisions in contrast with the American system of pollution
control.
15 In fact Ogus gives the example of species protection.
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likely to be made by future generations. Secondly, while altruistic motives are not
necessarily incompatible with market processes, a 'free rider' problem often
emerges. Many people may be prepared to give up some of their assets for
altruistic purposes only if they can be assured that a large number of others will do
the same. Given the problems and costs of co-ordination, the dilemma is likely to
be solved only by regulatory compulsion" (Ogus,1994:54). A regulatory approach
therefore seems to be the only workable solution for conservation. However, the
influence of the market ethos may have meant that the form of regulation adopted
was an economic instrument, a 'market mechanism'.
5) THATCHERISM & THE USE OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
This influence of the market ethos could possibly explain why criminal sanctions
were not introduced and a 'market mechanism' was. Thatcherite ideology, with
the emphasis on free markets, shows a very definite preference for property rights.
These are used as the form of legal control in a market system along with
contract i6. So, although the preference for a market system may not explain the
introduction of the voluntary approach, it may indicate why there was such
reluctance to interfere with property rights. However, relying on property rights
to protect habitats is of limited use. A limited degree of protection is provided by
ownership of property", but this cannot cope with the possibility of damage by
the landowner, the very type of damage that the WACA was supposed to address.
16 For an interesting discussion of the historical links between the use of contract and property see
Bergeron (1993).
17 For a detailed discussion of the protection afforded by property law see Alder (1996).
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6) THATCHERISM & THE USE OF PLANNING CONTROL
The Thatcherite preference for the market cannot alone explain the use of the
voluntary system as it is not a market solution. However, New Right ideology
may provide an explanation for the negative question posed by the thesis, why
planning controls were not used.
McAuslan sets out three ideologies of planning law: (1) "that the law exists and
should be used to protect private property and its institutions; this may be called
the traditional common law approach to the role of law"; (2) "the law exists and
should be used to advance the public interest, if necessary against the interest of
private property; this may be called the orthodox public administration and
planning approach to the role of law"; (3) "the law exists and should be used to
advance the cause of public participation against both the orthodox public
administration approach to the public interest and the common law approach of
the overriding importance of private property" (McAuslan,1980:2). He proposed
that planning law was based upon ideologies (1) and (2). They were "the
dominant ideologies in the law and administration of land use planning"
(McAuslan,1980:267). However, this emphasis changed under Thatcherism in
favour of ideology (1) which represents principles of the free market and de-
regulation.
According to Blowers (1987:286), "in its policies for development, the Thatcher
government has been able to give full expression to its ideological preferences".
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This is also noted by Lowe and Flynn (1989b:25): "of all the facets of
environmental policy, neo-liberal ideas have been most strenuously brought to
bear on the planning system, and here deregulation has been explicitly pursued as
a political priority". This has been achieved by deregulation and the promotion of
the interests of private developers 18 . There was also a centralisation of decision
making with special development orders and the introduction of Urban
Development Corporations that override Local Authoritieso.
One of the reasons given for why Thatcherite ideology had been so pronounced in
relation to land use planning is that it is accountable to local democratic
procedures and offers great scope for public participation. "The administration of
the planning system by local authorities has meant that it has inevitably been
embroiled in the government sustained challenge to the autonomy of local
government" (Lowe & Flynn1989a:265). This would therefore seem to give a
good explanation for why planning controls were so strongly resisted in relation to
habitat conservation.
7) CONCLUSION
The proposed influence of Thatcherite ideology seems to give a good explanation
for why planning controls were not used. Section 3D concluded that the influence
18 1980 saw the introduction of enterprise zones which involve exemption from rates, 10000
capital allowance for corporation and income tax purposes on industrial and commercial buildings,
and streamlined planning controls. In 1987 simplified planning zones were introduced which gave
general planning permission for specific categories of development.
19 For full details of the changes made see Blowers (1987).
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of the market ethos may have meant that the form of regulation, the voluntary
approach, was an economic instrument, a 'market mechanism'. However, even if
the argument that the introduction of a voluntary system was a result of
Thatcherite policy is prima facie tenable, it fails to take account of the approach
proposed by the Labour Government in 1978. A comparison can be made with
the Countryside Bill proposed in 1978. This also adopted an approach based on
market mechanisms, protection was voluntary and based on management
agreements and incentives.
The Countryside Bill 1978 was designed to address the problem of moorland
conservation but also provided for the wider countryside. For this it proposed a
voluntary approach. Clause 6 provided for management agreements with
landowners for the purpose of 'enhancing the natural beauty of any land.., or
promoting its enjoyment by the public'. The emphasis on management
agreements, the crux of the voluntary system, was the same. This therefore shows
that market mechanisms were not the sole preserve of the Conservatives.
It has been argued that this use of the voluntary approach was due to pressure in
the House by Conservatives. "Although the minority Labour government
amended the Bill to make management agreements the main instrument of
reconciliation, the Bill was opposed by the Conservatives" (Cox &
Lowe,1983:50). However, although the Bill had started with ideas of compulsion
and was later amended, these were seen as a back up for moorland conservation
but with the emphasis first on management agreements, and Clause 6 relating to
the wider countryside had always rested on the voluntary approach.
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The Labour approach was summed up by Mr Howell who said, "I very much hope
that moorland conservation orders will not prove necessary. They are a fall-back.
I hope that we shall encourage farmers to enter into annual management
agreements. If that is possible and practicable, no doubt we shall all be delighted"
(Hansard:HC961, 30-1-1979,1254).
If the voluntary approach was a result of Thatcherite ideology, why then did a
Labour government adopt the same approach? Plant argues that the move to the
market and rolling back of the state is not restricted to the Conservatives. "Right
across the political spectrum political parties are looking for ways in which to
replace government as the major agent of allocation of values, goods, services,
benefits, burdens and costs" (Plant,1988:8). The Labour party has explored
whether decentralisation and a market orientation can be compatible with socialist
goals. There seems to be a general move towards questioning the role of the state
and the adoption of market oriented solutions. There is a new consensus about the
role of markets. This fact is also noted by Gamble who points out that "the idea of
a policy watershed ignores the substantial continuities which link the policies of
the Thatcher government - for example on economic management, on local
authority cuts, on military procurement, and on the European Community - with
those of its Labour predecessor, suggesting that the real break in policy comes in
1976 rather than in 1979" (Gamble,1990:335). Any influence of the market ethos
on the introduction of a 'market mechanism' cannot, therefore, be attributed to
Thatcherism.
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In addition, this use of market mechanisms in the form of economic instruments is
not limited to the UK20 . Market mechanisms are compatible with the market
system because they try to incorporate the cost of third party effects in the price of
a product thus internalising the costs. This is an approach favoured by the OECD
(Turner & Opschoor,1994). However, the OECD tends to favour the negative
economic instruments, taxes and charges based on the 'polluter pays' principle
rather than subsidies and grants which represent the approach in the WACA. In
fact, subsidies are regarded by Nutzinger (1994) as only qualifying as economic
instruments if they influence the cost benefit ratio of certain activities. Subsidies
of the type involved in management agreements are not even included in the
definition of subsidies given by Opschoor & Vos (1989). Management
agreements do not affect the cost benefit ratio of an activity but merely represent a
substitute income source21 . Even in McNeely (1988), where the use of economic
incentives for biodiversity conservation is directly addressed, this type of 'subsidy'
is not considered. The market mechanisms adopted in the WACA and proposed in
the Countryside Bill 1978 therefore seem to be of a different type from those
classically regarded as economic instruments and represent an alternative
approach to policy implementation.
20 De Savornin Lohman (1994) provides an analysis of the increasing use of economic instruments
in OECD countries.
21 The use of management agreements affects the cost-benefit ratio of conservation but the
defmition of subsidy is that it affects the cost-benefit ratio of the primary activity, often agriculture
or development, not an alternative activity.
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CHAPTER 8
HYPOTHESIS 6
1) INTRODUCTION
This chapter tests hypothesis 6. This hypothesis is that trends in governmental
policy implementation mechanisms determined the choice of the voluntary
approach. This hypothesis is capable of showing why criminal sanctions or a
planning based approach were not adopted and why the voluntary approach was.
It is necessary at this point to return to the classifications of government action
described in chapter 1. The four basic tools that government can use to implement
policy are authority, treasure, nodality and organisation. The main focus of
writing on policy implementation is usually upon legislation, which is often
associated with the use of force (authority). However, all of these tools can be
employed through the medium of legislation. In addition, treasure, nodality and
organisation can all be deployed without resort to legislation.
2) IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
Daintith (1982) focuses upon the use of authority and treasure as tools of policy
implementation. They are very different in nature. There is a distinction between
"the deployment of force, which is an inherent component of rule, and the
deployment of wealth or property in the hands of the ruler" (Daintith,1982:215).
Thus they operate in different contexts. This gives essentially two main resources
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that are available to government: "first, the command of law, backed in the last
resort by force, carrying with it the threat of harm to those who do not comply;
and second, the possession of wealth, carrying with it the promise of benefit for
those who do. The first is simply exemplified by the use of the criminal law ...
the second by the offering of grants" (Daintith,1989:196). The use of these two
forms of implementation has been classified by Daintith as imperium and
dominium.
2)a) Imperium
This is associated with the use of authority and organisation. It encompasses
"those instruments of policy which involve the deployment of force by
government" (Daintith,1982:215) 1 . The emphasis is on parliamentary
sovereignty, with the typical form of policy implementation consisting of "formal
and unilateral changes in legal structures ... by means of Parliamentary legislation,
or by the exercise of formal powers delegated by Parliament to government"
(Daintith,1989:194). Imperium therefore includes legislation using the criminal
law. This authorises the use of force by government, for example, setting a
standard or rule for the behaviour of the relevant persons and providing sanctions
for non-compliance. However, the emphasis is not merely on sanctions,
compliance may be rewarded through a relaxation of legal commands 2. Part I of
the WACA dealing with species protection is typical of imperium.
I This often means the threat of force.
2 For example a tax reduction.
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2)b) Dominium
This is associated with the use of treasure and nodality. This approach centres on
the possession of wealth by government and includes "those legal devices of the
common law, such as contracts, gifts and other transfers, through which the wealth
of government may be deployed" (Daintith,1982:215). Dominium can mean the
promise of benefit for those who do comply with a particular policy. However,
dominiurn is not just associated with benefits; "a withdrawal of benefits, such as
government contracts or grants, can be used to 'punish non-compliance" (Daintith
1989:197). The management agreements for SSSIs are an example of dominium,
the landowners being offered compensation if they abstain from damaging a site.
2)c) Imperium, Dominium & Government Tools
Imperium and dominium involve elements of all four types of implementation
mechanism referred to in chapter 1. However, the dominant tools are authority
and treasure. As such they are not "comprehensive categories which can be made
to embrace all law or even all legislation" (Daintith,1982:215). There are other
forms of intervention. Chapter 1 referred to the use of nodality and organisation
as dominant tools. However, the use of both nodality and organisation is usually
linked to the use of either imperium or dominium. They therefore tend to be
secondary sources of policy implementation rather than dominant ones. The use
of nodality as a method of policy implementation has been labelled 'suasion' by
Daintith who has noted the linkage with the use of imperium and dominium. "In
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almost all cases ... the effective use of information as a policy tool either is related
to the potential exercise of imperium or dominium (where the information
incorporates a threat, or a promise, to use these resources in appropriate
circumstances), or is on a scale involving significant public expenditure, itself an
exercise of dominium" (Daintith,1994:213).
2)d) Application Of The Mechanisms
In addition to the direct application of imperium and dominium, there is the
possibility of their indirect use as bargaining tools "to secure undertakings from
powerful groups and organisations to act in conformity with policy"
(Daintith,1989:193). This is consistent with the idea of corporatist bargaining and
self-regulation discussed in chapter 5, but can also be seen as more akin to
contractual bargaining 3. According to Harris (1992), negotiation is inherent in the
idea of dominium. The two techniques overlap considerably, wealth being an
obvious bargaining tool. Agreement is also essential to the operation of
dominium because people cannot be forced to accept government wealth. In
addition, "other bargaining tools, such as its ability to impose legal obligations,
are also at the disposition of government" (Daintith 1989:193).
The application of negotiation is not restricted to the consultation of interested
parties at the stage of preparation of legislation. Negotiation may be extended so
that "the legislation is related in some way to an agreement between government
3 The importance of the govenunent's ability to enter into contracts is discussed in the next section.
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and those parties. It may be the expression of an agreement; or a lever to secure
an agreement. Agreements may also be secured by the threat of legislation: if
agreement can be reached, the need to legislate is avoided" (Daintith,1989:208).
Government may use either imperium or dominium as bargaining chips and both
the positive and negative sides of each. "A threat by government to introduce or
support unfavourable regulatory legislation can of course be just as powerful a
spur to informal compliance with its policy as the promise of favourable laws"
(Daintith,1989:209).
3) GOVERNMENT AS AN INDIVIDUAL - THE NEW PREROGATTVE
In addition to the implementation of policy through legislation, the government is
able to implement policy using the powers of an ordinary legal 'person'. The
government possesses the legal capacities of an ordinary person of full age, not
subject to any legal disabilities. Probably the most important of these capacities is
the power to contract. The importance of contactual regulation was recognised
by Daintith in 1979 when he commented that "government has discovered means
of using its increasing economic strength vis-a-vis private industry so as to
promote certain policies in a style, and with results, which for a long time we have
assumed must be the hallmark of Parliamentary legislation: that is to say,
officially promulgated rules backed by effective general compulsion"
(Daintith,1979:41). Daintith calls such contractual regulation the 'new'
prerogative because it represents the power to rule without parliamentary consent.
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Harris (1992) classifies this legal ability as the 'third source' of governmental
power, statute and the prerogative,4 being the first and second sources.
This 'new prerogative' is characterised by the use of common law for example
contract and property. It provides the authority for much use of dominium, along
with statutory authority 5, so the two are closely linked. An example is the
exercise of dominium through government contracts which further government
policy6. This new prerogative is not of use when imperium style control is
introduced.
According to Daintith, "for purposes of policy implementation, these 'ordinary'
capacities of government are of major significance" (Daintith,1989:195). This
means that an important technique of implementing policy is through bargaining
with interested parties and the deployment of the wealth of government
(dominium) using the 'ordinary' legal capacity of govenunent7. The
implementation of these mechanisms can also be delegated to other bodies such as
Quangoss . This takes their operation a step further away from the classic view of
policy implementation.
4 If adopting a narrow definition of prerogative - rights which the courts have recognised as being
unique to the Crown.
5 Dominium can take statutory form but is still different in nature to imperium e.g. welfare
benefits.
6 For example, pay restraint policy in the 1970s which was implemented through conditions
imposed on government contracts with private companies.
7 This approximates to the use of what Summers (1971) calls the public benefit conferral
technique and the private arranging technique.
8 For example the NC.
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4) APPLICATION TO SSSI PROTECTION
The SSSI provisions represent a classic example of the use of the new prerogative
and dominium. It might seem at first that the new prerogative is inapplicable to
SSSI protection because much of the writing on this focuses upon procurement
contracts9 and most examples of this form of implementation come from
procurement contracts. This is because procurement contracts are a relatively easy
area in which to utilise this ability, but the theory is applicable to all policy areas.
The management agreement is, in a sense, a 'true' example of the new prerogative
with no links to procurement at O w. It involves a 'contract' with the landowner
and ultimate protection for sites is through property law if a compulsory purchase
order is granted.
The dominium element is the management agreement . This involves the
deployment of government wealth" in the form of compensation provisions and
the notification provisions in Section 28 which according to Jowell (1989)
institutionalise the bargaining process. It therefore involves both the deployment
of wealth and negotiation. In addition, the extensive contact with the NFU
described in Chapter 5 can also be seen as part of this element of negotiation.
9 See for example Arrowsmith (1995) and Daintith (1979).
ID However, the argument that the new prerogative involves governing without parliamentary
consent is not applicable to the WACA because the system is in statutory form.
11 The use of government wealth should not be confused with the so-called 'financial control' of
pollution which is generally based on imperium and the polluter pays principle. See for example
De Kock (1980) and the discussion of economic instruments in Chapter 7.
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So the SSSI provisions have all the hallmarks of this type of implementation.
There is, however, an imperium element to the controls. Under Section 28(5)
there is a penalty if the reciprocal notification requirement is not complied with.
There seems, therefore, to be a mixture of approaches in use. However, as
Daintith (1989:198) points out, a "complex, many-pronged approach to problems
is today commonplace". The imperium element in the SSSI legislative scheme is
fairly limited and, as will be seen later, is rarely used. The reason for its existence
was actually the negotiation process before the introduction of the Act. The NFU
asked for such a provision to try and guarantee that farmers notified EN and thus
ensure members' compliance with the bargain (Holbeche, pers.comm). Thus the
imperium element is, in effect, a product of dominium style implementation, with
the NFU trying to maintain its strong corporatist bargaining position through
ensuring members' compliance.
5) ADVANTAGES OF USING DOMINIUM & THE NEW PREROGATIVE
So, why should the government decide to use the 'new prerogative' and dominium
for habitat protection rather than imperium? Government is required to account to
Parliament for all its activities 12, however, an action is still legally valid even if
Parliament disapproves. The benefit of this approach, therefore, is that its use is
"not subject to check through the application of public law standards of
12 Including those over which Parliament has not asserted legislative control.
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administrative law" (Arup 1990:255) 13 . There is no constitutional convention to
control the arbitrary use of dominium. Thus, the use of the ordinary legal powers
of government 14
 "is subject to only one major and incontestable legal constraint:
the consent of Parliament, in the form of legislation, must be obtained for any
consequential expenditure of public funds" (Daintith,1989:195). There is no other
control on the use of these powers. Government can enter contracts with
landowners without external contro1 15 . Judicial review may apply, but the limits
to the discretion will be very wide.
There is no real control of the government's action through the ordinary law of
contract either. Contract may be useful for making state bureaucracies more
accountable (Harden, 1992), but not for the protection of wildlife because it is not
consumer oriented, it is not a purchaser and provider situation. Its
inappropriateness stems from the fact that the engine of the contract system is "the
pursuit of self-interest" (Harden, 1992:2).
Even the control of spending does not necessarily inhibit the government's ability
to enter into contracts that will involve spending 16 . Even though legislation is
13 This is the view that was held at the time of the WACA. However, it has since been recognised
that "the weak legislative structure of dominium, and the informality with which it may be
exercised, clearly no longer inhibit judicial review as once they might have done"
(Daintith,1989:217). See Freedland (1994) for a discussion of judicial review of government
contracting.
14 Apart from any specific legislative restrictions that Parliament may impose.
15 They are of course bound by the financial provisions under Section 50 as to the amount of
compensation
16 Although, in fact, EN are restricted by their budget.
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necessary to authorise the spending, there are lower political costs involved in this
than with imperium legislation. Dominium legislation can often be achieved
through skeletal provisions that leave a broad discretion to ministers and other
funding agencies such as the financial provisions under section 50, WACA.
Dominium statutes therefore tend to be shorter and less complex. The WACA as
a whole can hardly be regarded as either short or simple. However, the dominium
style element (for habitat protection), is limited in length and leaves much
discretion to EN". According to Daintith, "there is a clear contrast with imperium
legislation. Other things being equal, therefore, the less onerous legislative
requirements attaching to dominium may certainly weigh with the policy maker in
his choice of implementing mechanisms" (Daintith,1994:218). In terms of
political costs, therefore, a dominium style approach would have been attractive to
the government.
Another advantage is that the use of dominium avoids one of the major problem
with the implementation of any policy, that of uncertainty. "To operate efficient
policies which seek to change people's behaviour, government needs adequate
information first about how they should behave - that is, what standard or target it
should set; secondly, about how they are behaving now, and why; and thirdly,
about what sanctions or incentives will align their behaviour with the desired
standard or target" (Daintith,1994:219) 18 . Uncertainty is a particular problem
where the policy applies to large numbers of people. "If such numbers can only
17 For example the process of negotiating management agreements.
18 The problem of uncertainty often forms the justification for the use of market mechanisms.
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be sufficiently reduced, not only may the operation of measures be more
effectively policed, but government can obtain the knowledge it needs in advance,
by asking those affected by its measures what their reactions will be or, even
better, obtaining commitments from them about their future behaviour"
(Daintith,1989:204). This is obviously much better than trial and error policies.
However, this negotiation is not limited to mere consultation; self-regulation is
also a possibility if there are few enough people concerned or "if there exist
enterprises or organisations with a sufficient control capacity (whether economic
or institutional) to guarantee the operation of the policy" (Daintith,1989:206). The
NFU is just such an organisation and its ability to self-regulate has been
considered earliero. The early consultation of the NFU that was noted in chapter
5 could therefore be explained as the government seeking agreement on its
policies rather than as an all powerful NFU exploiting its corporatist relationship
to force the use of a voluntary approach.
Another thing that helped the Government in this respect was the Porchester
Report". This effectively gave the voluntary system a trial run in respect of
moorland conservation. Its importance can be seen from the fact that all through
the debates on the WACA, reference was made to the report and the use of
19 Chapter 5.
20 Moorland reclamation in National Parks had been the subject of campaigning by environmental
groups for a number of years. A study of the extent of the change was commissioned by the
Exmoor Society and showed that it was a serious threat to the Park. An attempt to amend the
Countryside Act 1968 was unsuccessful, but pressure from the CPRE and CC led to the
appointment of Lord Porchester in 1977. The Labour Countryside Bill of 1978 was intended to
implement his proposals.
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voluntary codes. Porchester had said that management agreements needed
compensation to work so the WACA adopted management agreements with
compensation. The report gave the Government an indication of how the system
would be received by landowners.
The Porchester Report was critical of the voluntary approach. Despite these
reservations about the usefulness of management agreements, they were regarded
as a good way of maintaining the goodwill of the farmers. If coupled with
compensation they were seen as the way forward. Any failures in the past were
explained as problems of compensation. "There have not been agreements in
some cases. This was not because the National Parks lacked money but because
the committees did not agree with the farmers about the amount of compensation"
(Hansard:HC691,30-1-1979,1362). As the Porchester Report (1977:41) noted,
"the National Park Authority expressed the view that as the voluntary system of
notification before conversion had worked (in the sense that advance notice had
almost invariably been given) they were in favour of a procedure based on
voluntary principles and saw no need for compulsory powers, even as a back up to
voluntary agreements. This view was shared by the Country Landowners'
Association, the National Farmers Union and the Royal Institution of Chartered
Surveyors".
The main disadvantage of dominium is the cost involved. In contrast, imperium
seems to be cheaper than dominium. There are, of course, enforcement costs but
the costs of compliance with policy "are placed wholly on those whose behaviour
is to be affected. Taxing undesired activities may even bring the Exchequer a net
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return, after collection costs, and consequential losses of other forms of revenue
such as income tax, are taken into account" (Daintith,1994:214). However,
imperium also involves non-financial costs such as the political costs of securing
the passage of legislation. "To secure the passage of legislation, even if it is
politically uncontroversial, requires heavy investments of scarce governmental
resources. Government must draw on its stores of influence (over its own back-
benchers and perhaps other Members of Parliament) and of time (within an always
crowded parliamentary calendar)" (D aintith,1989 : 201).
The political costs of the WACA were in fact high. Even though the Government
had considered the Bill to be uncontroversial, and therefore sent it to the Lords
first, it took up much parliamentary time. The WACA therefore suffered the main
disadvantage of imperium legislation. However, government will pay these costs
because of a number of reasons, such as the possibility of an immediate political
dividend or because they may have to comply with international obligations. In
this context, the Birds Directive will have been instrumental in the necessity for
imperium style controls in part I of the WACA.
6) DOMINIUM, THE NEW PREROGATIVE & THE WACA
The SSSI provisions do seem to have the advantages of dominium and the new
prerogative. However they also suffer the disadvantage of cost. In addition, the
implementation of the WACA suffered the disadvantages of imperium regarding
political costs, although these are probably less than if the legislation had been
wholly imperiurn based. The habitat provisions could have been even more
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contentious if they were solely imperium as the discussion of penalties for non-
compliance with the notification requirement shows21.
Dominium and the 'new prerogative' seem, therefore, to be justification for why
imperium controls were not introduced for habitat protection. The previous
chapter indicates why regulatory planning controls were not favoured 22 and the
foregoing discussion may indicate why criminal sanctions were not introduced23
as the dominant mechanism. Thus the hypothesis shows a negative proof. In
addition, legislation for habitat protection was not a priority for the government.
The necessity for it was imposed upon the government by the requirements of the
Birds Directive and because of the rising levels of damage to sites. The approach
was therefore minimalist and dominium style controls were consistent with this.
The use of the new prerogative was in the interests of bodies such as the NFU so
that they would have agreed to such an approach. Thus the hypothesis also shows
a positive proof.
21 See Chapter 6.
n The influence of Thatcherite deregulation.
23 This trend may not necessarily be restricted to the UK. Morris (1972) argues that there is a
general trend away from the use of criminal sanctions and towards the use of incentive systems in
environmental protection in the US.
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7) AN EXPLANATION FOR THE TREND: FROM IMPERIUM TO
DOMINIUM
The use of dominium was at its zenith at the time of the introduction of the
WACA. According to Daintith, imperium was the only resource available to
government in earlier centuries. This is consistent with the adoption of imperium
style implementation in the early species protection statutes24. Dominium has
become available relatively recently and only with the development of the use of
dominium has the 'new prerogative' become relevant. Increasingly "government
uses its powers of dominiurn and in particular its award of advantages such as
grants, tax concessions, contracts and public services, as a means of obtaining the
co-operation and compliance of powerful private interests" (Arup 1990:257). This
trend has developed since 1945, since when there has been "a steady growth in
governmental reliance both on dominium as a source of social and economic
control, and on control through bargaining rather than arm's-length techniques"
(Daintith,1989:206).
By the time the WACA was introduced it could be asserted that "together
discretion and informal controls are of far greater importance than are formal
"legal" measures in state regulation" (Prosser,1982:3). This trend goes beyond
political preference and could therefore provide an explanation for why the
Labour Government's Countryside Bill of 1978 adopted a similar approach.
According to Daintith (1989:194), the policy tools of bargaining and the
24 Detailed in chapter 3.
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deployment of public wealth have attained major importance and are likely to
retain this importance "whatever the political complexion of the government in
power".
The reasons Daintith gives for the growth in the use of dotninium and the new
prerogative are "the growth of public spending-power; the increasing
concentration of private economic power; the increasing organisation of society
into interest groups and associations; the consequently increased capacity of
government to conceive and administer its policies by reference to individual or
group behaviour, as opposed to mass behaviour; a general aversion to explicit
legal coercion" (Daintith,1989:206). This therefore seems to be based on the
conditions indicative of corporatism 25 . In addition, he claims that government
today has "enormous resources of public funds and public property, accumulated
through taxation, borrowing, and purchase. Thanks to public tolerance of high
levels of taxation and governmental spending .... government can often now buy
compliance with policy through grants, soft loans, tax concessions, free or cheap
public services, and other such devices" (Daintith,1989:199). The justification
therefore seems to be based on the arrival of corporatist bargaining and high levels
of public spending.
Corporatism and high public spending were undeniably important in the transition
from imperium to dominium, however, the reason for this transition is much more
complex. Different constitutional frameworks are required for the use of
25 Which were discussed in chapter 5.
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imperium and dominium. Two basic legal approaches have been identified by
writers in the field of public law. These involve different constitutional
frameworks. In turn, these different frameworks lead to differing conceptions of
the rule of law. These approaches can be equated with imperium and dominium.
7)a) Gesellschaft Law
This represents the 'traditional' view of law based on legal positivism
(Prosser,1982)26. The focus is upon rules that are considered legally valid, statute,
case-law and statutory instruments. The emphasis is on establishing and
upholding rules, and it is these rules that govern the process by which resources
are allocated in the economy. The role of the government is to prescribe generally
applicable regulatory standards, in the civil or criminal law. These are sets of
conditions placed upon the exercise of market power by private actors. "In this
way, the law may supplement or even substitute its policy for that of the market,
but it does so through the prescription of standards cast in the form of rules
applied evenly and at arm's length from the private actors" (Arup,1990:248). The
role of the state is market supporting (Arup,1990) and this approach is therefore
associated with liberal capitalism (Prosser,1982). The role of law is to regulate
competing private interests.
26 There is actually a stage before gesellschaft which is called gemeinschaft where the focus is
upon common law rules, but for our purposes this can be included with gesellschaft as it also
involves imperium style control. It will however be referred to later to provide the starting point
for the concept of the rule of law.
258
This approach can be linked to that expounded by Dicey (1964), the focus of
which is the traditional role of state, based on the idea of unitary democracy, and
implementation through legislation. The emphasis is upon the use of imperium
style control.
7)b Bureaucratic Administrative Regulation
This approach is associated with administrative discretion and direct intervention
by the state rather than the use of rules. The state takes a more active role in
directing the economy, resulting in the label 'purposive action approach'
(Arup,1990). It involves legal power moving from the judiciary and legislature to
executive and administrative bodies such as quangos (Prosser,1982). It involves
greater state intervention.
The role of law is the efficient attainment of political goals. Its central function
becomes the provision of a foundation on which government policy can be
progressively developed and the problem of finding a workable procedure or
mode of operation for the state in its pursuit of policy functions can be solved.
This approach involves a "shift away from the market based, open and categorical
liberal form in the direction of closer administrative and corporatist relationships
between state and industry" (Arup,1990:249) 27 . Pluralism is also involved in this
transition (Craig,1994) as is corporatism28 . This approach can be associated with
27 See also Jowell (1989).
28 In this context the use of the term pluralism is prescriptive. Its meaning as adduced in chapter 5
was descriptive and related to how decisions are made. The prescriptive use concerns the role of
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the use of dominium. Thus Daintith's reasoning for the transition, based on the
use of corporatism, is consistent.
7)c) From Gesellschaft to Bureaucratic Administrative
It has been recognised that there has been a shift from gesellschaft to bureaucratic
administrative approaches. According to Prosser (1982:3), the "gesellschaft
conception of law., has been made increasingly outmoded by developments in the
modern state". An explanation for why this has occurred will also explain the
transition to dominium style policy implementation.
The two approaches involve different constitutional frameworks with different
roles for the state. The change in use is therefore linked to constitutional change.
This constitutional change is best illustrated by the change that has occurred in the
concept of the rule of law. Much as Dicey's theories have been criticised as
positivistic and empiricist (Harden & Lewis,1986;Jennings,1959), his explanation
of the rule of law provides a starting point in indicating constitutional change.
In 1885 Dicey published 'An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution a9. In this he explains the characteristic features of the political
institutions in England. He identifies two such features: parliamentary supremacy
the state in the light of the descriptive use. This prescriptive view of pluralism has changed with
the modem 'market pluralism' involving less government intervention: see for example Craig
(1994)
29 Referred to here in its 1964 edition.
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and the rule of law. The most important of these for our purposes is the rule of
lawn. Dicey attributes three meanings to this term. The first of these is the
supremacy of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power or even of
wide discretionary authority on the part of the government. Its second meaning is
that of equality before the law: "every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is
subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the
ordinary tribunals" (Dicey,1964:193). The final meaning expresses the fact that
the law of the constitution is not the source but the consequence of the rights of
individuals. The constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land. Thus,
any change in this 'definition' of the rule of law is dependent upon constitutional
change.
It is primarily the first of Dicey's meanings of the rule of law that we shall concern
ourselves with in this discussion. In essence Dicey was proposing a positivist
concept of law, that rules rather than discretion should be, and were in England at
that particular time, the dominant tools of govemment31. He was essentially
propounding in his rule of law that administrative action should be based only on
announced rules, and that discretionary power had no place within our
constitution. The emphasis was thus on Daintith's imperium, using the tools of
authority and organisation.
30 For a discussion of parliamentary supremacy see Allan (1985).
31 Dicey discussed other constitutions within Europe to illustrate that the supremacy of regular law
was peculiar to England at this time and concluded that the result in these other constitutions was
arbitrariness. "Wherever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness ... discretionary
authority on the part of the government must mean insecurity for the legal freedom on the part of
its subjects" (Dicey,1964 :188).
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Although Dicey's discussion centred on constitutional and administrative matters,
the relevance of the rule of law is not so strictly limited. The changes that have
occurred in relation to the rule of law relate to means of policy implementation
and these changes can be observed in all areas of policy implementation. Dicey's
principles can be generally applied and can be observed in almost every area of
the law.
Regular law rather than discretion prevailed at the time Dicey was writing because
the concept of discretion was relatively new in England. This regular law could
come from two sources. Blackstone called them the lex non scripta (the unwritten
or common law which included equity) and the lex scripta (the written or statute
law) (Blackstone,1825).
1 )00 0=6=1111132
When Blackstone was writing, the late eighteenth century, statute law was
regarded as being merely complementary to the common law. The reason for this
is that, at this time, the law was still very closely linked to its feudal past. The
primary emphasis was on land law. This is reflected in the fact that Blackstone
devoted a whole volume to a discussion of this branch of law. Society at this time
was very paternalistic, which is illustrated by the existence of practices of paying
32 This is pre-industrial society where there is no distinction between law, morality and politics.
Authority is traditional and the law jobs are performed as part of the whole functioning of the
group.
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customary wages, restrictive apprenticeship laws, and vagrancy and poor laws that
provided for some supervision of the poor. There was also a belief at national
level in protectionist policies. Consequently "in Blackstone's day parliament
played a relatively minor legislative role with the result that the common law was
of correspondingly greater importance" (Manchester, 1980:23).
7)c)ii) Gesellschaft33
By the time that Dicey wrote the Law of the Constitution, however, things had
changed. During this period a social and economic revolution had taken place. A
considerable growth in population had occurred coupled with a transformation
from a primarily agricultural society into an industrial one - a transition from
gemeinschaft to gesellschaft society. This required a change of philosophy that
would emphasise the value of individual effort. One such philosophy was
provided by Adam Smith who expounded the doctrine of laissez faire economics.
He put forward three functions for the state: to defend the realm, to administer
public justice and to carry out those public works that it was impossible for private
individuals to undertake. Allied to this was the influence of Bentham, who
advocated principles directly related to law reform.
This new philosophy of individualism was quickly adopted as the views of writers
such as Smith and Bentham soon became influential. The limitation of central
government was favoured by a wide range of political and pressure groups as
33 This is a term used for a large scale industrial society with a high division of labour.
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individualism flourished. Such opposition was exhibited, albeit for differing
reasons, by most parties. Yet, despite this opposition, with its corresponding
belief in laissez faire34, a considerable expansion in the functions performed by
central government occurred. Thus the legal system was placed under
considerable strain by these changing social and economic factors. The common
law was no longer able to play such a fundamental role, and legislation assumed a
more important place. Much of this early protective legislation resulted from
sheer necessity or from a concern for the moral well-being of the community 35 . It
was humanitarianism exercised at a national level.
However, by the close of the nineteenth century the pure individualist ethic had
been eroded by the growth of a host of state and municipal enterprises. Until this
point the civil service had been remarkably small, and this extension, which
necessarily involved increased public taxation, was strongly opposed. However,
despite this opposition, there was a steadily increasing volume of legislation and
an acceptance of an increased governmental role began to appear, as did an
increasing public belief in the justice of collective rights. Dicey was a great critic
of such notions of collectivism36 and strongly resisted the increasing regulatory
role played by the state.
34 See Craig's discussion as to whether it was actually a period of laissez faire or whether, as
certain theorists argue, Benthamite theory actually contributed to state intervention
35 This approach can be seen in the introduction of the early species protection legislation detailed
in chapter 3.
36 He did not recognise it as a doctrine such as liberalism, but merely as a sentiment. This is
because it had never "been formulated by any thinker endowed with anything like the commanding
ability or authority of Bentham". As he viewed it, collectivism had very little to do with law
reform and consequently its influence on legislation could not be measured; its existence could
only be proved by "showing the socialistic character or tendencies of certain parliamentary
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State intervention was established in areas outside the government's traditional
jurisdiction, those of defence and public justice. To facilitate this purpose,
legislation was employed37 . Legislation was seen as the key tool of government.
As Dicey (1964:198) says, "to lay down general principles of law is the proper
and natural function of legislators". He believed that laws, however harsh, were
better than despotism and caprice, which were the natural result of discretion in
his eyes. So, although a critic of collectivism, Dicey's view of the rule of law
matched the use of legislation as an implementation mechanism, although in a
more limited sense.
Dicey's work became very influential despite its obvious shortcomings. However
Dicey's rule of law was by no means unimpeachable. This is partly because
Dicey's writings were coloured by his political views. With the rise of
collectivism and the extension of governmental functions, Diceyan formulations
suffered extensive criticism.
enactments", unlike Benthamite liberalism whose tenets could be shown in specific changes in the
law.
37 In the 1890s when protection was first introduced for wild birds, legislation was necessary
because wild animals had no rights under the common law with its emphasis on property rights.
The only protection provided by the common law relied on the co-operation of the landowner,
which was generally not forthcoming.
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7)c)iii) Bureaucratic Administrative Regulation
According to Harden and Lewis (1986:3), "many, if not most, commentators
would now distance themselves to varying degrees from the text of Dicey's work,
arguing that whatever the validity of his original analysis, it had been overtaken
by events". The constitution has changed and is represented in the view of the
rule of law (Johnson, 1985). At the time of writing it had provided a fairly
accurate description of the system, but due to political beliefs Dicey had turned a
blind eye to some of the changes that were taking place at the time. He was thus
criticised as misconceiving the scope of administrative power that existed when he
wrote. This discrepancy became more obvious with time. Such systems are
continually evolving especially as there is no written constitution in the UK, and
Dicey's rule of law came to represent "no more than a staging-post in the
development of the British polity and state, albeit one which in many respects was
particularly well settled" (Harden and Lewis, 1986:4). There had therefore been a
shift away from the constitutional form associated with the use of imperium.
The rise of collectivism with its associated increase in welfare regulation resulted
in a transformation of the nature of the British state. As the perceived role of
government changed in this move to a collectivist society, so did the methods of
implementation of policy that were seen as both necessary and appropriate. As the
problems of industrialisation came to the fore, novel means of dealing with them
were necessary. The concept of regulatory measures was therefore inaugurated
and these often necessarily involved the use of discretionary powers. The mere
existence of these powers would therefore serve as a damning indictment to
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Dicey's theories, and they were in fact employed for that very purpose. The use of
the tool of organisation became thus more important within imperium.
In his book 'The Law and the Constitution', W. I. Jennings presented a critique of
Dicey's rule of law. He was not alone in this; writers such as Robson and Keynes,
who were also committed to the expansion of the state's role, participated in the
attack on Dicey and the ideals of individualism that his theories represented. The
Diceyan view, based on the concept of unitary democracy, was expressly
challenged, as they advanced an explicitly pluralist vision of democracy to replace
the unitary view espoused by Dicey. The unitary vision of democracy maintained
that all public power was legitimated through participation by MPs in parliament;
the pluralist vision implies that power can be legitimated and constrained in more
diverse ways such as citizen participation. This pluralist model proposed greater
governmental intervention. This was achieved by a number of means such as the
nationalisation of industry. Such redistributive and political functions of law were
ignored by the Diceyan concept.
The pluralists criticised Dicey's theory on a number of grounds: that it was both
descriptively flawed and prescriptively questionable. They had realised the
shortcomings of Dicey's theories and its individualistic prescriptions. In
descriptive terms, they contested the view of the role of the state espoused by
Dicey. Dicey saw the function of the government as to protect the individual from
aggression, and given such protection individuals were allowed to act as they
pleased provided they refrained from interfering with the liberty of others.
Jennings (1959) pointed out, however, that such powers interfering with private
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action were in existence when Dicey wrote and had been merely ignored by him.
This challenged Dicey's vision of the role of the state. The pluralists also
challenged the idea that all public power was wielded by the state, thus
undermining Dicey's belief in the omnicompetence of parliament. "There was an
increasing realisation that parliament did not in fact wield all public power, and
that many institutions outside of parliament exercised some species of public
authority" (Craig,1994 :12)38.
Jennings also argued that discretionary powers themselves were in existence even
when Dicey was writing. He used the existence of these powers to justify his
position in contesting Dicey's theory on the supremacy of regular law and the idea
that the rule of law and discretion are incompatible. This was linked to his
disagreement with the distinction between regular law and arbitrary power. He
states that "All powers can be abused, whether they are derived from regular law
or not" (Jennings, 1959:306). Therefore, discretion could not be criticised on the
basis that it would lead to the abuse of power and arbitrariness. Jennings believed
that Dicey had used his rule of law to create a concept to justify his political
beliefs and therefore it was not an accurate reflection of society. It was tainted by
political bias.
The prescriptive challenge on Dicey took the form of commending rather than
condemning group power. It was realised that in a modem welfare state the
38 Examples were given of various pressure groups which were influential in shaping and
constraining state action.
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legislature is incapable of managing the affairs unaided. "Their vision stressed the
existence of group power, group rights and obligations, decentralisation, and the
interconnection between economic and political liberty, the latter requiring
governmental intervention in order to secure such liberties for the individual"
(Craig,1994:35). The emphasis therefore rested on the expansion of the state.
According to Jennings, "since 1919, not only has the state intervened to protect
the individual from the consequences of industrialism, but also the development of
foreign competition has induced Governments, especially Conservative
Governments, to create institutions and powers for the purpose of assisting and
rationalising industry, commerce, and agriculture. Farmers and manufacturers
alike asked parliament not to free them from discretionary powers, but to confer
more discretionary powers in order that they might be further assisted"
(Jermings,1959:315).
The growth of the state continued and the extension of the collectivist ethic was
aided by measures taken during the First World War and the spirit of national
unity that had been aroused. The notion of the function of the state was radically
changed. The growth of the state and the rise of pluralism were well settled by
mid twentieth century. It had of course necessitated a change in the methods of
implementation of governmental policy. The emphasis became focused on penal
laws and regulation accompanied by discretion, rather than merely Dicey's regular
law. Allied to this was the growth in delegated legislation (Baldwin,1994).
Imperium still contributed to policy implementation. However, it was no longer
the focus as in earlier centuries as alternatives emerged. Negotiation became a
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necessary part of policy implementation and resulted in the rise of corporatism.
Winlder (1975) proposed that corporatism started with the recognition of the need
for economic planning in the late 1950s to early 1960s39. However, it was the
1970s when corporatism truly began its revival and the government put forward
their ideas of "a new form of interventionism, in which the role of the state was to
harness capitalism to the interests of all" (Winlder 1975:105). At that time the
essential features of corporatism were seen as "a limited commitment to public
ownership, detailed control over the internal decision making of privately owned
businesses, and a move away from explicit legal control" (Arup 1990:255). This
was in effect achieved through the new bargaining processes.
Harden and Lewis (1986) have identified certain changes involved with the trend
towards corporatism: the enlargement of the state through the incorporation of
new institutions representing important interests in society; and the expansion of
the area of operation of the new enlarged state structure beyond the traditionally
political into what had previously been thought of as separate economic or social
affairs. Thus Dicey's concept of the rule of law becomes practically obsolete
(Jowel1,1989). The boundary between public and private activity had significantly
shifted. This has resulted in new forms of control over the extended government
activity.
39 Although scholars and commentators have identified something approximating to such a
corporatist bias over a period going back to the Middle Ages with its modern revival occurring
after the First World War.
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Allied to this, the amount of legislation is declining (Rose,1982) although the
British Government has by every other measure grown substantially since 1939.
The reason given for this is that the bulk of laws is "no more and no less than
measures that authorise expenditure. Insofar as this is the case, legislation is a
necessary but relatively unimportant step in the policy process." (Rose 1982:25).
Rose is obviously referring to dominium statutes rather than imperium ones.
Talcing the place of imperium is the deployment of wealth through medium of
contract. This has come to the fore as a form of regulation (Harden,1992). The
state is moving closer to the organisational structure and modus operandi of the
modern corporation (Arup,1990).
8) CONCLUSIONS
As the nature of the constitution changed (represented in the changing definition
of the rule of law) so did the implementation mechanisms. The move from
gesellschaft to bureaucratic administrative resulted in a transition from the use of
imperium to the use of dominium and the new prerogative. The reason for this
constitutional change is related to the move to a corporatist state. Even though
Thatcherism is based on a denial of corporatism its influence is not inconsistent
with this theory. According to Harden, the use of contract as a regulatory tool was
developed "from the rhetoric of rolling back the state employed by Mrs Thatcher's
governments" (Harden,1992:vii). Thus the use of the new prerogative is
consistent with deregulation and market structures (Mayntz,1983)40.
40 Indeed the 'new' pluralism is market based (Craig,1994).
271
Thatcherism seems to have been a determinant in the choice not to use planning
control. However, in isolation, it did not provide a convincing explanation of why
the voluntary approach was adopted. The trend towards dominium and the 'new
prerogative' does. It is also consistent with arguments as to the corporate status of
the farming lobby and incrementalist theories of policy formation. These theories
refer to the situation where relevant bodies of substantive law whose adaptation or
development may provide one means of achieving the objective at hand are in
existence when the policy is being formulated. According to Daintith (1988:35),
"in such a situation the policy maker may be more likely to resort to an instrument
which draws upon such a body of law than to one which requires the creation of
quite new legal arrangements; and if he does, the shape of the measures he uses
will be dictated by the terms in which the existing legal scheme is expressed". As
Chapter 4 pointed out, the system enacted in the WACA was based on that in the
NPACA 1949 despite the fact that the underlying values were inconsistent.
It might, therefore, be asked why Part I of the WACA adopted imperium style
controls. A number of reasons exist. Firstly, it was more of a codification of
existing law41 (prompted by the EC) than the introduction of a new system and the
existing system was considered efficacious. Secondly, dominium could not
operate to protect species because of the nature of the problem. The trend towards
dominium is not all embracing. However, it will be used where it is considered to
41 Which was first introduced when imperium was the dominant type of policy implementation
mechanism.
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be the most efficacious method. For habitat protection this was obviously the
case. The disadvantages suffered by the WACA42 were never foreseen,
particularly because the original intention was only to protect a small number of
habitats. Thus the consideration of the most appropriate implementation method
in the primary stages of policy formation would have pointed towards the use of
dominium and the new prerogative. This would have been in tune with the
Thatcherite market ethos and the farming lobby would have been supportive of
this approach.
42 The political costs of enactment.
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CHAPTER 9
IMPACT OF THE WACA
To ascertain whether the voluntary system is accordant with the need to protect
habitats, it is necessary to evaluate how the system is working. According to
Beerworth, such an evaluation of legislation is "intimately related to the study of
the origins of legislation, as the ultimate content and administration of law is
inextricably linked to the genesis of the legislation. An understanding of the
impact which law has upon society must necessarily complement an
understanding of the social forces which give rise to legislation"
(Beerworth,1980:66). Similar forces influence the genesis and the impact of
legislation. This is why an appreciation of the determinants of the WACA is
important. Thus, some of the concepts considered earlier in the thesis will be re-
examined for the purposes of this chapter. This will indicate whether they have
also been influential on the impact of the provisions. This is important because it
indicates the reasons for the success or failure of the Act. This information can
then be utilised so as to avoid the enactment of ineffective legislation, or to amend
existing legislation so that it becomes more efficacious. As the NC pointed out,
"the main value of an analysis of achievement is ... to use it as an insight for the
future, by recognising what worked, what failed and why, where the problems
now lie and how they should be tackled henceforth, with better results than in the
past" (NCC,1984b:71). Given the recent implementation of the Habitats
Mirective l
 based on the provisions of the WACA such information is invaluable.
Discussed in Chapter 10.
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However, the use of such information, either in the formulation of new legislation
or as a foundation for a critique of current controls, is limited. According to
Beerworth, the information "rarely enters into, or indeed survives, the power play
which accompanies the formulation of highly controversial legislation in
democratic societies". This is because "social forces will overwhelm socio-legal
or other scientific evidence when new legal procedures are formulated"
(Beerworth,1980:70). Such a situation may have occurred with the passage of the
WACA. There were a number of influences on the Act, none of which seemed to
included evidence of the efficacy of the system already in operation 2 which was
the foundation for the protection under the Act 3 . The 1980 survey of damage to
sites was influential in prompting legislation4 but seems not to have influenced the
mechanism introduced5. The question is therefore raised whether such an
evaluation is worthwhile. However, an evaluation is necessary to see if the system
enacted in the WACA was and is suitable for the task in hand. Even if it is
concluded that the WACA is not instrumentally effective6, it must be remembered
that "the scientifically proven effectiveness of legislation, or the actual impact of
law, may not always be of great consequence when compared with the symbolic
value and impact of legislation" (Beerworth,1980:69). The provisions may be
2 Under the NPACA 1949 & CA 1968.
3 This is also true of the implementation of the Habitats Directive.
4 See Chapter 4.
5 Which gave rise to the inconsistency of the approach adopted with the purposes for which it was
introduced.
6 This term is explained below: section 6.
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suitable if they have a high symbolic value, for example by emphasising the
goodwill of landowners and that the government is being seen to do something
about the problem.
There are two elements to an evaluation of the SS SI system, consideration of its
impact and efficacy. The enactment of legislation is intended to affect the way in
which people conduct their activities. The impact of legislation is those
consequences that legislation brings about in practice, the effect of the legislation
on behaviour and attitudes, both positive and negative. As Tomasic (1980:33)
points out, it is "necessary to distinguish the consequences which flow from
legislation from its effectiveness". An assessment of impact is descriptive, it
attempts to show a causal connection between a legislative enactment and the
subsequent behaviour of individuals. To make this causal connection it is
necessary to consider the variables that may have conditioned individual
responses to particular statutory provisions and thus brought about changes in
behaviour instead of the legislation.
The determination of the efficacy of legislation is an evaluative exercise. Efficacy
is the extent to which legislation brings about in practice the impact (behavioural
changes) which was the legislation's goals. Therefore, a statutory provision will
be considered efficacious when the behaviour or attitudes that the legislation
wishes to influence change in the intended manner. Determining the efficacy of
the WACA thus involves the identification of the purposes 7 for which the
7 Real or supposed.
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legislation was enacted in order to determine the intended consequences. This
must then be compared to the actual impact of the legislation to ascertain whether
it is efficacious. It may have an impact on behaviour but, even though this is
causally connected to its enactment, if it does not match up to the intended
purposes of the legislation, it will be inefficacious.
Once the efficacy of the WACA has been determined, the question of suitability
can be considered. This must take account of changes in circumstances since its
enactment. Even if it is efficacious, it may not be suitable because different goals
or purposes for habitat protection may now exist and if it cannot match up to these
it will not be suitable as the basis for protection under the Habitats Directive.
When considering the impact and efficacy of legislation, it must be remembered
that the post-parliamentary stage can often be decisive in setting the parameters
for the performance of that legislation. The effect of legislation can be
substantially influenced in the formulation of new procedures 8 . Also, much
legislation confers substantial discretion upon ministers or statutory bodies and
their exercise of that discretion can be shaped by a number of things9.
Developments to the system since its enactment must therefore be considered
before an assessment of the system can be made. This involves both the
legislative changes to the WACA and to provisions affecting the operation of the
8 Such as the code of guidance and financial guidelines for the WACA.
9 For example see the later discussion of political appointments to the NC which will obviously
affect the way any discretion, such as to prosecute, is exercised.
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system. Only those changes that relate to the habitat protection system will be
considered here.
1) LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO THE WACA & PROVISIONS
AFFECTING ITS OPERATION
1)a) Wildlife & Countryside (Amendment) Act 1985
Concern was expressed (Phillips 1985, Adams 1984) over the 3 month loophole
before notification"). During the 1984/1985 session, the House of Commons
Select Committee on the Environment reported on the 'Operation and
Effectiveness of the Wildlife & Countryside Act" and criticised the existence of
this loophole. Shortly after the publication of the select committee report, David
Clark, the Labour spokesman on the environment, introduced a Wildlife and
Countryside Amendment Bill [Bill No. 22, 1984]12.
10 In November 1983 Friends of the Earth published "proposals for a natural heritage bill "which
proposed extension of development control and the subjection of MAFF grant aid to conservation
criteria. In 1984 Mr Peter Hardy, a Labour MP, introduced a private member's Bill (Bill No. 173,
1984) which was designed to close this loophole. The effect of the Bill would have been to make
an SSSI effective from the moment when a proposed notification was served. The measure was
supported by the conservationists, and even the CLA and NFU were prepared to agree. The Bill
went no further than its second reading but ministers agreed to introduce or support a similar
measure in the autumn session. However, at the opening of the 1984/1985 parliamentary session,
the Queen's speech made no mention of conservation of the environment. According to Lowe et al
the government was dragging its feet on the matter, and giving their reasons as lack of
parliamentary time. They put this down to a reluctance to introduce a modest amending Bill
because of a fear of giving MPs and conservation groups an opportunity to press for more wide-
ranging reforms.
ii Hereafter referred to as the House of Commons Environment Committee Report, 1985.
12 The measure was supported by the NFU, CLA, the Ramblers Association, CPRE, the Council
for National Parks, FOE, RSPB and the Royal Society for Nature Conservation.
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This was enacted on 26 June 1985 as the Wildlife and Countryside (Amendment)
Act (WACAA) 1985. Section 2 removed the 3 month designation loophole,
providing for immediate notification of the SSSI, whilst still retaining a three
month period for objections o , and for the confirmation or withdrawal of that
notification within a nine month period. In addition it extended the period for
negotiation in section 28(6)(c) from three to four months. Section 2 also provided
for a one month period in section 28(6)(c) when terminating a management
agreement. This gives the NC time to negotiate with the landowner to try and
continue the agreement. Section 4 amended the Forestry Act 1967, extending the
general duty of the Forestry Commissioners to endeavour to balance forestry and
conservation 14. This is similar to the duty that was imposed on water authorities
under section 48 WACA15.
1)b) Wildlife and Countryside (Service of Notices) Act 1985
0n25 July 1985 the Wildlife and Countryside (Service of Notices) Act 1985 was
enacted. This was enacted after a failed prosecution when EN could not prove
that a notification had been served 16. This applied the provisions in the Town and
Country Planning Act as to service of notices to the WACA so that it could be
13 The notification has immediate effect so that reciprocal notification must be given for PDOs.
14 The original clause 4 in the Bill, which proposed the extension of the duty of Agriculture
ministers to further conservation particularly in relation to farm capital grants, did not survive. The
Bill was emasculated in committee, clause 4 disappearing after a vote of 8 to 7.
15 Now repealed. See below: 1)e)
16 For details of the prosecution see Withrington & Jones (1992).
279
proved that a notice had been served on an owner/occupier. Section 28(3) of the
WACA, which provided for notification to be affixed to the land if the identity of
the owner or occupier could not be ascertained, was thereby repealed.
1)c) Agriculture Act 1986
Section 17 of the Agriculture Act (AA) 1986 placed a duty on the Minister of
Agriculture to endeavour to balance the promotion of an efficient agricultural
industry, the economic and social interests of rural areas, the promotion and
enjoyment of the countryside by the public and the conservation and enhancement
of the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside and any features of
archaeological interest17.
It was exactly this type of duty that was kept out of the amendment to the WACA
just a few months before with the defeat of Clause 4 of the Wildlife &
Countryside (Amendment) Bill. It provides very little additional protection for
SSSIs. However, it represented a recognition of the shifting emphasis of what was
previously a purely production centred agricultural policy.
Under section 20 AA 1986 the WACA was amended so that the duties of
agriculture ministers contained in section 32 WACA extended to all farm grants18.
17 This shift of emphasis towards conservation was also reflected in Section 18 which provided for
the designation and management of Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs). These are also based
on the voluntary approach using agreements but MAFF picks up the bill for compensation.
18 Not just those under the Agriculture Act 1970. The concession by the NCC in the fmancial
guidelines to treat all grants the same for the purposes of their obligation under Section 32 to offer
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Section 20 also changed the definition of farm capital grant in section 50, WACA,
to reflect this extension to all farm grants, putting on an official footing what the
NC had agreed to do anyway in the financial guidelines.
1)(1) Environmental Assessment Directive
EC Directive No 85/337, on The Assessment of the Effect of Certain Public and
Private Projects on the Environment, hereafter referred to as the Environmental
Assessment Directive, was implemented in the UK in a number of statutory
provisions. The main provision was the Town and Country Planning (Assessment
of Environmental Effects) Regulations 1988 (SI No. 1199) and the Town &
Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effect) (Amendment)
Regulations 1992 (SI No. 1494) and the Town & Country Planning (Assessment
of Environmental Effect) (Amendment) Regulations 1994 (SI No. 677). Circular
15/88 Environmental Assessment, issued by the Secretary of State, gives guidance
on the procedures. Separate regulations deal with land drainage improvement
works, salmon farming in marine waters, highways, harbour works and electricity
and pipeline works.
The effect of the Town and Country Planning regulations is that under section 4(2)
certain development applications cannot be decided until the LPA has taken
account of environmental information. This information takes the form of an
a management agreement was thus matched in the duty of the agriculture minister to further
conservation when applications are made for grants under any of these schemes.
19 Those within schedules 1 or 2.
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'environmental statement' submitted by the developer. The requirement for an
environmental statement is not restricted to where the development lies within a
designated area, so the directive affords some protection for the wider countryside.
Whether or not an environmental assessment is required depends on the nature of
the development. There is a short list of projects in Schedule 1 and a long list of
developments in Schedule 220 . The test for whether the regulations apply to the
development in question is whether it is likely to have significant effects by virtue
of factors such as their nature, size or location21.
The environmental statement provided by the developer must describe the likely
significant effects, direct and indirect, on the environment of the development,
explained by reference to its possible impact on - human beings; flora; fame; sail;
water; air; climate; the landscape; the interaction between any of the foregoing;
material assets and the cultural heritage. The environmental statement is of course
only one consideration when deciding the planning application. The LPA will
also have to take account of comments from the public and certain environmental
authorities22.
According to Haigh (1989b), the government was concerned that opponents to
developments could use the Directive, by pointing to some procedural failure in
20 The circular provides for the views of the NC and the CC to be taken into account when
deciding if an assessment is required in sensitive locations. It also provides that if the authority is
unsure of the significance of a development's effect on the natural heritage, it should consult the
NC and CC.
21 In effect a similar consideration to the environmental statement itself. The test is duplicated.
22 The NC is one such authority.
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assessment, to challenge planning decisions in the courts. An amendment was
therefore obtained to the Directive that provides that the environmental
information is to be supplied only to the extent that the Member State considers it
relevant. The government has thus left the decision as to the adequacy of an
environmental statement with the local authority. The implication of this is that a
LPA may possibly accept inadequate statements if it approves of a scheme and
wishes it to go ahead23.
The environmental assessment scheme does provide for an extended role for
nature conservation in determining planning permission for developments and as
such must be welcomed. However, it must be remembered that most agricultural
developments do not require planning permission so the Regulations 24 do not help
to protect SSSIs from these sorts of activities which have formed the most
substantial source of damage 25. The Town & Country Planning (General
Permitted Development) Order 1995 (SI 1995 N° 418) withdraws permitted
development rights from developments in Schedule 1 of the 1988 Regulations and
Schedule 2 projects where the development is likely to have significant effects. In
this second category, the Town & Country Planning (Environmental Assessment
and Permitted Development) Regulations 1995 (SI 1995 N 0 417) provide for the
developer to apply to the LPA for a determination as to whether an environmental
assessment is required.
23 The only check will be the information supplied by an environmental authority.
24 Although they are covered by the Directive.
25 See below: section 4.
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1)e) Environmental Protection Act 1990
Under the EPA 1990 the only major change was the split of the NCC and CC into
EN, CCW, SNH26 . Apart from this the changes to habitat protection were few in
number. The first was the alteration to section 15 of the Countryside Act 1968 in
Schedule 9 paragraph 4. This removed the requirement of national interest for
entering a management agreement. It also allowed such agreements to be entered
into for adjacent land although not non-contiguous land. In Schedule 9, paragraph
11(9), section 29 of WACA was amended so that 'commencement date' was
replaced with 'making of the order'; the effect of this is that a separate notification
of a proposal to carry out a PDO is required once a NCO had been made 27. In
paragraph 11(10) the requirement that this notice be in writing was also added28.
1)0 Water Act 1989, Water Industry Act 1991, Water Resources Act 1991
The Water Act 1989 repealed section 48, WACA. Section 9 imposed a duty on
the NC to notify 'relevant bodies' of the existence of SSSIs if they may be affected
by their activities. These bodies include the National Rivers Authority, Water and
Sewerage Undertakers and Internal Drainage Boards. The body is then under a
requirement to consult with the NC if it thinks that an operation it intends to carry
26 For a detailed discussion see Ball (1991).
27 This deals with one of the problems raised in North Uist Fisheries v SOS for Scotland [1991]
SLT 333 considered below: 2b and Chapter 10: 2aiii.
28 This was to bring it into line with the requirement in Section 28 WACA.
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out is likely to damage or destroy the SSSI. The requirement is the same as that in
section 48, WACA, but covers all water bodies. In addition, before authorising
anything it thinks likely to damage the SSSI, the NRA must consult the NC. The
Code of Practice on Conservation Access and Recreation (1989) issued by the
DOE, suggests widening this consultation requirement from just those operations
that the relevant body thinks will damage the SSSI to all operations. However, as
Ball (1990:76) points out, these duties are "ultimately unenforceable, since there is
no remedy if the relevant body fails to consult with the NCC. This reflects the
fact that their real purpose is to bring the matter to the NCC's attention so it may
give advice or offer a management agreement"29.
The provisions under the Water Act 1989 were superseded by the Water Industry
Act 1991 and the Water Resources Act 1991. Under section 16 of the Water
Resources Act, the National Rivers Authority (NRA) has a statutory duty to
exercise its functions, so far as consistent with its other duties, to further
conservation. Under section 17 the NC is required to notify the NRA of the
existence of SSSIs that the activities of the NRA may damage, and the NRA must
consult EN before carrying out or authorising works that appear to the NRA to be
likely to damage a SSSI of which they have been notified". This seemingly
strong protection is seriously undermined by only requiring consultation where the
NRA believes that the operation is likely to cause damage, they are hardly best
29 Although judicial review is still possible.
39 Except in an emergency.
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placed to make such a judgement 31 . Section 4 of the Water Industry Act provides
similar consultation requirements for the private water undertakers.
Section 17 of the Water Resources Act 1991 was superseded by section 8 of the
Environment Act 1995 which extends the duty to the Environment Agency's
functions.
1)g) Environment Act 1995
Section 7, EA 1995 provides for the Ministers and the Environment Agency to
have regard32 to the desirability of conservation when exercising their functions.
The precise nature of the duty varies depending on the function. Under section
7(1)(a) in respect of proposals relating to functions of the Agency, other than its
pollution control functions, the duty is to exercise the power so as to "further the
conservation and enhancement of natural beauty and the conservation of flora,
fauna and geological or physiographical features of special interest". This is
limited to where it is consistent with a number of other objectives listed in section
7(1)(a)(i) - (iv). In relation to pollution control functions, under section 7(1)(b),
the duty is merely to have regard to the desirability of conserving natural beauty
etc. The duties are similar to those of the NRA under the Water Resources Act
1991.
31 See for example Southern Water Authority v NCC [1992] 3 All ER 481 discussed below: 2b.
32 This is arguably a dilution of the original requirement. Section 48 of the WACA provided for
the furtherance of conservation as did Section 16 WRA 1991.
286
1)h) Planning Guidance
When the WACA was enacted in 1981, the relevant planning guidance regarding
nature conservation was contained in DOE Circular 108/77. This was fairly
limited in the advice that it gave, pointing out the obligation in section 11,
Countryside Act 1968, to "have regard to the desirability of conserving the natural
beauty and amenity of the countryside". Although at first sight this does not seem
to encompass nature conservation, it is defined so that conservation of flora, fauna
and geological and physiographical features are included.
The circular recommended consultation with the NC when drawing up policies for
nature conservation and when considering the impact of development proposals.
It also recommended early consultation in respect of planning applications on
SSSIs33 so as to allow more than the minimum notice 34 before the application was
determined. It recommended attaching conditions to the planning consent so as to
reduce damage to "an acceptable level". The circular also stressed the UK's
obligations under the Ramsar convention and pointed out that LPAs must play a
part in promoting the conservation of the sites35.
33 Which the LPAs were obliged to do under the Town & Country Planning (General
Development Order) 1977, section 15(1)(g) and section 15(5). This requirement is now in the
Town & Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995, Article 10.
34 Of 14 days.
35 Under article 3 of the convention, contracting parties are required to "formulate and implement
their planning so as to promote the conservation of designated wetlands, and as far as possible, the
wise use of wetlands in their territory".
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Despite the enactment of the WACA with the changes in site protection, it was
1987 before a revised guidance was issued in DOE Circular 27/87. Much of the
guidance concentrated on Special Protection Areas (SPAs) under the Birds
Directive. As these are also designated as SSSIs, the LPAs are obliged to consult
the NC before granting planning permission. The guidance gave a list of factors
to take account of when deciding such applications and stated that planning
permission should only be granted where the "authority is satisfied either that
disturbance to Annex 1 or migratory birds, or damage to habitats, will not be
significant in terms of the survival and reproduction of the species, or that any
such disturbance or damage is outweighed by economic or recreational
requirements". Such an approach, whilst seeming to emphasise conservation,
leaves the weighting of these "economic or recreational" requirements as against
the conservation ones to the LPAs36.
The circular also pointed out that developments close to a protected site may have
serious repercussions within it and advised LPAs to consult the NC whenever a
planning application seemed likely to affect an SSSI. It then went on to consider
mineral extraction and forestry which had not been addressed in the previous
guidance.
36 However, recent cases such as R v SOS for the Environment ex parte RSPB Times August 2nd
1996, have shown the willingness of the European Court to afford greater weight to conservation
considerations. For a more detailed discussion of these cases see Chapter 10.
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The next guidance to be issued was in DOE Circular 1/92, entitled Planning
Controls Over Sites of Special Scientific Interest. This was concerned with the
changes implemented in the Town & Country Planning General Development
(Amendment)(No 3) Order 1991 and the revised environmental assessment
procedures. The withdrawal of permitted development rights under Part 4 of
Schedule 2 to the General Development Order 1988 meant that planning
permission is required for all use of land in SSSIs for war games, motor sports and
clay pigeon shooting. This was seen as an opportunity to take account of nature
conservation before land is used in this way. In addition, the amended GDO 1988
now requires LPAs to consult about planning applications in any consultation area
defined by NC around an SSSI, whereas before they were merely advised to do so.
If a consultation area has not been defined, LPAs are advised to pay particular
attention to any planning application in the vicinity of an SSSI and then decide
whether consultation with the NC is needed.
The most recent guidance is contained in Planning Policy Guidance 9 on Nature
Conservation37. PPG9 deals primarily with the implications of the Habitats
Directive; this protection is not fully operational yet so the importance of PPG9 is
currently rather limited, much of its advice being the same as that in Circular 1/92.
PPG9 reinforces the Government's view of a hierarchy of sites rather than the
view favoured by the NC38 of a network of sites39.
37 There is also some guidance provided in a number of other PPGs. For example Department of
Environment Planning Policy Guidance PPG7; The Countryside And The Rural Economy,
Department of Environment Planning Policy Guidance PPG12; Development Plans And Regional
Planning Guidance, Department of Environment Planning Policy Guidance PPG 13; Transport. 
38 This is also the view that was proposed in the Huxley Report (1947).
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1)i) Conclusion
The changes that have been made to the system can be categorised as attempts to
solve drafting defects or to deal with the structural/design criticisms. Those
introduced to solve drafting defects include the removal of the three month pre-
designation loophole, the provisions for proving service of notification on a
landowner and the requirement of a separate notification when a NCO is made.
None of these was predicted as problematic at the time of the enactment of the
WACA. They came to light in the operation of the systemo.
Those introduced to cope with structural or design criticisms are environmental
assessment, changes to planning policy guidance, extending the negotiation period
in section 28 from 3 to 4 months and the duties imposed on the Minister of
Agriculture, the NRA, private water undertakers and the environment agency. All
of these attempt in some way to cope with the conflict between conservation and
other activities and the problem of other acts outranking the provisions of the
WACA.
39 The provisions of PPG9 are discussed fully in Chapter 10.
40 The requirement for a separate notification when a NCO is made was only realised after the
case of North Uist Fisheries v SOS for Scotland [1991] SLT 333.
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However, little of substance has been changed since the introduction of the system
and the same philosophy of voluntariness is in operation. The changes that have
been made merely serve to indicate that the original system was faulty.
2) THE LAW IN PRACTICE
The initial task in assessing the impact of the SSSI system is the determination of
what the law is in fact. This is necessary because where the law "has been subject
to interpretation which is formally or in practice authoritative, it is the impact of
the provision as interpreted which should be measured, not just the original
statutory formulation" (Miers & Page,1982:216). It is often the case that "the law
as it appears on the statute books may be only a partial and sometimes misleading
guide as to the administered situation which in fact exists" (Lempert,1966:118).
The law in practice may be influenced by the interpretation of it adopted by the
agency responsible for the implementation of the Act". In addition, it is
necessary to consider court decisions to ascertain how the judiciary have
interpreted the law.
2)a) Agency Interpretation
"The impact of a statutory provision obviously depends upon what it says, and
thus one precondition of the consequences that are brought about realising in
practice what government's intentions are, is that the legislation should realise in
41 EN, CCW and SNH.
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law what its intentions are; and this in turn is dependent on how it is interpreted
and applied by those responsible for its implementation" (Miers &
Page,1982:244). The interpretation of the provisions by the NC must therefore be
considered, as the NC has substantial discretion42. The law can only be evaluated
on the basis of how it is being implemented in practice by the NC, rather than how
it perhaps should be.
The first possible area of influence of agency interpretation is in determining the
designation criteria for SSSIs. Guidelines for the selection of SSSIs are used by
the NC staff to determine whether a site should be designated. However, these
have not remained the same since the enactment of the WACA. "The guidelines
that NCC staff use to identify potential biological SSSIs have been in existence for
nearly a decade. During this time they have been developed and refined. Between
1985 and 1989 they were revised to take account of improvements in knowledge
and of developments in categorisation of habitats brought about by the National
Vegetation Classification" (NCC,1990:16). These guidelines therefore determine
whether a site is notified and thus whether it will come within the procedures laid
down by the Act. However, they do not affect the protection of the site as such.
Notification as an SSSI does not equate to protection. The guidelines will
therefore not affect the impact of the Act in relation to preserving sites, but they
do give the NC a very wide discretion as to the scope of the Act. The more
42 It is responsible for determining the requirements for designation and for performing the actual
designation, it is the enforcement agency and has discretion as to whether or not to prosecute. It is
also left to the NC to decide whether or not it wishes to offer management agreements to
landowners (unless it has objected to an agricultural grant which has been refused on nature
conservation grounds).
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flexible the designation criteria, the wider the scope of the Act. This is important
given that the original intention of the Act was to protect only a few sites under
what is now section 29 and its remit was extended substantially during the
parliamentary phase. By construing the designation criteria widely the NC can
also extend the remit of the Act. According to The National Audit Office
(1994:11), "Although they regard the series in England as 90-95 per cent
complete, in March 1993 staff were considering some 650 sites throughout the
country which might be proposed as Sites of Special Scientific Interest depending
on the results of full surveys and assessments".
Another possible area of influence is the operation of the financial guidelines.
This will obviously be influential on issues of resources which were so
controversial during the enactment of the WACA43 . From May 1989 onwards, the
afforestation grant element" was excluded when calculating payments for
management agreements that were offered because the Forestry Commission had
refused afforestation grant solely on nature conservation grounds. According to
the NC, the effect of this was that "the need for compensatory agreements in
respect of afforestation proposals has ... decreased" (NCC,1990:18) 45 . This may
therefore have led to a reduction in the pressure on resources for management
agreement payments as it will obviously reduce the cost of certain agreements.
43 These will be considered in more detail later in the chapter: section 3bii.
44 Which had been voluntarily included by the NC.
45 This withdrawal may indicate that fears expressed by the NCC in their 8th Report, of
exploitation and spurious claims by landowners not genuinely wishing to carry out the damaging
operations, had come to fruition.
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This has also been achieved to some degree because after the government received
bad press over the destruction of the Somerset Levels in 1983, it financed all
management agreements on SSSIs from central funds. This was designed to avoid
the loss of sites through lack of resources.
There has also been a saving in administrative resources since 'model' forms for
management agreements were introduced in 1988. Where payments do not
exceed £5,000 per annum, agreements can be completed by Regional Offices and
any smaller valuations are done in house. "These measures have led to a reduction
in the time taken to complete many agreements" (NCC,1988:14) and have thus
increased the chances of saving sites.
In 1991/92 EN launched the Wildlife Enhancement Scheme for SSSIs in particular
areas. These provide for positive agreements on the sites with landowners being
paid to undertake positive management. In these areas damage is less likely,
particularly from neglect.
All of this points to the adoption by the NC of an expansive approach to the
operation of the WACA. The criteria for designation were extended in 1989 and
initially the NC were willing to extend the remit of the financial guidelines by
including forestry grant. However, this has been limited since 1989 with the
removal of the afforestation grant element. This may be due to issues of limited
resources. Excluding forestry grant has entailed a saving in resources, as has the
introduction of model forms of agreement. The focus seems to be on streamlining
the systems operation but expanding its scope. By saving money in some areas,
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more is available to conclude management agreements on other sites. The broad
approach to the designation criteria may also be linked to the concept of the SSSI
system as a network of sites, trying to make this network as extensive as possible.
If this is so, it is almost contradictory to the approach of the Government who only
ever intended to protect a limited number of sites when the proposals were first
made.
2)b) Judicial Interpretation
When one considers how contentious the WACA was, there have been few cases
concerning it in its 15 years of operation. A possible reason for this is that most of
the contention about the Act centred on the structural and design defects whereas
the courts tend to deal with the practical and drafting defects.
2)b)i) Southern Water Authority v NCC [1992] 3 All ER 481
This case concerned Alverstone Marshes on the Isle of Wight, designated as an
SSSI in November 1982. Notification of the designation was sent to the
respondent water authority and two farmers who owned land on the site. The
prosecution concerned a ditch that ran between the land of the two farmers and
was included in the designation but did not form part of the land owned by the
water authority.
In the notification received was a list of proscribed operations, one of which was
dredging. In 1987 the two farmers asked the water authority to carry out dredging
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operations on the ditch. Negotiations took place with the NC but were
inconclusive and in January 1989 the water authority went ahead and carried out
the operations. No consent for this work had been granted by the NC. It resulted
in serious damage to the features that were the purpose of the designation. The
water authority were then charged with an offence under section 2846.
Two arguments were put forward by the NC. The first was that the water
authority were occupiers47 of the ditch whilst carrying out the dredging operations.
The second argument was that the water authority, as owners of other land within
the SSSI, were guilty of an offence for carrying out the dredging operations on a
part of the SSSI which did not belong to them because they were an addressee of
the notification.
In deciding the first point, Lord Mustill held that they were not occupiers. He
considered meanings attributed by the courts in reported cases to be of no use
since "they draw their meaning entirely from the purposes for which and the
context in which they are used" (Southern Water Authority v NCC [1992] 3 All
ER 481 at 487). Lord Mustill considered that consistency with other parts of the
statute was important in this respect. "The section contemplates that the elaborate
46 The farmers were not prosecuted even though they would have been liable for causing or
permitting the operation to be carried out. The reason given for this in the judgment was 'personal'
and was not detailed. Given that the NC usually wish to maintain good working relationships with
landowners so as to ensure the safety of the site it may have been felt that to prosecute them would
have jeopardised this. A prosecution of the water authority on the other hand would not affect the
relationship with the landowners and would reinforce the duty of the water authorities to consult
the NC before carrying out such operations.
47 See Chapter 2 section 2di where this defect was identified.
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machinery of notices, waiting periods, agreements and so forth will be set in
motion by a notification under S.28(1) to an owner or occupier. The juxtaposition
with 'owner' shows, to my mind, that the occupier is someone who, although
lacking the title of owner, nevertheless stands in such a comprehensive and stable
relationship with the land as to be, in company with the actual owner, someone to
whom the mechanisms can sensibly be made to apply" (Southern Water Authority
v NCC [1992] 3 All ER 481 at 488c). As the next step up in protection is a section
29 Order then compulsory purchase, Lord Mustill considered that in order to be an
occupier under section 28 the interest must be able to be purchased". In addition,
the interpretation of occupier should be limited because liability under the section
is strict and notification ensures knowledge of possible offences; transient
occupiers would not have received notification and this would impose too onerous
a liability". This is important because the question of occupier for the purpose of
offences under the Act also dictates who must be notified of the existence of the
SSSI. However, as Jewell (1992:1371) points out, "notification is not a defining
characteristic of occupation, rather the fact of occupation (or ownership) is
intended to enable notification".
The second argument, that the water authority was prohibited from working on the
ditch by virtue of the fact that it happened to be owner of another portion of the
site and had in that capacity been an addressee of the notification, was dependent
48 This is contradictory to the inclusion of commoners since the EPA 1990.
49 Note the classification of the highway authority as an owner/occupier in Ward v SOS for the
Environment [1996] JPL 200.
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on the interpretation of the words "on that land" in section 28(5). The provision in
section 28(5) reads as follows:
"The owner or occupier of any land which has been notified under
subsection (1)(b) shall not...carry out, or cause or permit to be
carried out, on that land any operation specified in the
notification..." [emphasis added]
The court held that the argument should fail. The reasoning for this was that "just
as the original notification is sent to the current owner of a part of the land in his
character as owner of that part, so also is the prohibition imposed on the person
who at the time when operations on part of the land are performed is the owner of
that part" (Southern Water Authority v NCC [1992] 3 All ER 481 at 489).
However, in section 28(1):
"Where the Nature Conservancy Council are of the opinion that any area
of land is of special interest ... it shall be the duty of the Council to notify
that fact -
(b) to every owner and occupier of any of that land ..."
'Any of that land' means the whole site. The offence is about carrying out PDO on
the SSSI not a part of an SSSI so it is illogical to treat the SSSI as separate parts or
they should be notified as separate SSSIs. The argument as to absence of
notification for transient occupiers does not apply to the water authority as they
were owners of part of the SSSI and did have notification, and would have been
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notified anyway by the NC for the purposes of the duty to consult. They would
have known that dredging was a PDO because the requirement to register each
SSSI as an individual entry in the land charges register means that the list of PDOs
has to relate to the site as a whole rather then individual holdings within it.
Without the possibility of liability under section 28 itself there is no restriction on
the water authorities. They have a duty to consult under the Water Resources Act
1991, but if they fail to do so there is very little that the NC can do. Theoretically
they could bring an action for judicial review, but if the action has already taken
place they will have to found an action for damages and there is no 'plaintiff.
The House of Lords adopted a strict statutory interpretation (unlike the lower
court). However, they did recognise the deficiencies of the system. Lord Mustill
claimed that "it only needs a moment to see that this regime is toothless"
(Southern Water Authority v NCC [1992] 3 All ER 481 at 484). The case shows
that section 28 was badly drafted. The narrow approach adopted may have been
to illuminate the deficiencies of the system. "What the present appeal does
disclose is that the statutory scheme is flawed" (Southern Water Authority v NCC
[1992] 3 All ER 481 at 484).
2)b)ii) Sweet v Secretary of State for the Environment & NCC [1989] JEL 245
In 1985, Westhay Moor was designated as an SSSI and the owner, Mr Sweet, was
notified of that fact". In June 1987 a Nature Conservation Order was made. An
50 For full details of the Sweet saga up to this point see Withrington & Jones (1992).
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inquiry was held before an Inspector under the provisions of Schedule 11, and on
the basis of this report, the Secretary of State gave his decision in January 1988 to
confirm the order. Mr Sweet appealed against this decision on two grounds.
The designation concerned three fields and their associated ditches. In the
Inspector's report only part of the area was described as being of national
importance. Mr Sweet's first argument was that the Secretary of State had no
power to include in the Order land that was not in itself of national importance.
Schiemann J considered the fact that loss of any of this land would destroy the
habitat and that the whole of the Order land constituted a single environment and
therefore held that the Secretary of State was entitled to draw the boundaries of the
site where he had done. This highlights the problem of defming the size of an
environmental unit when there is a problem of interdependence; buffer land
almost certainly cannot be included.
The second challenge related to the twenty operations that were specified in the
order as being potentially damaging. Objection was made to eight of these" on
the basis that they were not 'operations'. This was dismissed on the basis that
'operations' did not have a precise meaning and planning law was of no use in
helping to construe the statute. The purpose of the Act was considered and the
definition was wide enough to cover the matters specified. However, despite this
51 Cultivation (including ploughing, rotovating, harrowing and reseeding); grazing; mowing or
other methods of cutting vegetation; application of manure, fertilisers and lime; burning; the
release into the site of any wild, feral or domestic mammal, reptile, amphibian, bird, fish or
invertebrate, or any plant or seed; the storage of materials; the use of vehicles or craft likely to
damage or disturb feature of interest.
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wide definition, one thing definitely not covered by 'operations' is doing nothing,
which may be very damaging to the nature conservation interest.
2)b)iii) North Uist Fisheries v Secretary of State for Scotland [1991] SLT 333
This concerned a NCO on Loch Obisary made on 23 May 1990. The appellants
were the owners of the loch and fish farmers who had carried out their business on
the loch for a number of years. The appellants objected to the order and a public
inquiry was held in November 1990. The Secretary of State, having considered
the report of the inquiry, stated in a letter of February 1991 that the Order would
continue. The appellants then appealed against the order.
In July 1990 the appellants had sent a letter to the NC proposing to carry out one
of the PDOs (fishery production) which they were already performing. They
contended that this constituted a notice under section 29(4) and that 3 months had
expired without the offer of a management agreement even before the public
inquiry. Therefore, when the SOS had confirmed the order he had failed to take
account of a material consideration, namely whether section 29(3) did not apply in
relation to the fish farming operations. It would be unreasonable to confirm a
NCO that could not actually stop anything in practice because the moratorium
period had already expired52. Fish farming was the only principal operation
specified as damaging. Lord Cullen held that the Secretary of State had failed to
take account of the fact that the letter constituted a valid notice under subsection
52 This argument is echoed in R v NCC ex p London Brick [1994] ELM 95.
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(4) and that three months had expired. The Order was therefore invalid because
the confirmation was unreasonable53.
In addition, Lord Cullen went on to consider obiter the definition of 'likely' in
section 29(3) and decided that the requirement was that any potential damage be
probable rather than a bare possibility. As Ball and Bell (1994:414) point out, "If
this interpretation is correct, it would undermine the whole of the legislation on
SSSI's. It is submitted that the judge's reasoning should not be followed, since it
seems to be based on an entirely incorrect understanding of the context of the
legislation". The court adopted a very narrow interpretation of the provisions
again. This is explained by Reid (1992:249): "The court appears to have accepted
the appellant's argument that as a nature conservation order imposes some
restrictions on the individual's freedom to use his land, and indeed creates the
possibility of a criminal conviction if the restrictions are ignored, then according
to one of the accepted canons of statutory interpretation, the provisions should be
interpreted narrowly. This approach is in keeping with the law's traditional
emphasis on the protection of property rights and individual freedom, but arguably
overestimates the degree of restriction imposed by an order - much greater
limitations are accepted in the planning system without being perceived as
infringements of property or personal rights".
53 The problem raised by the validity of the notice has been remedied by the EPA 1990.
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2)b)iv) R v NCC ex parte London Brick Property Ltd [1994] ELM 95
This case concerned a SSSI in a brickworks owned by London Brick. The
challenge was to the notification 54. The pit was of interest because of the previous
pumping operations that had kept the water level low. Pumping had ceased and if
left as it was, the water beetles which formed the focus of the scientific interest
would be lost. London Brick contended that EN had failed to take account of the
cessation of pumping just before the original notification and that as such
reassessment was necessary before the designation was confirmed. Thus, as in
North Uist the confirmation was unreasonable.
In addition they contended that the interest would cease if the conditions were not
maintained and that EN had not taken account of this. The first contention failed.
The second contention depended on the 'duty' to notify. May J identified two
parts to the notification procedure. There is a duty under section 28(1) to notify a
site and then a discretion under section 28(4) whether to confirm that notification.
As such the second contention failed because, unless the special interest was
doomed, it was a reasonable exercise of EN's discretion to confirm the
notification55 . The court indicated that it was reasonable for EN to have a policy
normally to confirm unless the site was doomed which this one was not (yet).
54 Which was under the amended Section 28 procedure rather than the original 1981 version.
55 It should be illegal if the NC refuse to notify a site on political or tactical grounds and they
could be forced to do so by an interest group. However they could exercise their discretion not to
confirm.
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2)b)v) R v NCC ex parte Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council [1996] JPL 203
This case concerned the notification of Red Moss SSSI in Bolton. An action was
brought to judicially review the NC's decision to confirm the notification. Bolton
MBC (as owners of the site) objected to the notification of the site but
misconstrued the purpose of the notification. They believed that the site was to be
notified solely for its potential for regeneration, whereas it was notified for its
current interest and the regeneration potential was merely an ancillary factor.
They therefore addressed all of their objections to the issue of possible
regeneration of the site. They were not made aware of this mistake on their part
until late in the objection process and the notification was then confirmed. Bolton
MBC believed that the basis of the notification had not been made sufficiently
clear to them so as to enable them to make a full and effective objection, and
failing to correct their mistaken approach. They claimed that such actions
amounted to an abuse of natural justice.
Popplewell J concluded that the NC should have realised that the objections were
based on a mistaken belief that the only issue was the potential of the site. He
held that there had not been a "fair appreciation of the objection by Bolton and
that, in the result, natural justice has not been observed" 56. This raises an
interesting issue of who constitutes the council for the purposes of notification.
EN thought they had made matters clear to officers they had dealt with. The court
adopted the traditional approach on removal of property rights.
56 The SSSI was later renotified.
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2)b)vi) Conclusion On Judicial Interpretation
The majority of the cases have concerned notification, the area of wide discretion
of the NC. Because of the impact of notification on property rights the courts
have tended to adopt a very strict approach to interpretation. They have tended to
limit the application of the Act. They have been reluctant to adopt a wide
definition where legislation leads to a criminal offence. Consequently the
provisions of the WACA have been interpreted restrictedly.
3) VARIABLES INFLUENCING IMPACT
In order to show a causal link between the legislation and impact, the influence of
other legal and extra-legal variables must be taken into account. According to
Miers and Page (1982:214), "it is notoriously difficult to measure the impact of
legislation. This is so because behavioural or attitudinal change following the
enactment of legislation may be as much caused by the social conditions which
prompted the legislation as by the legislation itself. Even where the impact of the
legislation can be identified, that impact will be dependent upon the operation of
other social variables such as the occupational grouping or class of those
implementing or complying with the law, and the distribution of wealth and power
among these groups". Thus any impact that can be shown may not even be due to
the operation of the Act. It may be alternatively explained by other variables.
Ideally, one would wish to hold constant all variables having a potential impact
upon the behaviour and attitudes in question apart from the enactment of the
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legislation, for "only in this way could an unambiguous measure of the causal
connection, if any, between the legislation and any subsequent changes in the
target population be derived" (Miers & Page,1982:215). However, this is patently
impossible. We are therefore limited to a description of the changes in
behaviour57 and the possible variables influencing this change, and the causal link
between the legislation and the change can then be estimated but by its very nature
this estimate will be inexact58.
The main variables capable of influencing impact59 are the characteristics of those
to whom the legislation is addressed, the characteristics of the legislation itself
and changes in context. What one is ideally looking for is that the characteristics
of the legislation can be isolated as the only variable influencing impact and thus
the enactment can be said to have caused the impact shown.
3)a) Characteristics Of Those To Whom The Legislation Is Addressed
The attitudes of those subject to the law will obviously influence how they
respond to it. The more acceptable legislation is, the more easily it is applied.
According to Cranston, "opinion about legislation depends partly upon an
57 Which is undertaken in the next section.
58 This is not to say that the assessment of impact is not worthwhile. The identification of
variables which may also influence the impact of the legislation is important when considering
questions of enforcement of that legislation or its amendment.
59 They are also relevant to the efficacy of the legislation because these variables will also
influence the extent to which the consequences which are brought about in practice realise the
purposes of the legislation.
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evaluation of its attributes 60 and partly upon an individual's pre-existing
disposition towards the legal system" (Cranston, 1980:89). This pre-existing
disposition may be conditioned by a process of socialisation whereby individuals
internalise a favourable attitude to law but if that individual is also a member of a
group, the norms which have been enshrined in legislation may be rejected in
favour of the norms of the group. According to Kohfeld & Likens, "as a pervasive
psychological phenomenon, social influence should have a significant impact on
individual compliance" (Kohfeld & Likens,1982:355). EN market research on
owners "showed that although 38 per cent of owners and occupiers considered
relations with English Nature good or excellent, the same number felt that
relations were poor or non-existent" (National Audit Office,1994:19)
It is therefore helpful to categorise groups of persons that the legislation is
directed at. According to the National Audit Office (1994:20)
ownership/occupation of land units on SSSIs was comprised of: private 65%,
businesses 13%, trusts 9%, central govt 7%, local govt 5%, other 1%. The
categorisation adopted here is linked to the types of damage that the Act was
directed at controlling. The first group is landowners involved in agriculture. The
second group is Local Planning Authorities and landowners involved in
development. The final group is statutory undertakers. The characteristics of each
that are capable of influencing the impact of the Act are considered in turn.
60 This question is considered in the next section.
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As the main impetus behind the WACA was the control of agricultural damage
and the largest proportion of damage to sites is agricultura1 61 , it is the attitudes of
landowners involved in agriculture that we are most concerned with. According
to Brotherton (1990:200), "farmer attitudes both in general and in relation to
particular cases may affect the extent to which outcomes are favourable to the
NCC", and thus the impact of the Act. According to Brotherton, attitudes are
favourable for some 70% of farmers in England and Wales whilst around 50% are
very concerned to proceed with their proposals. He contends that "farmers'
attitudes to the NCC may have shown some improvement through the 1980s ...
whilst the farmers' concern to proceed may perhaps have lessened with the
progressive withdrawal from 1 December 1983 of farm grants designed to
stimulate agricultural production" (Brotherton,1990:202). This improvement in
attitudes may well be linked to group membership if the norms of the group
embody favourable attitudes towards conservation. Most landowners involved in
agriculture will be members of the NFU62 or CLA so the norms of these groups
may have been of influence. Other variables may also have influenced attitudes
towards conservation and these are discussed in the next two sections.
It was concluded earlier63 that the NFU's corporatist relationship with the
government was capable of exerting an influence on the adoption of the voluntary
approach. Because of their extensive involvement in the formulation of the
61 See below: section 4.
62 Which has some 100,000 members. Estimated by Holbeche (1986) to be about 85% of active
commercial farmers.
63 See chapter 5.
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controls, the NFU and CLA tried to create a consensus about the Act. This was
partly through fear of failure of the voluntary system being answered by the
government with strict sanctions. Lowe et al (1986) quote a NFU letter of 6-11-
81, circulated to members: "It must be stressed that if farmers are not prepared to
be conciliatory on SSSIs, for example, by modifying schemes where possible and
seeking management agreements (with payments) where appropriate, then there
can be no question that a future government of any party would consider more
punitive controls for SSSIs and possibly elsewhere". This fear of sanctions seems
to have been important in the NFU's continued pressure to maintain the voluntary
approach as the primary means of contro1 64 and to make it work. "Having ensured
that its commitment to 'voluntary co-operation' was enshrined as the fundamental
principle of the Act the farming and landowning lobby has faced the task of
convincing a sceptical conservation lobby and ensuring that the practices of the
industry live up to the rhetoric of the 'goodwill' case" (Cox et a1,1985b:145). This
may, therefore, represent one of the variables influencing the impact of the Act.
The provisions themselves may not be as important as the pressure from the NFU
and CLA to make them work.
The approach of the NFU and CLA can be linked to a change in their relationship
with government Chapter 5 concluded that their relationship was corporatist in
nature but that they had utilised pluralist modes of intermedation during the
parliamentary phase of the enactment of the WACA. This lobbying continued
64 See the report of the Select Committee on the Environment Vol. II for evidence of the NRYs
emphasis on goodwill.
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after the Act in respect of the code of guidance on SSSIs and the financial
guidelines for compensation for farmers denied agricultural grants. The NFU and
the CLA were involved with the development of both, unlike the conservation
groups which were not consulted until after the drafts had been published. This
again represented the close corporatist relationship maintained with the
government, giving them the ability to exert influence from an early stage.
However, this relationship did suffer under the Thatcher government. A range of
techniques were utilised in pursuit of Thatcherism, including attempts to
dismantle corporatism, the extension of property ownership and privatisation65.
The corporate status of the NFU and CLA was therefore subject to the 'external'
problems associated with the election of the Thatcher government. Although
more akin to the CBI than the trade unions (Holbeche,1986), their influence was
undoubtedly diminished. However, this has been partly offset by their proficiency
at lobbying and their involvement at EC level in determining agricultural policy.
It has also been assisted by the fact that the so-called 'internal' problems 66 did not
affect the NFU which was highly organised and had for years ensured compliance
with agreements 67.
65 These techniques were not all deployed from the start. Initially, the focus was on the
dismantling of corporatism and in the mid to late 1980's the privatisation regime came into play.
See Gamble (1989) for details.
66 See Chapter 5.
67 See Cox et al (1990a) for details of the NFU's activities in this respect.
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The replacement of Thatcher with Major led to the reappearance of a more
consensual style of policy maldng 68 . However, this has not heralded a return to
the previous strong position of the landowning lobbies69. According to
McCormick (1993:279), "The reduced power of the NFU has combined with
growing criticism of MAFF to reduce the influence of the agricultural lobby,
while allowing environmental groups more influence"". The NFU survived the
decline in corporatism but has had to be more reliant on lobbying, particularly in
relation to conservation policy. This is because any return to the corporatist
relationship has been due to political attention moving to conservation policies.
However, in these areas their authority is both externally and internally weak so
the relationship is on a different footing. This extended corporatist relationship is
also undermined by a lack of goodwill on the part of members which is essential
to ensure freedom from legislation. The 'internal' problems which affected the
trade unions in the 1970's are starting to take their toll. The NFU is also under
pressure externally from those doubting the efficacy of the agricultural support
system with its resultant environmental and monetary costs. The relationship is
therefore much weaker in relation to environmental policies than production ones.
68 Holliday considers that "this reflects a rather less dogmatic approach to policy making. In
addition, it is evidence of a realisation that Thatcherite modes of operation were not always ideal"
and that "a gradual reconstitution of neo-corporatist arrangements ... remains a clear possibility"
(Holliday, 1993:316).
69 This is partly because many of the structures have been destroyed.
70 MAFF has been subjected to attacks about its poor track record on environmental issues. This
led to the NFU pressing MAFF to take a more active role in respect of environmental issues. "This
had less to do with farmers' commitment to environmental matters than with the NFU's
determination to avoid ceding controls over agriculture to the DOE or any other conservation
agency" (Winter, 1991:53).
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The implications of this include a recognition by the NFU and CLA of a decrease
in their influence. Concern that stronger controls may be implemented if the
voluntary approach does not work has led to a concerted effort to ensure that it
does work. The possibility of being able to resist the introduction of stronger
controls is diminishing so all efforts are concentrated on making the Act work.
The landowning lobbies are adopting conservation because they view it as a new
'crop'. "Something had to be done to reduce over-production, and even the NFU
and CLA at last began to see the potential value of nature conservation as an
alternative objective of land use, for which farmers might be paid"
(Ratcliffe,1989:12). As the norms of the NFU and CLA are directed towards
ensuring the working of the Act their members are likely to assume those same
norms. Such a change in attitudes was recognised in the second reading debate on
the Amendment Act: "the National Farmers Union has acted in an exemplary
manner towards the legislation" (Hansard HC 72,8-2-1985,1235, Dr Clarke MP).
Those landowners involved in agriculture that are not members n will obviously
not be influenced by these norms by virtue of membership of the group. However,
they may be influenced by them indirectly. According to Bell (1985:15), they are
all bound "by the enormous moral responsibility it [the Act] lays upon them ...
The legislation trusts the farming community and depends upon its goodwill to
achieve the right balance. This approach has the firm support of landowners and
their representative organisations. They are, nevertheless, acutely aware that their
responsibilities for conservation have been thrust into the limelight as never
71 Certainly less than 15% according to Holbeche (1986).
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before. Already under attack from a number of quarters, land management
decisions are now subjected to a critical scrutiny that concentrates on those that
are seen to be in conflict with conservation practice. Abuse, even by a very small
minority, threatens to bring the whole edifice crashing down". The debate
generated by the legislation has led to a cultural change "alerting farmers to the
strength of feeling that exists about conserving the countryside.. .this has been
translated into action by many and has had a marked impact on land management"
(Be11,1985:16).
"Government departments and agencies own or occupy land on around 1,400 Sites
of Special Scientific Interest and many have their own nature conservation
objectives. To build on these ... English Nature have negotiated declarations of
common purpose called Statements of Intent with 10 bodies" (National Audit
Office,1994:19). These include the Forestry Commission, British Association for
Shooting & Conservation, Sports Council, Crown Estates Commission - Windsor
Park, National Trust, MOD, English Heritage, British Coal Open Cast,
Association of County Councils, National Parks. "These statements provide a
positive framework for co-operation with other bodies and help to ensure that site
management is more effectively planned and the importance of nature
conservation is fully recognised" (National Audit Office,1994:21)
The second category of persons subject to the legislation is Local Planning
Authorities and landowners involved in development. The LPAs in particular
have been affected by the de-regulation of land use planning under the Thatcher
government which was documented in Chapter 7. They have less de facto control
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over the process than in the past, thus limiting their ability to control damage to
SSSIs through activities given planning permission.
The final category is statutory undertakers. Water bodies in particular are of great
importance as many are owners or occupiers of SSSIs. In these cases the
Department of Environment Code of Practice on conservation, access and
recreation (1989) recommends that a management plan for the SSSI is agreed with
the NC.
3)b) Characteristics Of The Legislation
When considering the characteristics of the legislation as a variable influencing
impact, the central issues are (i) the operation of other legislation / guidelines
linked to the Act (ii) the nature of the incentives and disincentives provided by the
legislation to encourage compliance, (iii) and the means of enforcement provided.
Issues of suitability of the controls introduced are also relevant but it is difficult to
separate out such issues. If the controls are unsuitable they probably will not
work as well.
3)b)i) Ancillary Provisions
It is necessary to take account of "the possibility that the enactment of a particular
law may be only one of several similarly directed governmental interventions in
the same historical period" (Lempert,1966:18). It has to be remembered that
section 28 forms only one part of the implementation of the policy of protecting
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habitats. Other institutional, financial and procedural arrangements have been
made which will have a bearing upon the impact of the law. Examples include the
planning system and the financial guidelines.
The working of these will obviously affect the impact of the WACA and may
provide an alternative explanation for any impact shown. However, their
influence is difficult to quantify. It is easy to see where the granting of planning
permission has led to the damage of a site, but it is difficult to ascertain how much
has been prevented by refusal of planning permission on sites. PPG9 stresses the
nature conservation interest of a site as a material consideration when deciding
planning applications. However, it is merely guidance. Miers and Page
(1982:177) consider that such guidelines "may have an effect which is little short
of legislation. In many cases they will in practice constitute an official, final and
authoritative interpretation of a provision, both for those implementing it, and for
those subject to it". Yet it is still impossible to quantify its effect and the
phraseology used is not precise enough to be of any real assistance. In addition,
such guidance is incapable of influencing levels of damage from agricultural
operations because they are outside the scope of planning control.
The financial guidelines are relevant to the question of incentives and will be
discussed below.
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3)b)ii) Incentives / Disincentives
There are two elements to this, the impact of deterrence (section 28 liability) and
the impact of incentives (Management Agreement compensation). The deterrence
is the possibility of prosecution & fmes, the incentives are payments under
management agreements. But the two are separate: a landowner is not
automatically entitled to the incentives, qualification is dependent upon entering a
management agreement with the NC so the situation is not as straightforward as it
seems. As Jacob (1980:69) points out, "the empirical problems inherent in
researching deterrence are multiple. There is the fundamental problem of
measuring deterred behaviour because it consists of acts never performed".
Deterrence theory "rests on the hypothesis that crime will decrease in relation to
perceived costs" (Sedgwick,1980:91). Thus, the most obvious reason why
individuals comply with legislation is a material one, they stand to gain or to lose
something of value to them (Veljanovski,1980) 72. Deterrence theory emphasises
72 Sedgwick proposes a retribution theory instead of deterrence theory, which is based on morality
and the distinction between right and wrong. This circumvents what he calls the punishment
dilemma: "once a crime has been committed, punishment of an individual appears in a different
light since the threat of punishment did not deter the offender in question. In addition, the marginal
benefit of punishing a particular criminal as a deterrent to other potential offenders is very small.
Consequently, the benefits of punishment appear smaller in the particular case than they had
appeared in the ex ante situation before any crimes were committed" (Sedgwick,1980:92). Thus
any deterrent effect is diminished over time. This is also recognised by Neiman who criticises the
use of economic incentives; in particular "tinkering with the calculus of private transactions in
order to direct egoistic behaviour to public ends ignores the important need to wreak retribution and
punishment on those who refuse to satisfy public goals" (Neiman,1980:31). "The crucial
characteristics of the deterrence perspective is that it focuses on the impact of punishment. It
considers the sanction as a cost to the individual rather then as a reflection of social judgement.
Lacking from this perspective is a concern with the intrinsic character of the crime committed.
Deterrence theory has little to say about the rightness or wrongness of criminal behaviour"
(Sedgwick,1980:94). However, adopting a deterrence theory perspective is less of a problem with
the WACA because it is not a stigmatised crime. This view is confirmed by Hawkins (1983:37):
"Criminal law and its ceremonies are laden with moral overtones. Yet the nature of the conduct
subject to control in systems of regulation invites moral ambivalence, an ambivalence reflected in
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''a confrontational style of enforcement based on detection and punishment of
violations" (Scholz,1984:385). However, "the mere fact of the formal provision of
positive or negative sanctions is frequently insufficient to encourage or to
discourage the behaviour or attitudes defined in the legislation. Thus, individuals
will typically balance the costs of implementing the legislation against the benefits
which may formally accrue to them; and conversely, they will balance the costs of
non-compliance against the benefits of continued disobedience" (Miers &
Page,1982:231). "The utility-maximising individual will compare the alternatives
available to him or her and choose among them on the basis of their expected
utility. Punishment is therefore understood as a means of manipulating the
various costs and benefits confronting the potential criminal so as to induce
compliance with the law" (Sedgwick,1980:90).
This balance will depend on the individual's perception of the costs and benefits of
a particular action. It will be based on "a wide variety of factors, such as the age,
class, race, sex and socio-economic status of the individual; whether he is acting
alone or as a member of a group, and if so, the size, composition, legal status,
objectives and values of the group and its relationship with others; the nature of
the behaviour or attitudes defined by the legislation, in particular whether they are
of economic significance, socially acceptable or deeply entrenched within
particular groups; and the characteristics of the legislation itself' (Miers &
1age,1982:231). Factors such as group membership will affect this73.
the frail legal sanctions provided in the legislation for breach of regulation, and the extreme
reluctance with which the law is invoked".
-M The effect of membership of the NFU has been discussed earlier.
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The nature of the behaviour defined by the legislation, which is often the
abstention from agricultural activities, is often seen as contrary to the 'Holy Grail'
of farming productivity. According to Cranston, "it can by hypothesised that
behaviour to which individuals are not committed as a way of life is deterrable to
a greater extent than behaviour to which a commitment has been made"
(Cranston,1980:89). The commitment to productivity is an obvious example. In
addition, of all types of behaviour, economic behaviour is the most difficult to
control. Behaviour which earns a farmer his living is likely to be difficult to
control in such a way.
3)b)ii)a) Deterrence/Compliance
Deterrence in the context of the SSSI centres on the possibility of prosecution and
subsequent fines. There is also the threat of injunction available to the NC;
however, this has rarely been used. According to P Stuttard of CCW they have
obtained an injunction only once and even then it was not served. Deterrence is
dependent on an individual's perception of the risk of detection and punishment,
and "the social variables affecting the individual who is punished and the degree
of his commitment to the prohibited conduct, and more specifically, on the nature
of the punishment itself' (Miers & Page,1982:236). The nature of the punishment
is financial. However, the level of these fines has often been criticised as being
too low and therefore providing no deterrent. It must be remembered though that
the level of fines may not have that great an effect on the impact of the Act; even
i_f they were higher the positive impact of the Act may not be any greater. This is
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confirmed by Balch (1980:57); "in general we expect compliance rates to increase
with both the probability of detection and the severity of expected sanctions. But
mild punishment may be more effective since it breeds less negative affect or
stigma and is more likely to be meted out. This would explain why frequency is a
more potent predictor of deterrence than severity".
However, "a person whose illegal income far exceeds the occasional fines that he
must pay when convicted of an offence will, other things being equal, continue to
disobey the law" (Miers & Page,1982:236). Thus "punishment works best when
other factors, especially positive reinforcement, are appropriately manipulated. It
is not likely to suppress the punished behaviour in future unless the contingencies
that reinforced it have been reduced, removed, or replaced" (Balch,1980:57) On
this basis, there was little deterrent effect in the fines imposed by section 28 and
section 29 particularly having regard to the positive reinforcement provided by
MAFF grants. As a means of comparing these consider the Essex farmer being
paid fl million per year under a management agreement. This is on the basis of
net profit foregone. If the farmer had gone ahead with the proposal he would have
made El million profit annually. The maximum fine, however, is currently £5000.
The fines probably have more symbolic value, in showing that it is considered
unacceptable to damage sites and the possibility of a criminal offence may deter
some.
Before a landowner is deterred by the possibility of a fine, however, he must
believe that it is likely that his offence will be detected and that he will be
prosecuted. "Certainty of punishment appears to have a larger effect on the level
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of crime than does the level of severity" (Jacob,1980:71). The likelihood of
detection is linked to the system of site monitoring. Although this has improved
substantially, the targets are only the visiting of a third of the sites each year, thus
reducing the chance of detection. Even if the offence is detected, there is no
guarantee that it will be prosecuted. As Withrington & Jones pointed out in 1992,
"perhaps less than half of reported incidents of damage to SSSIs constitute
breaches of section 28. Nevertheless, a total of only twelve prosecutions since the
1981 Act is less than one would expect" (Withrington & Jones,1992:97). If the
likelihood of prosecution is so distant, then it is unlikely to provide any deterrent
effect whatsoever.
Even without any real deterrent effect some landowners are obviously complying
with the law. This may be because they agree with its goals, or because they
perceive the slim possibility of prosecution as a deterrent. However, as Miers and
Page point out, "we may distinguish from those who comply with the law because
they agree with its substance, or because they perceive the costs of non-
compliance to outweigh the benefits, those who comply because it is the law....A
deep moral or political conviction in the legitimacy of the law may induce
individuals to comply with particular prescriptions notwithstanding their
opposition to them" (Miers & Page,1982:237). In this context it must also be
considered that landowners are complying with the provisions in order that stricter
controls are not introduced if the system is seen as failing.
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3)b)ii)b) Incentives
The incentives provided by the SSSI system are the compensation payments under
management agreements. The payments are calculated in accordance with the
financial guidelines. These guidelines enshrine the principle of full compensation
for profit foregone. Thus the landowner loses nothing by agreeing not to perform
the operation and in fact may gain because the calculations take no account of the
risk factors of projects. A management agreement eliminates risk. "In a context
where land values are falling and the search for alternative sources of farm income
is increasingly pressing, owning land which carries a designation can be seen as
advantageous rather than, as formerly, entailing a form of penalty" (Cox et
a1,1990a: 189).
However, farmers may not be happy to cease farming a particular area of land.
They may not be offered a management agreement, perhaps because it would be
too expensive. In such a situation there is usually a great incentive to carry out the
operation - MAFF Grants. If a landowner does not enter a management agreement
he is therefore likely to proceed with the operation as it will make the most
economic sense. One consequence of MAFF grants is overgrazing. This was
noted by the House of Lords Select Committee on the EC (1984:32) who
commented that "One of the most frequently mentioned causes of damage to the
environment is overgrazing in the hills, as a result of overstocking ... Many
witnesses believed that this has been encouraged by the availability of
compensatory allowances (commonly referred to as headage payments) under
Directive 75/268, payment of which is based on the number of livestock units
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which a farmer possesses". This claim is reinforced by the NCC who point out
that "Agricultural policy mechanisms designed to bolster farm incomes continue
to lead to pressure on areas of high nature conservation interest. In particular the
availability of Hill Livestock Compensatory Allowances may have contributed to
environmental over-grazing in some upland areas and a subsequent need for
management agreements to bring the stocking levels down to a level compatible
with safeguarding the conservation interest" (NCC,1990:18).
According to Barney Holbeche of the NFU, such pressures have lessened
considerably since 1986 when the Capital Grants Scheme was severely limited74.
The overall impact has been a lessening of agricultural incomes creating a need
for alternative income sources. These pressures from the CAP may also have been
lessened by its reform in 1992. However, not all of its reform has been beneficial.
In 1984 milk quotas were introduced and "one of the consequences of quotas was
a reduction in the use of purchased feedstuffs and a corresponding concentration
on improving the utilisation of grass. This led some farmers to destroy certain
ecologically interesting grasslands by 'reclaiming' them" (Winter,1991:51).
However, there have been a number of benefits such as set-aside. "Guaranteed
prices for the major amble crops such as cereals and oilseeds have been reduced
and a series of area based direct payments are now made to compensate farmers
for this reduction. In addition, in order to receive these compensation payments,
farmers must set aside at least 15% of their amble land, for which they will also
74 Details of the changes are discussed in 3)c).
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receive an area payment" 75(Wynne,1994:49). In addition "there is now a system
of quotas limiting the number of livestock on which farmers can receive
payments" (Wyrine,1994:49). The NFU sees the reduced profitability as
decreasing the pressure on farmers to plough up sites to convert to arable (B
Holbeche, pers.comm.).
However, according to EN, the reformed CAP has not dealt adequately with the
question of subsidies which continue to initiate damage to wildlife (House of
Lords Select Committee on the EC,1993:12). Proportionately, much more money
is available for agricultural support than nature conservationm. The reform of the
CAP has been described by Wynne (1994:48) as "an attempt by politicians to
address budgetary and surplus problems and, at the margin, environmental issues".
However, "the reduction in incentives for intensification and the introduction of
new initiatives sympathetic to nature conservation should help lessen the pressures
for new [management] agreements" (NCC,1989:16). This has a knock-on effect
on the resources available for conservation because "falling profitability is
generally being reflected in smaller payments being negotiated under new
agreements" (NCC,Annual Report 1986).
75 Arable area payments scheme.
76 According to MAFF (1994) AgriclillarginalleiBi the total spent on agricultural support in
1994 was £2609.8 million; agri-environment measures represented only £18.8 million of this.
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3)b)iii) Means Of Enforcement
"The effectiveness of law ... depends crucially on the nature of enforcement"
(Veljanovslci,1983:81). The adequacy of the means of enforcement is not
dependent upon how they are utilised in practice", but whether they are
appropriate for the control of the behaviour in question. "This involves such
matters as the structure, composition and powers of the enforcing agency, its level
of technical or professional expertise, and the nature of the sanctions it can evoke
in the event of non-compliance" (Miers & Page,1982:227). It is the resources
theoretically available for enforcement that matter, although their actual
application is relevant in relation to the question of agency interpretation78.
3)b)iii)a) Structure, Composition and Powers of the NC
Because of the substantial discretion given to the NC, the attitudes and behaviour
of its officials who implement the legislation are important variables in
influencing its impact. Their exercise of this discretion will be "in part according
to their conception of its functions both as the means of implementing a particular
statutory scheme, and in part according to their perception of the costs and
benefits of implementing it in individual cases" (Miers & Page,1982:238). "It
seems that no particular consideration was given to the policy which the NCC
should adopt on taking prosecutions, for instance defming what was in the public
77 For example vigorously, haphazardly or corruptly.
78 Considered above: section 2a.
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interest" (Withrington & Jones, 1992:97). Thus it is left to individual officers to
decide.
Another factor which may influence the NC's exercise of their discretion is the
trend of political appointments to the NC during the conservative administration.
Lowe (1983a) points out that 18 out of 39 new appointments by the Conservatives
to both the NC and CC had farming or forestry interests. This meant that over a
third of the NC had such interests. Eleven of those appointed had served or were
currently serving in an official capacity with the NFU, the CLA, or their Scottish
or Welsh equivalents or the Timber Growers Organisation79. One example is Sir
Hector Monro, the junior minister responsible for the Bill, who was appointed to
the NC". This trend of political appointments will obviously affect NC policy
and influence the way in which the Act is working.
3)b)iii)b) Level of Expertise
The NC have no in-house legal expertise to conduct prosecutions so the Area
Regional Officer is responsible for gathering evidence and witnessesm . "Problems
have arisen in taking cases to court when the NCC's county officer has failed to
caution defendants or to date documentary evidence" (Withrington &
79 A comparison is made of appointments to the CC and NCC under the Labour administration up
to 1979 and the Conservative administration 1979 to 1983 by Brotherton & Lowe (1984). This
shows that under Labour 14 members were conservation based and 8 were farming based. Under
the Conservatives 9 were conservation based and 14 were farming based.
80 He was a member of the Area Executive Committee of the Scottish NFU.
81 Although they are now using solicitors to provide legal advice on an agency basis.
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Jones,1992:98). Obviously, the conduct of a prosecution can make the day-to-day
relationship of NC's county offices with the local farming community very
difficult and, in some cases, impossible 82. "The understandable reluctance of
NCC county officers to get involved in legal proceedings is one of the main
reasons why so few prosecutions have been taken" (Withrington &
Jones,1992:99). "In the two years after 1985 the NCC contemplated a number of
prosecutions. Most were not pursued because of lack of evidence. In some cases
Crown immunity was involved" (Withrington & Jones,1992:102).
3)b)iii)c) Nature of Sanctions Available
The question of any deterrent effect from prosecution and fines has already been
discussed. However, in addition the NC can apply for a section 29 Order (NCO)
or a CPO. Any breach of section 29 will involve larger fmes which may be more
of a deterrent. However, very few NCOs have been used, 40 since the start of the
Act (VVithrington & Jones,1992). It is arguable that the NCO as a 'step up' in
control is not appropriate to control the behaviour in question. It is used when
section 28 has failed to secure an agreement with a landowner yet it is based on
exactly the same procedure. This would indicate that it is unlikely to work and is,
therefore, inappropriate. It also involves a blank cheque if anything is really to be
done.
82 Investigators are now used instead of staff. These investigators gather evidence which is then
screened by retained solicitors.
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3)b)iii)d) Assessment of Enforcement
One method of evaluating the NC's implementation is to look at allocative
efficiency which occurs where there is a balance between the costs and the results
of implementation. This is important where there is a limited budget and the
allocation of capital and manpower to the implementation of differing aspects of
the legislation, or to differing ways of implementing the same provision is likely
to affect its operation. The limited number of prosecutions reflects a preference
for resources being directed towards the negotiation of management agreements
rather than the conduct of prosecutions, site protection is the ultimate goal.
Hawkins (1983:36) highlights "a marked reluctance to employ the formal
machinery of law enforcement" in a number of regulatory systems. This is also
noted by Veljanovsld (1983:77): "in many areas of social regulation the law is
enforced in a highly discretionary and conciliatory manner". Prosecution is too
costly in terms of site loss. The conduct of a prosecution is unlikely to foster a
good relationship with the landowners and secure the safety of the site. According
to Wyn Jones, "At the end of the day we want the site managed and if we
prosecute we lose the site" (Pers. comm.). "Before pursuing a prosecution
English Nature must consider whether this would be in the interests of nature
conservation, bearing in mind the need to secure the long term management of the
site with the help of the owner. Where damage can be easily reversed, or the
evidence is weak, they will not proceed. English Nature must also consider the
cost and time involved; for example action against one landowner lasted four
years and cost over £100,000 in staff and legal costs (National Audit
Office,1994:24).
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This accords with the nature of the provisions. They can be regarded as a
compliance rather than a penalty system. With penalty systems, the principal
objective is retribution or punishment. With compliance systems "the responsible
authority is concerned to secure conformity to standards; rule breaking is
perceived not so much as criminal but as a problem to be solved by the concerted
efforts of the authority and the individual concerned" (Miers & Page,1982:239).
The emphasis is on encouraging the landowner not to continue damaging the site
and to build a good working relationship, something which is highly unlikely after
a prosecution has taken place. Compliance systems' conception of enforcement
"centres upon the attainment of the broad aims of legislation, rather than
sanctioning its breach. Recourse to the legal process here is rare, a matter of last
resort, since compliance strategy is concerned with repair and results not
retribution" (Hawkins,1984:4) 83 . As Mayntz (1983:124) points out, "while it
remains true that poor implementation can ruin the best of policies, it is also true
that perfect implementation does not assure realisation of policy goals if the
programme takes the wrong approach".
3)c) Change In Context
Coincidental historical happenings often provide as good an explanation for a
perceived change in behaviour as the legislation itself. "The likelihood of
" This can of course be contrasted with the Victorian Bird Protection legislation which was
designed as a penalty system. Retribution was an essential part of the system.
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independent historical variables entering as causal factors in the perceived change
increases as the time lapse between the measurements increases"
(Lempert,1966:124). Fifteen years have elapsed since the passage of the WACA;
this length of time indicates a likelihood that such 'historical' variables may have
played a part in the impact shown. The recession since the end of the 1980's may
well have been responsible for the decline in damage attributable to activities
given planning permission. The influence of such variables is, however, very
difficult to ascertain.
The most important contextual change is to MAFF grants. As Chapter 2 noted,
the conflict with agriculture was highly contentious at the time of the enactment of
the WACA. Given that agriculture represented the highest proportion of damage
to sites in the 1980 survey (Moore,1987), any changes in these grants may have
influenced the impact shown 84. Grants can be paid by virtue of the Agriculture
Act 1970, section 28, which enabled capital grants to be paid for carrying out or
establishing farm businesses. This was widened by the Agriculture Act 1986,
section 22, to include ancillary businesses. The Farm Land & Rural Development
Act 1988 allowed payment of non-capital grants.
When the WACA was enacted the relevant scheme was the Agriculture and
Horticulture Development Scheme (AHDS) 85 . This was in operation from 1
84 This is also linked to the nature of the incentives/disincentives provided by the WACA
discussed above.
85 For a general overview of the scheme see the explanatory leaflet AHS 5 & ABS 2 (1980).
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October 1980 to 31 December 1988 86 . This provided grants for, inter alia, a
number of activities capable of damaging SSSIs87 . These included: fish farming88,
orchard grubbing89, reseeding and regeneration of grassland 90, land clearance and
reclamation, claying and marling91 , field drainage and freshwater flood
protection92.
This scheme was replaced by the Agriculture Improvement Scheme (AIS) 93 . This
was in operation from 1 October 1985 to November 1988. This was the first grant
scheme to recognise conservation separately. Leaflet MS is pointed out the
notification requirement for SSSIs and the existence of management agreements.
It was also the first scheme to provide grants for non-agricultural diversification94.
As with the AHDS grants were available for freshwater fish farming (Leaflet MS
16), orchard grubbing (leaflet MS 5), grassland improvement (leaflet MS 13)95,
86 Replacing the Farm & Horticulture Development Scheme (leaflet FHD 1,1980).
87 Although the grant for removal of hedgerows under the Farm & Horticulture Development
Scheme (leaflet FHD1,1980) was replaced with a grant for planting new hedges and reconditioning
of old hedges (Leaflet AHS 24,1985).
88 The activity that was in issue in North (fist Fisheries v Secretary of State for Scotland [1991]
SLT 333 discussed above: section 2biii. Although the revised version of leaflet AHS 35 (1984)
stated that the Minister would consider the effect of the proposal on the countryside when deciding
the grant application.
89 See leaflet AHS 27 (1985).
90 Included in this is 50° o grant for the application of lime and fertiliser in Less Favoured Areas.
91 These are operations intended to stabilise light or fen soils. See Leaflet AHS 26 for details of
the rates of grant.
92 For details of the rates of grant see leaflet AHS 23 (1984).
93 For general details of the scheme see leaflets AIS 1 & AIS is.
94 See leaflet AIS 6 Tourism & Crafts. 
95 Although the rate of grant for lime and fertiliser application was reduced to 30% in Less
Favoured Areas.
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field drainage and freshwater flood protection. Grants were also provided for
conservation (leaflet MS 4) although these were limited in nature, including
hedges, trees and shelter belts96.
The Farm Diversification Grant Scheme (FDGS) was in operation from January
1988 to January 1993. It was to encourage farmers to diversify into non-
agricultural profit-making activities on their farm (Leaflet FDS2). This was
merged with the Farm and Conservation Grant Scheme (F&CGS) which came into
operation on 19 February 1989 (leaflets F&CGS 12 & F&CGS 1). This scheme
was designed to reduce the conflict between conservation and agricultural grants
schemes. Under the F&CGS, grants are given for capital expenditure which has
an environmental value. According to the MAFF handbook (leaflet F&CGS 12),
the F&CGS 1989 "is designed to help fanners maintain efficient farming systems,
whilst also meeting the often heavy cost of combating pollution and conserving
the countryside and its wildlife". The emphasis on production has not, however,
been eroded.
The scheme provides grants for, inter alia, field boundaries, traditional buildings,
heather burning, bracken control, fencing livestock out of broad-leaved woodlands
or heather moors and heaths (leaflet F&CGS 10), reseeding and regeneration of
grassland, field drainage, flood protection (leaflet F&CGS7) and farm
diversification (leaflet F&CGS 11). A grant can be claimed through an
Improvement Plan under the F&CGS 1991 or outside of a plan under the F&CGS
96 Which had previously received grant under AHDS (leaflet AHS 24,1985).
331
1989. Although more conservation oriented than the previous schemes, it seems
to be directed more towards aesthetics and farm efficiency97.
4) ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT
An assessment of impact involves ascertaining how the WACA has affected the
behaviour of those subject to its provisions. This entails a comparison between
behaviour whilst subject to the provisions with the behaviour which would have
existed had the WACA never been enacted. This comparison "is one which by
definition cannot actually be made" (Lempert,1966:111). The assessment must
therefore involve an estimate of what the behaviour would have been without the
WACA.
A number of models of research design exist for the assessment of impact98 . The
design which will give the most accurate estimate of what behaviour would have
been without the Act is a multiple time series. This uses a control group for
comparison. This involves taking a number of measurements of behaviour both
before and after the introduction of the legislation and measurements at the same
time in a control group. These can then be compared and the impact of the
legislation can be assessed. While such an approach may be possible in America,
with comparison possible between states, it is impossible in the UK. There is no
97 There are a number of other grants schemes in existence. However, they are not directly
applicable to this discussion and are therefore discussed in Chapter 10.
98 Details of the various research designs are given in Lempert (1966).
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control group that we can compare the measurements with. Without such a
control group, historical variables cannot be accounted for 99 . However, the basic
time series, taking a number of measurements over a period of time but without a
control group for comparison, will give some indication as to impact and how
behaviour has changed, but its validity is tempered by the possibility that the
impact can be explained by means of rival hypotheses. The rival hypotheses (or
variables) discussed earlier are reconsidered in detail in this section to see if they
account for the impact shown.
The first stage is to ascertain whether there has been any change in behaviour.
However, because of the nature of the provisions in section 28, changes may be
methodologically difficult to ascertain. According to Feeley (1976:508),
"facilitative types of law are likely to pursue their ends by altering the rates of
activity rather than flatly prohibiting or requiring a prescribed pattern of
behaviour"; changes "brought about by such laws are not likely to be formally
stated, clearly identified or even widely acknowledged. Neither are they likely to
be immediately obvious to the outside observer and at times even to all their
sponsors". Because of the temporary nature of the prohibitions imposed on
landowners and the reliance on the voluntary approach, the impact of the SSSI
system may well be diffuse and long termm.
99 These historical variables may be the primary explanatory variable which has influenced the
impact rather than the legislation itself.
too An assessment of impact will be helped by the fact that the system has now been running for
15 years and changes are likely to have been effected by now.
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The time series method of impact assessment will use the published statistics of
the NCC, EN, SNH and CCW. These give details of damage to SSSIs each year.
These will be compared with the damage statistics from before the enactment of
the WACA. This will not give a complete picture of the impact of the WACA
because the statistics are not comprehensive. Recording of damage has taken
place on a rather ad hoc basis and is not systematic in nature so cannot give a true
picture of changes. "The lack of systematic recording and consistent definitions
make it impossible to determine if the incidence or amount of damage is
increasing or decreasing" (Rowel1,1992:1).
In addition, using the time series comparison method gives rise to the possibility
of 'regression'. Regression is due to a "higher than chance probability that if the
year before the passage of the law is chosen as one of the two points, it will have
been a year of exceptionally high incidence of the type of behaviour which the law
is trying to regulate, since laws often gain their necessary momentum for passage
in response to just such out of the ordinary situations" (Lempert,1966:125).
The only damage statistics available from before the passing of the Act are those
published during the passage of the Act indicating a damage level of 13% of sites
(Moore,1987). Thus regression seems a strong possibility. However, it was
concluded in Chapter 4 that the main stimulus for the introduction of the
provisions at that point in time was the need to comply with the requirements of
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the EC Birds Directive and not merely the high level of damage m . In fact Moore
(1987) claims that the NC conducted the survey once the intention to introduce
legislation had been announced in order to strengthen their case for extending
controls over all SSSIs.
However, one other possibility which must be noted is that the lack of systematic
monitoring of damage before 1980 may have led to a higher than average
incidence of damage being recorded when the study was actually made.
Cumulative damage from a number of years was probably recorded, thus
increasing the levels of damage recorded at that point. Thus, any drop in the
number of sites recorded as having been damaged since the introduction of the Act
may not be attributable to the influence of the Act but to regression.
The figure of 13% damage was reached by combining the results of two surveys
(Moore,1987:62). The first was reports of significant damage reported by NC
regional staff This excluded insignificant damage which was categorised as local
damage from which the site would recover quickly 102 . Because the results
obtained from this would be an underestimate lo , a separate sample survey was
also conducted making a random selection of 15% of sites to check. The results
of the routine survey showed that 8% of sites had been significantly damaged.
101 The high level of damage did, however, increase pressure in the parliamentary stage to extend
the protection proposed beyond that provided by Section 29. The damage statistics affected the
nature/type of protection even if it did not initiate the new Act.
102 Such damage is now included in the statistics.
103 Because significant damage could occur without the regional officers being aware of it.
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The results of the special survey showed that 15% of the sites had been
significantly damaged. These were combined to reach the figure of 13% of sites
suffering significant loss.
Another problem in assessing the damage statistics is that known as
instrumentation. Changes in the calibration of a measuring instrument may
produce changes in the obtained measurement. The possibility must be
considered that the change in the law will be accompanied by a change in the
method of collecting data concerning that law. The focus of the damage statistics
during the parliamentary phase may well have initiated a more comprehensive
system of monitoring, particularly as the 1980 survey had shown that routine
recording of damage did not reveal the full scale of damage.
Monitoring of damage did become more systematic after the introduction of the
Act. From 1983 onwards damage statistics were published every year in the
annual reports of the NC. However, this was purely the routine recording of
damage and does not present a problem of instrumentation. However, the
inclusion in 1989 of over grazing as a form of damage, which had not been
included previously, is just such an example of instrumentation. Another example
is damage through insufficient management which has only been recorded as a
separate type of damage from 1989 onwards, and only in England. The first major
change in data collection was initiated in 1989/90. The NC commenced a number
of regional trials intended to lead to the development of systematic monitoring of
the integrity and quality of the SSSI series. The trials led in 1991/92 to the
development of a programme of site integrity monitoring with a target of visiting
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or revisiting 1/3 of sites. According to Hughes (1994), under this scheme some
part of 52% of all sites were visited in 1992. Before this point, it is perfectly
possible that damage has been recorded several years after it occurred.
If regression is a factor, the statistics since the introduction of the Act may seem to
indicate a reduction in the levels of loss and damage when there is not one in fact.
If instrumentation is a factor, the statistics since the introduction of the Act may
seem to indicate a rise in the levels of loss and damage when there is none, it is
just because the real level of damage had not been realised before. This is quite a
strong possibility, given that when the special survey was carried out in 1980 the
levels of damage were substantially higher than those indicated by the routine
survey. With the current system of monitoring moving more towards the
approach of the special survey the levels of damage may not be rising but just
being identified correctly. When this is combined with the effect of including
short-term damage in the statistics, instrumentation seems to be a factor than must
be taken account of.
In addition to the problems of instrumentation and regression, a number of other
factors with regard to the damage statistics must be considered. There are a
number of inconsistencies in the recording of damage. This is not just because
recording of damage is rather haphazard in nature, there is also the problem of
different categorisations of damage. Since the split of the NCC into EN, CCW
and SNH different ways of recording damage have been used. SNH and EN
classify short-term damage differently and SNH do not record damage through
over grazing. According to D Pritchard of RSPB a significant proportion of
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damage has been hidden. Many areas were not renotified under the 1981 because
of damage. As these no longer counted as SSSIs the damage to them was never
recorded.
A number of types of damage are also under-represented in the statistics. The
National Audit Office (1994:15) give the example of a report on farm pollution in
1990 by the Nature Conservancy Council which identified 46 cases of chronic
pollution damage on a small sample of Sites of Special Scientific Interest; "far
fewer cases were shown in the formal loss and damage statistics .. covering the
same period". In addition, "deterioration due to lack of management - which
English Nature regards as the most serious long term threat to many sites - is not
fully represented in the figures" ... and "other threats to sites such as acid
deposition and pollution from traffic are not dealt with in the loss and damage
statistics as the existence of the threat and its impact on the site are difficult to
establish in the course of routine monitoring visits" (National Audit
Office,1994: 15).
The other factor that must be taken into account when assessing the statistics to
determine the impact is that they do not specify whether the damage occurred with
the consent of the NC, after the four month moratorium period, or whether it was
unlawful under the terms of the Act. Much of the damage occurring may be
Lawful within the terms of the Act. It is a reduction in unlawful damage and
hopefully damage after the 4 month moratorium104 that is the desired impact.
- 04 Encouraged by offering a management agreement.
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However, these cannot be distinguished from damage occurring after the giving of
NC consent to an activity. This is not a great problem, however, as the probability
is that the NC are unlikely to give consent to a damaging activity.
Because of these difficulties, the positive side of the provisions, management
agreements will also be taken into account in assessing the impact of the Act.
Rather than just considering whether the Act has reduced the rate of damage, it is
useful to consider how many sites are now 'protected' because a management
agreement has been entered into.
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Figure 1.
The 1989/90 peak in damage was explained by the NC as relating to
instrumentation: "the enhanced effort in loss and damage recording in the report
year has resulted, inevitably, in a higher incidence of recorded damage than
previous years" (NCC,1990:21). For the following year. according to Rowell. the
339
data is incorrect. It includes only the data for England which "amounts to less
than 50% of the recorded damaged area for that year" (Rowel1,1992:18). Damage
levels have been consistent since 1983-4 at around 4.7%. Taking account of the
missing data for 1990-91, this accords with the view of Withrington & Jones
(1992) that damage levels are running at approximately 5%. In 1980 damage was
estimated to have occurred to 13% of sites. Levels of damage therefore seems to
have fallen since the introduction of the Act. However, this may be because of
regression, with a higher proportion of damage being recorded in 1984 because of
the 'special' survey that was conducted. If this is the case, can any reduction in
damage levels be seen?
One possible means of ascertaining this is to discount the results of the special
survey and consider only the results of the routine survey. The average level of
damage since the Act is approximately 5%. The routine survey of damage in 1980
indicated 8% damage. There seems to have been a reduction in the levels of
damage. However, Withrington & Jones point out that "the post-1981 Act
statistics are not the result of systematic monitoring, and it is likely that the actual
damage is somewhat higher" (Withrington & Jones,1992:97). This is not fatal
because the routine survey in 1980 was probably on a similar basis. In fact the
surveys since are likely to be more comprehensive because of instrumentation,
thus making levels of damage seem even higher in comparison to the 1980 levels.
So there may have been a reduction in damage levels. However, the levels
recorded in 1980 under the routine survey may be responsible for regression
because the routine survey may have recorded cumulative damage from previous
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years, thus increasing the amount of damage recorded. It is therefore almost
impossible to ascertain whether any reduction in damage levels has occurred.
This can be remedied by comparing damage levels on sites that have been notified
under the 1981 Act and were thus covered by the provisions, and those awaiting
re-notification which were only protected under the provisions of the 1949 Act.
On these sites landowners were supposed to voluntarily comply with restrictions
but they were not obliged to. Such a comparison gives an indication of the likely
result of a multiple time series comparison. Information is only available for the
years 1983-1991 but the time scale is long enough to indicate general trends.
However, this may not give an accurate comparison because some landowners
may have voluntarily complied even though they were not subject to the
provisions. This is not fatal to the exercise because the effect of this would be to
diminish any differential between the two types of sites. If a differential in
damage levels is seen despite this, it indicates that the provisions of the Act are
responsible for the difference.
82.3% of the sites damaged in 1983-4 were not covered by the 1981 Act, because
they had not yet been re-notified. Of the sites that had been notified only 2.13%
were damaged. Thus damage to those sites covered by the Act seems even lower
than Figure 1 would suggest. This indicates that, even allowing for
instrumentation and regression, a reduction in damage levels has occurred.
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Figure 2.
For those sites awaiting renotification damage levels are much higher than for
those that have been notified under the 1981 Act. This indicates that the Act is
reducing damage levels to sites even though the levels of damage for notified sites
have increased. The rate of increase is generally consistent between the two apart
from 1985-1986. This may be explained by the enactment of the WACAA 1985
which closed the 3 month pre-designation loophole. Before 1985, Adams argues
that the provisions of the WACA increased the rate of damage to non-notified
sites: "It is apparent that notification or renotification of sites has triggered their
destruction. The Act has in fact accelerated the loss and damage of precisely
those areas it seeks to protect" (Adams,1985:12). The drop in 1985-86 may,
therefore, represent the prevention of this type of damage.
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Apart from the 1985-86 discrepancy, the alterations in the levels of damage for
both types of site are consistent. Levels of both types of damage would have been
affected by regression, instrumentation, characteristics of addressees and changes
in context. This leaves the characteristics of the legislation as the only
distinguishing variable between the two. This therefore seems to indicate that the
WACA itself led to the differential in damage levels rather than any other factor.
Thus, although regression and instrumentation may have affected the levels of
damage recorded, making it difficult to compare with pre-1981 statistics, this
method shows that, despite this, the Act does seem to have reduced damage levels.
Better data is available from the Site Integrity Monitoring Scheme. "This
indicates that 40% of sites visited showed deterioration or damage, and 21% were
under threat" (Rowel1,1992:1). However, the Act is only directed towards damage
and not deterioration so it would be unrealistic to use these figures when assessing
the Act.
The question that must then be addressed is whether the types of damage that the
Act was intended to reduce actually account for this reduction. The Act was
primarily directed towards the reduction of damage from agricultural / forestry
operations. The 1980 survey levels were:
Agriculture 51% - Of this 15% was related to failure to carry out beneficial
activities. This is probably equivalent to damage that is now classified as
neglect or insufficient management.
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Industry 21% - This included mineral working, tipping, laying pipelines,
residential building and industrial pollution. Apart from the pollution
element, most of this would now be included in the category of damage by
planning permission.
Fire 16% - This included vandalism and badly controlled muirburn. Some
of this damage would therefore now be counted as agricultural as fire is no
longer a separate category.
Forestry 4%
Recreation 4%
Other 4% - This included damage by water authorities and vehicles.
Thus, the figure of 51% for agricultural damage is likely to have been higher in
reality when the levels of damage from badly controlled muirburn are included.
51% can therefore be regarded as the minimum proportion of damage caused by
agriculture before 1981.
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Figure 3.
In order to compare these results with the 1980 survey it is necessary to combine
the figures for agriculture and insufficient management in the years 1989-94
because they were both included in one category in the 1980 survey. The effect of
this is to give an average over the period 1983-94 of 44.76%. This seems to be a
reduction on the minimum of 51% shown in 1980. However, this method suffers
from the problem that if in one particular year a high incidence of another type of
damage is recorded other types of damage drop as a proportion of total damage
even if there has been no real change in levels. This seems to be a possible
explanation for the drop in 1986-7 with the high levels of recreational damage
recorded. In addition, problems of instrumentation arise because lack of
management or insufficient management is much more widespread than the
published figures suggest as it is only recorded in England. When this is
combined with the numerous changes in classification of damage between 1983
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and 1986 it is impossible to theorise why agricultural damage seemed to diminish
in these years and then subsequently increase.
One way to avoid these problems is to consider instead the proportion of sites
damaged by agriculture each year. This will not be affected by an increase in
other types of damage.
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Figure 4.
The drop in damage levels for 1985-86 can be explained by the enactment of the
WACAA 1985 which closed the three month loophole before designation. The
1989/90 increase is related to the increased recording in that year, particularly of
chronic damage through over grazing in the uplands. In 1980 7.6% of sites were
damaged by agriculture according to the special survey (Moore 1987). Thus the
proportion of sites being damaged by agriculture has fallen. However, as figure 3
shows agriculture has not fallen as a proportion of total damage. This may
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indicate that figure 4 only shows a reduction because damage levels in general
have fallen rather than that the Act has been successful in reducing agricultural
damage specifically.
This is confirmed when making a comparison between notified and non-notified
sites for both agricultural damage and damage caused by planning permission
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This indicates that levels of damage by agriculture are reduced for notified sites,
thus indicating that the Act is having an impact. However, if this impact was a
consequence of the restrictions imposed. levels of damage through planning
permission should be the same for both types of sites as both are subject to the
same regime. As can be seen from Figure 6 this is not the case.
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Figure 6.
Planning permission is to an extent outside the Act because of the defence to
section 28(5) liability and there should, therefore, be no difference between
notified and non-notified sites. This indicates that the particular restrictions
imposed in the Act do not explain the reduction in damage levels. However, some
of the difference may be explained by the fact that activities covered by planning
permission are likely to be on the PDO list. Even though owners do not have to
notify their intentions to carry out such activities, because of the defence in
section 28(8)(a), they may often do so because they are listed on the notification
documents. This would, therefore, give the NC an opportunity to conclude a
management agreement with the landowner which they may not have for non-
notified sites. However, this cannot account for such a large discrepancy between
damage levels.
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It must be some characteristic of the Act which has caused this impact because
both types of site are subject to the problems of regression and instrumentation,
and are affected by the characteristics of the addressees and changes in context. If
it is not the specific restrictions that account for this then it must be the positive
side of the Act - management agreements.
SSSIs protected by management agreements
Figure 7.
Since 1985-86 there has been a sharp increase in the number of management
agreements that have been entered into. This has been explained by Wyn Jones of
EN as a consequence of a change in administrative practice. Until the mid 1980s
there was a tendency to use long term agreements executed under seal for 21 year
periods. These were not very flexible for EN or the farmer. Farmers wanted
shorter agreements so as not to have to commit themselves for so long. Therefore,
3 year agreements were introduced. Administratively it is better for the
conservation agencies to have 3 year than 21 year agreements because of the
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ability to review them earlier. Farmers were more willing to commit themselves
for a shorter period so the uptake of agreements rose. Also as the average cost has
fallen the NC has greater resources to enter these agreements. According to the
National Audit Office (1994:21) "the average cost per hectare has fallen from
£100 for agreements started in 1885-86 to £30 for those started in 1991-92. This
is partly as a result of falling agricultural profitability but also due to a toughening
of English Nature's negotiating stance".
However, despite this rise in numbers of agreements, the area covered by these
agreements remains small. This is because, according to Wyn Jones, it is easier to
secure management on small areas than on large ones. When this is combined
with the fact that most SSSIs in England 105 are small and fragmented the anomaly
is explained.
When the uptake of management agreements is compared to the difference
between rates of damage to notified and non-notified sites there seems to be a
correlation.
105 which accounts for the majority of agreements.
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As more notified sites are covered by management agreements, rates of damage
are reduced on notified sites and in comparison rates of damage to non-notified
sites appear higher. Thus the Act has reduced levels of damage through the
positive side of the controls - management agreements.
However, the difference between damage to notified and non-notified sites is not
constant. This does not defeat the theory proposed because the variations are
capable of explanation. In the period 1983-85, levels of damage were higher for
non-notified sites because of the 3 month loophole. The Act actually encouraged
damage on non-notified sites so that both types of site were not subject to the
same conditions. Otherwise it can be contended that levels of damage would have
been approximately the same. In 1985 the WACAA was introduced which
accounts for the decrease in the different rates of damage. This brings the levels
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of damage to the two types of site within 0.56% indicating that, but for the
loophole, rates of damage on both types of site would have been equivalent.
After this point the only distinguishing feature that can account for the difference
is management agreements. It cannot be the restrictions, as the levels of damage
through planning permission in Figure 6 show. This is consistent with the
conclusion reached on the characteristics of legislation, that there was no deterrent
effect from the restrictions but that there was an incentive effect.
This has also led to another impact on damage levels. Because management
agreements are being entered into by so many landowners, levels of long term
damage are also falling.
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Figure 9.
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The current levels of long term damage are generally accounted for by damage
through planning permission. The 1988-89 peak for non-notified sites correlates
to the increase in damage through planning permission to those sites in Figure 6.
In 1993-94 damage by activities given planning permission accounted for 72% of
the area suffering partial or whole site loss. Over the whole period, such activities
have accounted for 43% by number of sites wholly or partially lost. These large
numbers are obviously of some concern. According to Rowell (1992:22) "A
significant proportion of this can be ascribed to continuing peat extraction" which
is outside the terms of the Act. Despite the drop in levels of long term damage on
notified sites, this may not continue. "As the majority of short term damage106
results from inappropriate management such as over-gazing and is recorded year
after year on the same sites, it is clear that appropriate management is not being
applied" (Rowell, 1992:1). It is likely that levels of long term damage will
increase as these sites continue to suffer damage and are no longer retrievable.
Because of their incomplete nature, it is unwise to rely solely on the statistical
figures available when assessing the impact of the WACA. "Because only part of
the SSSI resource was monitored these figures must be considered to be minima.
They do, however, provide useful indications of the nature, relative severity and
causes of damage" (NCC,1990:21). It can be ascertained that damage has
reduced, even if we cannot tell by how much and that the nature of damage has
changed with less long term damage occurring. Reports from the conservation
106 Sites which have suffered short term damage should recover within 15 years given effective
and appropriate management.
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agencies and other sources have therefore been considered in order to confirm the
impact shown.
According to the NC there has been an impact on attitudes of those subject to the
legislation. "A trend of improvement has been established, and within the main
land and natural resource user groups there has been increased willingness to
consider the needs of nature conservation in the pursuit of primary objectives.
The concern to make contributions or at least concessions to nature conservation
... is evident in the greater responsiveness of government departments and
agencies, public utilities, local authorities, relevant parts of industry and business,
landowners and occupiers and their organisations" (NCC,1984:44). Thus part of
the reduction across both types of site may be attributable to such changes in
attitudes.
During the 1984-85 session, the House of Commons Select Committee on the
Environment reported on the Operation and Effectiveness of the Aet na. The
committee also believed that the Act was working well ms and did not recommend
any radical changes to the provisions. They wholeheartedly s upported the
voluntary approach, believing that there had been a change of mood in the farming
community in favour of conservation, the impact of the act was positive 109. They
107 Initially the Committee had intended to consider the working of the whole of the Act, but
limited itself to only Part II, which they considered to be the 'crux of the legislation'. They did this
because of a 'sense of urgency, fostered by the need to deal as soon as possible with the loopholes'.
Some of these loopholes were dealt with by the 1985 Amendment Act, however, not all of them
were and the report does give a good picture of how the Act was working in 1985.
108 Despite reservations about the loopholes.
109 Any attempt to impose new duties or controls was viewed as unnecessary and antagonistic.
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viewed the lack of compulsion in the Act as a positive thing, and "the only way to
develop good will towards conservation in the farming community and a stable
system of consent and common purpose in the long term" (chapter2,paral 0). At
the time this seemed unfounded but given the results shown in Figure 8 it is
justified.
One area where there has not been a significant change in approach has been in
relation to statutory undertakers where levels of damage have remained rather
high. However, the problem is restricted to certain undertakers. As Rowell
(1992:49) points out, "All incidents attributed to statutory undertakers were
undertaken or authorised by water authorities or internal drainage boards"
(Rowel1,1992 :49).
5) CONCLUSIONS ON IMPACT
The impact shown has been a reduction of damage to an average of 4.7%110.
Within this there has been a decrease in long term damage as a proportion of total
damage. There has been little overall change in proportion of damage which is
agricultural but there has been a decrease in long term agricultural damage. There
has been a decrease in the proportion of sites suffering damage through activities
given planning permission but the area suffering loss through this source is still
very high. There has been a widely commented on change in attitude by farmers
110 Although the actual figure may well be higher because of the lack of systematic recording of
damage.
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in favour of conservation and a large increase in the number of sites protected by
management agreements. However, there has been little increase in the actual
area protected.
"While it is impossible to say with certainty that the law produced a specific
change, it is often possible to say with a high degree of certainty that a particular
legal structure plus a particular series of administrative interventions resulted in a
certain change in behaviour patterns" (Lempert,1966:119). A change has been
shown to have occurred, but can we say with certainty that the SSSI provisions
were responsible?
The impact shown is a reduction in levels of damage.\ This is not specifically
linked to the type of damage that the Act was trying to control. Damage by most
activities carried out by the landowners themselves has fallen, as has long term
damage. However, it is not possible to tell what proportion of the damage
occurring is illegal under the terms of the Act. Withrington and Jones (1992)
estimate that less than half of the recorded damage constitutes breaches of the
provisions. It is a reduction in illegal damage and damage after the four month
moratorium that was hoped for.
One of the problems is that "the proportion of farmers abandoning their proposals
following NCC objections is not known" (Brotherton,1990:201). This is also
recognised by the National Audit Office (1994:15): "the fact that notification does
not always protect an individual site does not mean that designation is of little or
no value. For example there is no way of knowing how many proposals to
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develop on or near Sites of Special Scientific Interest have never been progressed
because of the notification, but it is likely to have a significant deterrent effect".
A detailed analysis of compliance has been conducted by Kohfeld & Likens
(1982). This puts into algebraic form the influences on compliance or non-
compliance in reaching an optimum level. Such optimum levels do exist because
there is a natural limit toward which compliance tends over time. The question
then is whether compliance with the Act has reached such an optimum level. If
so, a levelling out of the take up rate of management agreements and levels of
damage can be expected.
The reasons for the current levels are the number of management agreements and
the change in landowner attitudes. It seems more likely that the process of
formation of the legislation rather than the legislation itself was responsible for
this impact on landowners' behaviour". The effect of this is likely to have
reached its optimum level by now. If it is also unlikely that many more
management agreements will be concluded then the only way to reduce damage
levels is to alter the deterrence side of the system. The deterrent effects of the
provisions cannot be ascertained with the data available, even though the positive
ones can be shown.
111 As discussed earlier, the extensive involvement of the NFU in the formation of the legislation
and their diminishing influence have led them to pressure landowners to comply.
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According to Jacob (1980:70), "It is also likely that deterrence operates at a
threshold level. It may well be true that up to a certain point laws have no effect
on behaviour... Consequently, if one examines changes in the law or variations
that remain below a threshold, one may come to the false conclusion that law has
no effect. Unless one investigates a wide range of sanction levels, these threshold
effects are likely to go undetected". Thus the deterrent side of the WACA may be
below this threshold level.
"The results of site integrity monitoring are a relevant indicator of how well
notification protects sites. An English Nature analysis at five regions ... showed
that over half of sites visited in these regions in 1991-92 showed no change in
condition since the last visit. Improvements were recorded on about 20 per cent of
sites in all five regions, and some deterioration or damage was recorded on over
18 per cent of sites in each region" (National Audit Office,1994:13).
One of the biggest problems, as can be seen in Figure 3, is the large proportion of
damage caused by activities outside the SSSI protection. A large proportion of
this is attributable to recreational damage for example from off-road vehicles. A
substantial proportion of damage from planning permission is peat extraction in
pursuance of existing perpetual planning permissions which is outside the system.
"Although not numerous by comparison with agricultural activities, these
developments represent the most serious cases of damage" (Withrington &
Jones,1992: 97).
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There are also high rates of damage attributable to activities not properly covered
by the Act such as operations carried out by statutory bodies112, overgrazing by
commoners and damage by pollution from outside the site. "Cases of intentional
damage by owners and occupiers of SSSI land are relatively few and the great
majority of reported incidents are the result of past activities and decisions or are
caused by persons, such as commoners or the general public" (NCC,1990).
Thus "prosecution cannot be pursued in all cases of damage. An analysis by one
region ... showed that in 1991-92 only 21per cent of cases of loss and damage to
sites broke the law" (National Audit Office,1994:24). "Of the nine prosecutions
which have been sought six were decided in favour of the Nature Conservancy
Council and three against; two of the latter fell on technicalities relating to the
notification process. Fines imposed were small, ranging from £200 to £1,500.
Nevertheless English Nature believe that prosecution or the threat of it, and the
attendant publicity act as a deterrent" (National Audit Office,1994:24). Thus the
NC view prosecution more as a means to force an owner into a management
agreement' 13.
-
112 Especially in the water industry.
113 For example see the Sweet saga detailed in Withrington & Jones (1992).
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